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INTRODUCTION 
 
When I began this dissertation in 2009, the World Health Organization had just 
set the pandemic alert level at phase 5 for H1N1 (swine flu)—one step away from a full-
blown pandemic. News reports inundated us with information on this new viral strain that 
bears the name of the swine. All of a sudden, the order of consumption seemed to have 
reversed: the swine had found a way to consume our bodies. (This is why, at the 
beginning of the epidemic, American Meat Institute quickly put out a video on the 
Youtube reassuring the public of the safety of pork1—the hierarchy of consumption must 
be safeguarded!)  Surely, this was not the first time we bonded with a different species in 
the name of influenza—the bird made headlines long before the swine. Nonetheless, the 
swine flu appeared to be far more menacing as it conjured our deep-rooted contempt for 
this stout, cloven-hoofed animal.  
As we know, “swine” connotes greediness or uncleanness, and derivatively to 
“pig out” means to overindulge; “hogging” something means taking more than one’s fair 
share; an “oinker” is a person who eats greedily; and someone who “lives in a pigsty” 
keeps their domicile extremely untidy or unhygienic. But “pig” is also a derogatory name 
for a variety of people: chauvinist men, police officers, or even unattractive, promiscuous 
women—our “pig” has many faces.2 Significantly, “in pig” also means pregnant; while 
this phrase is usually applicable to a sow, it can also be used to derogatorily describe a 
                                                
1 “Pork is Safe and Not a Source of Influenza.” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gTDHCWCVtAg; 
last accessed on Oct. 19, 2010. 
 
2 Cf., Oxford English Dictionary, “pig, n.1” 
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pregnant woman.3 Moreover, apart from the usual “breeding like a rabbit” or “breeding 
like a rat,” “breeding like a pig” is also used to denigrate women who give birth to “too 
many” children. In light of this connection between pig and pregnancy, the scandal that 
has arisen over the “Octomom’s” plan to adopt a pet pig amidst the swine flu scare merits 
attention.  
The “Octomom,” Nadya Suleman, is famous for giving birth to her octuplets via 
in-vitro fertilization. Suleman reportedly claims that if she were to get a pet pig, “it would 
wear a diaper” and live outdoors “because of its smell.”4 People for the Ethical Treatment 
of Animals (PETA) quickly responded—and popularized the story—by imploring 
Suleman to reconsider her plan. In its typical biting tone, PETA pleads, “instead of 
adding another mouth to feed, we hope that she’ll focus on the 14 that she already has. 
And if compassion doesn’t change her mind, hopefully the fear of the pig flu will.”5 The 
blogosphere is full of jokes made at the expense of, and diatribes against, Suleman—one 
blogger is certain that Suleman is “trying to bring home the bacon,” New York Daily 
carries the story with the heading “Octuplet mom Nadya Suleman adding pet pig to huge 
brood?,” and the title of PETA’s article reads “And Pig Makes 15 for Octomom?”6 The 
pet pig is indicative of Suleman’s excessiveness.  
                                                
3 Cf., Oxford English Dictionary, “pig, n.1” 
 
4 UsMagazine broke the news, but the online article is no longer available. I am using the report from 
PETA here: http://www.peta.org/b/thepetafiles/archive/2009/04/28/And-Pig-Makes-15-for-Octomom.aspx 
; last accessed on Oct. 19, 2010. 
 
5 “And Pig Makes 15 for Octomom?” PETA. http://www.peta.org/b/thepetafiles/archive/2009/04/28/And-
Pig-Makes-15-for-Octomom.aspx; last accessed on Oct. 19, 2010. 
 
6 April 24, 2009. NYDailyNew.com. http://www.nydailynews.com/gossip/2009/04/24/2009-04-
24_octuplet_mom_nadya_suleman_wants_to_get_a_pet_pig.html 
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Strangely, the pig in this scandal seems to serve the role of a surrogate child. 
Apart from the bacon joke, the pig is spoken of as if it is a member of Suleman’s band of 
progeny: it is an addition to the existing “brood,” “another mouth” to be fed, and perhaps 
most tellingly, as suggested by Suleman’s own words, a diapered baby-substitute. The 
adoption of a pet pig, it seems, is yet another way of fulfilling Suleman’s baby obsession. 
Legal scholar Bridget J. Crawford also observes the slippage between Suleman’s children 
and the pet pig. In Animal Blawg, Crawford comments that Suleman may have been 
viewed “as an abnormal ‘hoarder’—first of children and potentially now of animals” 
(2009). As we know, even Suleman herself has been derided as an animal. Being dubbed 
“Octomom”—a label Suleman attempted to patent—she has been depicted as an octopus 
in numerous online images, with each of her arms reaching out to one of her octuplets. A 
zoo in Connecticut declared that it has its own “Octomom” when one of their sows gave 
birth to eight piglets, uniting Suleman and the sow by virtue of the wonder of multiple 
births.7 As such, while many ridicule Suleman’s plan, and PETA in particular questions 
her ability to care for a pet pig, the pig also deepens the perception of Suleman’s sow-like 
multiple births. The pig is at once a reminder of Suleman’s problematic motherhood and 
a testimony to her animality. (The plot thickens when, in 2010, Suleman agreed to put up 
a sign in her front yard to promote spaying and neutering animals—“Don't let your dog or 
cat become an ‘octomom.’ Always spay or neuter. PETA.”8) 
                                                
7 “Connecticut's Own Octomom-pig,” April 24, 2009. 
http://www.zooborns.com/zooborns/2009/04/connecticuts-own-octomompig.html 
 
8 “Octomom Nadya Suleman unveils spay and neuter sign for PETA on her front lawn,” May 19, 2010. LA 
Times. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/unleashed/2010/05/octomom-nadya-suleman-unveils-spay-and-
neuter-sign-for-peta-on-her-front-lawn.html 
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 It is significant that Suleman’s adoption drama took place amidst the swine flu 
scare. Recall PETA appeals to Suleman by invoking fear: “if compassion doesn’t change 
her mind, hopefully the fear of the pig flu will.” Leaving aside the curious notion that 
compassion and fear both lead to the same end, PETA’s statement highlights the 
precariousness of kinship. Strikingly, it suggests that membership to one’s family is 
predicated upon a contagion-free body, and in this case the pig flu—even if it’s just a 
threat—demarcates family and outsiders. The pet pig becomes an unfortunate delegate of 
the pig flu, threatening the wholesomeness of its supposed foster family (even if it were 
to be kept outdoors).  
The dynamics of the pig flu scare are certainly not contained within the Suleman 
adoption drama. Indeed, given the role the pig plays in Western culture, the impact of the 
swine flu on its imaginative landscape is considerable. Specifically, this new flu virus has 
tied us to an animal species that we have long disavowed. What does it mean for humans 
to be infected with the swine flu? What do we make of this transgression of species 
boundary? Once infected, do we become more swine-like—and perhaps, less human? It 
is noteworthy that during the early phrase of the outbreak, Israeli Health Minister Yakov 
Litzman attempted to rename “swine flu” as “Mexican flu,” as he deems the reference to 
pig “offensive” to both Islam and Judaism.9 It is as if the name itself carries a transitive 
property of uncleanliness, and being infected by a disease of the swine renders one 
unkosher. Moreover, questions of kinship become particularly relevant amidst the swine 
flu scare. At stake is not merely cross-species kinship (as in the case of the Suleman 
adoption drama), but also human kinship. For instance, how should we relate to those 
                                                
9 BBC News, April 27, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8021301.stm 
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who are infected, or those who might be infected? In Hong Kong, the first confirmed case 
of swine flu led to a one-week quarantine of the hotel where the carrier once stayed—300 
guests and staff were subjected to involuntary confinement for the entire week so a 
medical team could monitor their health.10 But even extreme measures such as this did 
not contain the virus, and as the virus continued to spread, the local government ended up 
sending infected patients to various campsites remote from the urban areas. In the U.S., 
the swine flu scare fueled discussion of border control; some had suggested that the U.S.-
Mexico border should be closed in order to contain the epidemic. The swine flu 
challenged human kinship by rendering the infected bodies suspect. Each of these 
infected bodies—bodies of our family, friends, neighbors, and guests—had become a 
threat that ought to be contained and isolated. 
 
*  *  * 
 
I introduce this dissertation with the swine flu scare and the Suleman adoption 
drama because they highlight the precariousness of kinship. But the animal in question—
the swine—is also significant. Within the history philosophy, there has been a long 
history of swine bashing. The pig is often summoned when the question of what is 
properly human is broached: In the Republic, Glaucon ridicules Socrates’ vision of the 
polis as “a city for pigs” (372d). Lacking conventional comforts such as couches and 
dinning tables, Socrates’ polis befits only the unsophisticated pigs. After all, delicacies 
                                                
10 BBC News, May 2, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8029871.stm 
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and comforts are the qualities that set human desires apart from that of pigs.11 Another 
famous man-versus-pig moment takes place in John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism. In his 
attempt to distance utilitarianism from a simplistic notion of hedonism, Mill declares that 
“[it] is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates 
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” (10). Mill sets up the fool as a clear contrast to the wise 
Socrates, just as the pig is to the human. Hedonism is deemed “philosophy of the swine” 
because it fails to distinguish pleasures that are properly human from other lowly—
beastly—pleasures. And the hierarchical distinction of higher and lower pleasures is 
informed by the supposed superiority of the human over the swine. Given the history of 
our philosophical prejudice against pigs, the swine flu scare in 2009 takes on new 
significance. Whereas in the past philosophers summoned the pig in their writings, this 
time the swine has summoned philosophers to rekindle questions of boundary and 
kinship.  
In this dissertation, I examine the role of kinship in language. My focus on 
language is motivated by the social-political significance of being a speaking subject in 
animal advocacy. Given the typical rhetoric of “giving a voice to the voiceless” in animal 
rights discourses, it is important to examine the implications of speaking for animals; in 
particular, we need to ask in what sense animals are “voiceless,” and more 
fundamentally, what it means to have a voice. While the first two chapters of my 
dissertation critically engage current discourses on animal rights, the third and fourth 
chapters articulate a theory of language that emphasizes kinship. I go against the grain of 
the usual interpretation of language as a capacity that allows us to reason. Instead, 
drawing from the works of Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein, I show that 
                                                
11 For a substantial discussion on the notion of the “city for pigs,” see McKeen (2004).    
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linguistic capacity is also a relational capacity. Language is that which enables us to 
develop kinship with others—including animal others. To illustrate the way language 
difference is employed to demarcate kinship in popular discourse, I close my dissertation 
with a chapter examining the relation between racism, language, and animal advocacy.  
 
*  *  * 
 
While the recent proliferation of discourses on animal ethics/animal philosophy 
has certainly enriched my research, it also makes the question of Why another 
dissertation on animals? more pressing. In chapter one I motivate my overall project by 
situating it within the larger animal rights literature. I demonstrate the urgent need to 
reevaluate the linguistic divide that has hitherto distinguished humans from animals. 
Specifically, I examine how the linguistic divide has shaped current discourses in animal 
ethics—philosophers continue to privilege speech in their advocacy of animal protection, 
despite their explicit dismissal of the moral relevance of language. Using Patricia 
Williams’ defense of the rights discourse as my point of departure, I show that the power 
of rights is very much informed by the power to speak. There is an ineliminable link 
between one’s ability to author one’s speech and the authority one derives from one’s 
rights. To buttress my etymological analysis, I use legal scholar Cass Sunstein’s 
argument for animals’ right to sue to showcase the connection between rights and speech. 
I show that the linguistic divide asserts itself at the very core of the rights discourse. 
A major part of this chapter addresses the problem of “speaking for animals.” 
Some philosophers have pointed out that the act of speaking for animals continues to 
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privilege humans because it presupposes a voice-silence binary. It sustains and reinforces 
a hierarchy of power that favors beings with speech. They suggest that a non-
anthropocentric animal ethic requires that we appreciate the voice—as well as the 
silence—of animals. While I am sympathetic to their concerns, I argue that a non-
anthropocentric ethics is a fantasy at best and a hindrance to animal liberation at worst. 
We cannot retreat from speaking for animals: I articulate the paradox of such a retreat by 
showing that the very refusal to represent animals also involves a representation of 
animals. So, instead of disavowing the authority of speech, I motivate my readers to 
consider an alternative theory of language that would best mitigate the potential violence 
of speaking for animals.  
Both chapters one and two problematize the current discourses on animal rights, 
but each has a different focus: chapter one revolves around issues of language and 
speaking subjects in animal advocacy, while chapter two addresses the topic of kinship 
directly. In chapter two, I turn to psychoanalysis to articulate an animal care ethic that 
will serve as an alternative to the mainstream animal rights discourse. To set up my 
argument, I investigate Freud’s study of infantile zoophobias. According to Freud, in 
nearly all cases of infantile animal phobias, the feared animal functions as a father figure. 
The feared animal takes on the prohibitive role as the father-substitute. With this in view, 
I show that mainstream discourse on animal rights unwittingly reinscribes a human-
animal relationship that is predicated on fear and prohibition.  
In light of the standard animal-father substitution mentioned above, Freud’s 
biography of Leonardo da Vinci stands out as a provocative exception. In this 
psychoanalytic biography, Freud examines da Vinci’s fascination with a vulture—only 
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this time the vulture is an androgynous creature that serves as a mother-substitute. More 
significantly, unlike other accounts of infantile zoophobia, the vulture has a nurturing 
rather than crippling effect on the infant da Vinci. With the story of the androgynous 
vulture, I argue that Freud’s interpretation of da Vinci opens up a new way to understand 
our relationships with animals—a way that Freud himself had not anticipated. Insofar as 
love and compassion also regulate behaviors, a promising animal ethic need not be 
governed by prohibitions and rights exclusively. In short, I analyze the significance of 
this deviant case of animal obsession and its ramifications for reconceiving the human-
animal relationship. 
Whereas chapter one focuses primarily on language and chapter two kinship, 
chapters three and four formally bring the two topics together by addressing the role of 
kinship in language. Chapter three revolves around Heidegger’s interpretation of the 
word “symbol” in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929/30), the work where 
he most extensively articulates the concept of the animal. Following Aristotle, Heidegger 
isolates “symbol” as the key ingredient of human discourse. He interprets “symbol” as 
the joining together of two things, and the primary example he uses to illustrate this 
“joining together” is the two halves of a friendship token rejoining together. Building on 
Heidegger’s etymological analysis of “symbol,” I show that the condition for discourse—
logos—is dependent on kinship. The upshot of my analysis is that linguistic capacity is 
tied to social capacities. Chapter four centers on the topic of identity, especially animal 
identity. The question of identity is intimately tied to the question of language, 
specifically the question of how we should speak for animals. Drawing on Jacques 
Derrida’s work, I introduce and substantiate the problems of identity politics and 
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standpoint theory within animal ethics. After articulating various identity issues, I move 
on to examine Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance. I show that the notion of 
family resemblance offers a fruitful way of understanding how we are related to animals.  
Despite its promises, the family metaphor is not without its limitations. In 
particular, the notion of family still does not escape the exclusionary logic that belies our 
relationship with animals. Furthermore, family is not immune to violence, as it can even 
be the site of insidious violence. To further complicate the notion of kinship and family, 
and especially the way animal kinship is built at the expense of human kinship, I return to 
popular animal rights discourses in my concluding chapter. There, I offer a critical 
analysis of animal advocacy in popular culture—with specific attention paid to racism. I 
examine the ways in which racist discourses appropriate the rhetoric of animal rights by 
analyzing The Cove, an Oscar-winning documentary that has mobilized the recent outcry 
over dolphin hunting in Japan. I argue that The Cove employs the typical racist tactic of 
dehumanization in order to racialize and marginalize the Japanese dolphin-hunters. 
Ironically, this tactic of dehumanization involves dramatizing the linguistic differences 
between the dolphin-rescuers and dolphin-hunters. As a result, The Cove unwittingly 
invokes the human-animal dichotomy in its dolphin advocacy.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
GIVING ANIMALS A HEARING: RIGHTS DISCOURSE AND ANIMAL 
REPRESENTATION IN ANIMAL ETHICS 
 
Logocentrism is first of all a thesis regarding the animal, the animal deprived of the 
logos, deprived of the can-have-the-logos.                 
Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I am  
 
 
I learned that the best way to give voice to those whose voice has been suppressed was to 
argue that they had no voice. 
     Patricia Williams, Alchemy of Race and Rights 
 
 
The Stoic retreated to the position that at least they don’t have syntax. The moral 
conclusion was meant to be ‘They don’t have syntax, so we can eat them.’  
    Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals 
 
In the Politics, Aristotle posits humans as the only animals endowed with speech, 
with logos. Aristotle’s definition of the human proliferates throughout the history of 
Western philosophy, where the human is often defined against other animals by virtue of 
this capacity to speak. This linguistic divide has been translated into an ontological 
  12 
hierarchy whereby the human is privileged over the animal—an ontological hierarchy 
that, many animal advocates contend, informs our treatment of animals.   
Against this philosophical backdrop, thinkers concerned with animal ethics have 
dutifully addressed this linguistic divide. Many of them have recourse to Jeremy 
Bentham’s famous line, “The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, 
Can they suffer?” 12  For Bentham, sentience, not language, entitles one to ethical 
considerations.13 Bentham’s view has been popularized by Peter Singer’s utilitarian 
defense of animal liberation,14 and is further reproduced by other works on animal rights. 
Richard Sorabji, for example, insists that the linguistic capacity of animals is “a point of 
the highest scientific interest, but of absolutely no moral relevance whatsoever” (1995, 
216). Gary Francione echoes Sorabji’s sentiment: “the short answer to the question posed 
by Nagel’s essay is who cares what it is like to be a bat? As long as the bat is sentient, 
then whatever other characteristics the bat has or does not have are irrelevant for the 
moral purpose of whether we should treat the bat exclusively as our resource” (2000, 
120). More recently, Francione responds to the claim that humans are uniquely linguistic 
with a simple question: “so what?” (2009, 8). Within the animal rights discourse, the 
question of linguistic difference is often deemed irrelevant to the issue of moral status.15 
                                                
12 Bentham (1823). Chap 17, section 1, footnote to paragraph 4. 
 
13 Garrett’s article (2007) on the origin of animal rights is helpful here. Having examined Francis 
Hutcheson’s pioneering work on animal rights and its influence on Bentham, Garrett concludes: “Instead of 
universal rights being expanded to include all types of rational, mature human beings, the non-cognitive 
ability to feel pain and pleasure became the focus, moving rights beyond reason and species to include all 
types of pain-avoiders and pleasure-seekers” (265). Derrida also offers a helpful analysis on how Bentham 
changes “the question” regarding the animal in philosophy (2008, 27-28). See also Napolitano (2010, 52-
54). 
 
14 Singer (2009, 7). 
 
15 See also Warren (1997, 61). 
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Some philosophers have made a different but related response to the linguistic 
divide— they muddle it by challenging its boundary.16 Their effort is twofold. On the one 
hand, they employ empirical studies of animal communication as evidence against this 
linguistic divide. Indeed, if dolphins can learn American Sign Language,17 if Koko the 
gorilla can make up new words, lie to her trainer, and even learn to rhyme,18 how can we 
insist on defining humans in terms of their capacity to speak? How can we maintain the 
exceptionality of humans by appealing to language? On the other hand, philosophers also 
point to “marginal cases,”19 cases where humans do not develop the capacity to speak. 
For these thinkers, if we are unwilling to exploit those humans who can’t speak, then 
linguistic difference clearly cannot be the justification for our exploitation of animals. 
Once again, the linguistic divide is shown to be an impertinent criterion for determining 
moral status.  
While the question of linguistic capacity is ritualistically addressed in the 
literature, it is usually broached in the context of demonstrating its moral irrelevance. (It 
is as if philosophers want to address the linguistic question in order to get it out of the 
way!) While I agree that linguistic capacity should not govern one’s moral status, in this 
chapter I want to look at the linguistic question from a different angle. Specifically, I 
want to consider the social-political significance of being a speaking subject in animal 
advocacy. Consider the typical rhetoric of “giving a voice to the voiceless” in animal 
advocacy, wherein the advocates and the animals are related dichotomously as speaking 
                                                
16 For a general account on how philosophers deal with the linguistic divide, see Steiner (2005, 18ff.). 
 
17 See Cavalieri (2001, 20); Wise (2002, 135-158).  
 
18 See Wise (2002, 207-230); Fellenz (2007, 46). 
 
19 Singer (2009, 14); Dombrowski (1997); Fellenz (2007, 46-47).  
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vs. voiceless. However, insofar as the task of an animal advocate involves speaking for 
the animal-other, the voice of the animal is trivialized at best and obliterated at worst. 
Indeed, advocating for animals underpins the linguistic hierarchy whereby the speaking 
humans are ranked above the dumb beasts.  
In what follows, I examine the rights discourse in animal ethics; I show that 
arguments for animal rights in current literature remain logocentric—the unwitting 
privileging of logos. And by showing the privileged status of language in the literature, I 
hope to rejuvenate discussions on the linguistic divide in the animal debate.20  
 
The Primacy of Rights/The Primacy of Speech 
Anyone who has taken a quick glance at a university library collection on animal ethics 
immediately notices the dominance of animal rights in the literature. Mainstream 
discussions on animal ethics are often narrowed to the question of whether animals have 
rights.21 Peter Singer’s seminal work Animal Liberation has had a tremendous influence 
on the animal rights movement—despite Singer’s claim that he is not arguing for the 
rights of animals.22 Feminist thinkers have noted and criticized the primacy of rights in 
animal ethics.23 Notably, in “Animal Rights and Feminist Theory,” Josephine Donovan 
argues that animal rights theories continue to rely on “mechanistic premises of 
                                                
20 In a recent article, Weil (2010) discusses the “animal turn” in academia. Her essay offers many helpful 
insights on issues of representation and the problem of speaking for animals.  
 
21 Wolfe (2010) offers a helpful analysis on rights discourse in the current framework of the animal debate. 
 
22 Singer (2009) considers critiques of animal rights “irrelevant to the case of Animal Liberation” because 
his argument for animal equality does not rest on the assumption of animals having rights (8).  
 
23 Donovan and Adams (2007) identify five major problems with the rights discourse (Introduction, esp. 4-
6). See also Adams (1994).  
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Enlightenment epistemology” (2007, 69). For instance, Tom Regan’s rights theory 
“inherently privileges rationality,” while Singer’s utilitarianism “requires a quantification 
of suffering . . . that falls back into the scientific modality that legitimates animal 
sacrifice” (2007, 64).24 In addition to the problematic lineage of the rights discourse, 
critics are worried that the insistence of extending rights to animals is just another form 
of humanism. Literary scholar Frances Bartkowski asks if the declaration of apes’ rights 
would “entail new and more intimate ways of enslaving their capacities for reciprocal 
attachment” (2008, 86). In “Of Mice and Men,” Catherine MacKinnon reminds us that 
“seeking animal rights on a ‘like-us’ model of sameness is misconceived” because we 
“miss animals on their own terms” (2004, 264).25 In other words, even animal rights can 
still be a token of humanism.  
In a more recent critique of animal rights, Kelly Oliver points out that the rights 
discourse often falls back on a line-drawing strategy in order to demarcate creatures with 
rights from those without rights (2009, 29). She wonders if the rights discourse can 
overcome the human-animal opposition, given that it rests on the logic of exclusion and 
binary opposition (2009, 29).26 To complicate the rights discourse even further, in this 
chapter I argue that the prioritization of rights in the literature is intertwined with the 
prioritization of language in the animal rights debate. The primacy of rights cannot be 
                                                
24 See also McKenna (1994); Kheel (2004). McKenna argues that Singer’s argument for vegetarianism 
prioritizes reason over emotion, while Kheel characterizes the primacy of rights as a “masculinist 
orientation” (336).     
 
25 Or, as Oliver (2009) puts it, “Just as feminists ask why women have to be like men in order to be equal, 
we can ask why animals have to be like us to have inherent value” (30). 
 
26 In his forward to Animal Rites, Mitchell makes a similar point about this problem. He articulates the 
paradox of animal rights as follows, “The very notion of ‘animal rights,’ to begin with, seems impossible 
insofar as it is modeled on human rights, because the very idea of human rights . . . is predicated on the 
difference between humans and animals” (2003, ix).  
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separated from the primacy of language and the privileging of linguistic beings. I will 
examine, first of all, the linkage between language and the effect of rights.  
In The Alchemy of Race and Rights, Patricia Williams responds to the critique of 
rights from Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholars. She defends the rights discourse by 
speaking of the empowering effect of rights. For her, “one’s sense of empowerment 
defines one’s relation to the law” (1991, 148). While those who are already empowered 
by rights can afford to move beyond the rights discourse, those who have been deprived 
of rights still find the rights language desirable: “‘Rights’ feels new in the mouths of most 
black people. It is still deliciously empowering to say” (1991, 153, 164). Here, I am 
particularly interested in the empowering effect of rights. What does it mean to be 
empowered? Can we speak of empowerment for the animal? (What would that look like? 
How would we recognize it?) According to the OED, to empower means “to invest 
legally or formally with power or authority; to authorize, license.” I emphasize 
“authority” here because of the etymological kinship between authority and authorship27 
– having power means having the power to speak.28 Thus empowerment connects rights 
to the ability to author one’s own speech, to speak for oneself. As Williams puts it, an 
expansion of rights “[gives] voice to those people or things that . . . historically have had 
no voice” (1991, 160). Rights give us a say; and without rights, we may as well be dumb 
animals. It is noteworthy that in her defense of rights, Williams compares her great-great-
                                                
27 Hobbes, of course, famously points out this connection in Leviathan, chapter 16. Following Benveniste, 
Bourdieu also reminds us of the connection between “auctoritas” and “auctor” in Language and Symbolic 
Power (1991, 222).  
 
28 In addition to “authority,” the word “dictatorship” also intimates the connection between power and 
speech. According to the OED, to “dictate” means “to put into words which are to be written down; to 
utter, pronounce, or read aloud to a person.” But it also means “to prescribe (a course or object of action); 
to lay down authoritatively; to order, or command in express terms.”  
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grandmother Sophie (who was a slave) to a wild fox. According to Williams, whether a 
slave or a fox, “rights over them never filtered down to them; rights to their persons were 
never vested in them” (1991, 156). In light of the connection between rights and speech, 
how should we understand the empowering effects of animal rights? Does it mean letting 
animals speak for themselves? Must animals write for their rights?  
In addition to Williams’ defense of rights, Jacques Derrida’s reading of Leviathan 
in The Beast and the Sovereign also highlights the connection between rights and speech. 
In his posthumously published seminars, Derrida complicates the relationship among law, 
rights, and speech. Derrida’s reading of Leviathan is characteristically rich, but for the 
purpose of this chapter I will focus specifically on the following passage from Leviathan: 
To make Covenant with bruit Beasts, is impossible; because not 
understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any 
translation of Right; nor can translate any Right to another: and without 
mutuall acceptation, there is no Covenant.  (2009, 55, Derrida’s emphasis) 
 
Here we once again see how rights and speech intertwine. In Hobbes’ view, animals do 
not enter into the covenant because they do not have language; and lacking language, 
they cannot accept any “translation of right.”29 As Derrida highlights in this passage, a 
key element of language is this ability to “accept”—the ability to respond and reciprocate 
(2009, 55). Without this responsivity, animals can neither “accept” rights nor commit 
themselves to the covenant. Interestingly, Derrida observes that animals are not the only 
beings excluded in Hobbes’ account of the covenant—God is also excluded in this 
covenant of men. More strikingly, God is excluded for the same reason as animals are 
excluded—neither God nor animals respond and reciprocate (2009, 55-57).  
                                                
29 Because animals do not have language and cannot make covenants with humans, Hobbes also claims that 
humans cannot do injustice to animals (Francione 2000, 123n51).  
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  It is by drawing a parallel between the silence of God and the silence of the 
beasts that Derrida disrupts the speech-silence hierarchy. He helps us see that silence (or 
irresponsiveness) is not always the mark of the dumb beasts. Indeed, if God has a “right” 
to be silent, if God’s sovereignty is expressed in this asymmetry of responsiveness, then 
why do we insist that the irresponsiveness of the animal is a defect, a lack, and even a 
justification for their exploitation? How does silence get bifurcated into the silence of the 
privileged and the silence of the oppressed?30 More importantly, if we perceive God’s 
silent treatment as an exercise of power, can we also perceive animals’ silence as 
powerful and meaningful in its own right? (I will revisit the question of silence later.) 
In his reading, Derrida also observes that insofar as God and animals are excluded 
from the covenant, they both occupy a space external to the law. He even compares their 
“being-outside-the-law” status to that of the criminals (2009, 17). Whether “ignorant of 
right” or “having the right to suspend right,” neither the animals nor God are subjects 
of—hence subjected to—the law (2009, 33). Thus far, the animal rights movement has 
responded dutifully to this “outside-the-law” status of animals. For animal rights 
advocates, the answer to the suffering of animals lies in undoing their “outlawed” status 
by including them in our “covenant,” our law. They tell us that it does not matter whether 
animals can respond to our rights (once again, we see the Benthamian line invoked); what 
matters is that we can respond to theirs. At first glance, animal rights advocates appear to 
be at odds with Hobbes by including animals in the covenant. However, as we will see, 
the expansion of rights to animals reinforces, rather than challenges, the linguistic divide 
that defines the Hobbesian covenant from the beginning.  
                                                
30 It is noteworthy that animal advocates are often accused of anthropomorphism when they speak for the 
animals, while the term “anthropomorphism” referred initially to the act of attributing human qualities to 
deities.    
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To further illustrate the logocentrism of the rights discourse, I want to turn to the 
enforcement (or the lack thereof) of animal rights. In “Can Animals Sue?” legal scholar 
Cass Sunstein points out that even though anticruelty laws do exist to protect animals, 
these laws are not enforced as often as they should be. This is because enforcement takes 
place only through public prosecution, and animal protection is generally a low priority 
for prosecutors (2004, 252-253). To address this “enforcement gap,” Sunstein argues, 
“private citizens should be given the rights to bring suit to prevent animals from being 
treated in a way that violates current law . . . animals should be permitted to bring suit, 
with human beings as their representatives, to prevent violations of current law” (252).31 
In our judicial system, the interests and desires of animals must be mediated by a human 
representative—a representative who speaks in legal lingo and not in an animal voice. As 
such, the voice of the animal is obliterated at the very moment we give it a hearing.   
While the primacy on “rights” in the literature is expedient for legislating against 
animal cruelty and institutionalizing animal protection, it comes at a cost. Specifically, 
the focus on rights obscures the power relation on which animal exploitation rests. In this 
context, critiques of liberal rights theory seem particularly relevant. 32  Catherine 
MacKinnon has argued that granting rights to members of oppressed groups only 
guarantees their equality formally, but it does not necessarily bring about actual equality 
                                                
31 It is interesting that Sunstein proposes a different solution to this “enforcement gap” in a more recent 
article, Leslie and Sunstein (2010, 122ff.). In it he suggests that we adopt “disclosure of information as a 
regulatory tool” (123). Such a disclosure can be done through, for example, a “labeling system” (136). 
Food labels are supposed to inform consumers of the practice of a given meat supplier, and the point is that 
“consumers [would be] empowered to make food choices that take into account their preferences for 
different levels of animal welfare” (136).  
 
32 For a helpful summary on CLS scholars’ critiques on rights, see Schneider (1990); Schwartzman (1999). 
In many cases, critiques of liberal rights overlap with feminist critiques of animal rights. 
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if the structure of power remains untouched.33 Wendy Brown makes a similar point: 
“while [rights] formally mark personhood, they cannot confer it; while they promise 
protection from humiliating exposure, they do not deliver it” (1995, 127). Although 
MacKinnon and Brown are concerned with human rights in their respective works, the 
point they make is relevant to the animal rights debate. Indeed, the “enforcement gap” 
articulated by Sunstein shows precisely the discrepancy between the granting of rights 
and the exercising of rights. Even though animals are granted certain rights (or 
protections) in our legal system, these rights are not necessarily accessible to them. And 
their lack of access to these rights stems in large part from their inability to make claims 
(with a language that is recognized by the court). As a result, the extension of rights to 
animals has real force only if there is a human representative to speak for the animals, 
and this dependence on a human representative reinforces the existing power hierarchy. 
Ironically, the enforcement of animal rights trades on, and exacerbates, the linguistic 
divide that has segregated humans and animals in the history of philosophy.  
 
The Problem of Speaking for Animals 
In Cass Sunstein’s vision of the animal plaintiff, the human representative speaks on 
behalf of animals in order to further animal welfare. However, it is important to keep in 
mind that animal advocates are not the only ones speaking for animals. As laboratory 
veterinarian Larry Carbone reminds us, within the debate of animal research, research 
advocates also speak on behalf of animals in order to justify animal experimentation 
(2004, 4). Just like animal protectionists, research advocates also claim knowledge and 
expertise with regard to the desires, preferences, and interests of animals—despite the 
                                                
33 This particular critique by MacKinnon is presented by Schwartzman (1999, 34).  
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fact that these two groups have conflicting goals.34 As such, speaking for animals is 
necessary for both animal liberation and animal exploitation. 
Now, the very act of speaking for others, even if well-intended, can still be a form 
of violence. For one thing, it is hard to listen when we are too busy speaking. And it may 
be difficult to appreciate silence—to see that silence is already pregnant with meaning—
when we feel compelled to “give voice” to the voiceless. (As Derrida argues, silence can 
even be an exhibition of power—God’s silent treatment, for instance.) Stephen Laycock 
articulates the problem of giving voice to animals as follows. 
We insert ourselves at the heart of the purported alterior subjectivity, there 
to speak for the mute, to give voice to the silent—to give (or rather 
impose), that is, our own voice, not to offer the animate Other a vehicle 
whereby it may express itself. And to substitute voice for silence is the 
clearest demonstration that we have not yet attuned ourselves to the 
silence beyond “silence,” to the fact that “silence” is still the term of a 
binary conceptual contrast. (1999, 277) 
 
As Laycock rightly puts it, the problem of speaking for animals goes beyond the risk of 
projection. This is because when we insist on speaking for others, we implicitly subscribe 
to the voice-silence binary. We sustain and reinforce the hierarchy of power that favors 
beings with speech—human beings. Feminist theorist Linda Alcoff has also cautioned 
against the impetus to speak for others. For her, the practice of speaking for others is 
often “born of a desire for mastery,” and those who speak for the other often reinscribe 
the hierarchy that privileges the speaker in the first place (1991, 29). Accordingly, “the 
impetus to speak must be carefully analyzed and . . . fought against” (1991, 24). It is 
important that we interrogate our own investment in speaking for others, and how 
                                                
34 As Carbone points out, “[both] animal protectionists and scientists claimed to speak for the reality of the 
lives of research animals” (2004, 169). For example, animal protectionists describe “unspeaking tortures” 
in research labs, while some research advocates claim that “not all fatal toxicity studies are painful to the 
animal subjects” (2004, 169). 
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speaking for others may sustain the privileged position that we assume. Speaking for 
animals can become a form of “paternalism,” a “human chauvinism” that inhibits genuine 
openness to the animal other (Laycock 1999, 279).  
Certainly, the speaking for others problem is not exclusive to the animal 
protection movement.35 In “Of Mice and Men,” Catherine MacKinnon points out that it is 
a problem common to women’s issues as well as animals’: “Just as it has not done 
women many favors to have those who benefit from the inequality defining approaches to 
its solution, the same might be said of animals. Not that women’s solution is animals’ 
solution. Just as our solution is ours, their solution has to be theirs” (2004, 270). I will 
return to the distinction between women’s solution and animals’ solution later. At the 
moment I want to focus on the notion of “animal solution.” First of all, what counts as an 
“animal solution”? And if there is an animal-proper solution, how do we recognize it? 
What (and whose) standard do we use to measure the success of an animal solution? 
MacKinnon suggests that we consider “what it would do to the discussion if [animals] 
spoke for themselves” (270, emphasis mine). So it seems that an animal solution requires 
us to listen to the animals. Here, MacKinnon tries to problematize the linguistic divide: at 
stake is not whether animals can speak, but whether we can understand them when they 
speak, and “what it will take to learn the answer [from the animals]” (270). The burden is 
therefore on us instead of the animals. I take MacKinnon’s point to be an invitation to 
rethink our approach to animal ethics. That is, we need a more fluid and creative notion 
of “speaking” (and “listening”).  
                                                
35 In fact, in Alcoff’s critique, the “others” in the speaking for others problem are not animal others. 
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It is perhaps instructive to compare MacKinnon’s invitation to Laycock’s 
recommendation to philosophers. After chastising philosophers for “paternalism” and 
“human chauvinism,” Laycock writes, 
It is no excuse to complain that in attending the Other’s voice we hear 
nothing, that we must speak for the Other because the animate Other 
cannot speak for itself, that the screen would be blank without our own 
projection. Let the screen lapse into imageless blankness. Let all lapse into 
silence. (279, emphasis mine) 
 
While MacKinnon’s invitation is sensitive to the violence of speaking for animals, I 
wonder what it means to have animals “speak for themselves.” And despite Laycock’s 
poetic appeal, I wonder what might be the material force of “lapsing into silence,” 
especially when it comes to transforming our relationship with animals on the ground. 
More specifically, my worry is twofold. First, how can we guarantee that this “lapsing 
into silence” would not lapse into an excuse to retreat from standing up for the powerless 
and the oppressed? How can we tell the difference between silence and indifference? 
Alcoff reminds us that retreating from speaking for others may “significantly undercut 
the possibility of political effectivity” (1991, 17). And we must ask ourselves, how can 
we stop violence against animals when we get caught up in the violence of speaking for 
them? Second, suppose that “letting animals speak” does not collapse into a disavowal of 
responsibility, and that it still calls for our response. Now, in order to make such 
responses we must first translate the animal’s voice into our terms. But as long as 
translation is involved, the claim that we should let animals speak for themselves seems 
vacuous, if not disingenuous. Similarly, “lapsing into silence” still calls for an 
interpretation—a human interpretation—of this silence. In the end, MacKinnon’s and 
Laycock’s recommendations may turn into mere self-congratulatory gestures that cover 
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up the projection and interpretation involved in our translation of their voices or silence. 
What we posit as the “animal solution” may remain an anthropocentric solution; we may 
continue to put words in their mouths even if we claim otherwise.36  
Finally, I want to reflect on this tendency to valorize the voice of animals (by 
insisting that animals should speak for themselves). Here, Larry Carbone’s observation 
on the tradition of academic writing is helpful.  
Scientists (and scholars in many fields) use the impersonal passive voice 
in their writing as a sign of their attempts to remove their particular 
interests and biases from their project at hand. They pose as mere 
bystanders, objectively reporting nothing but the facts, dispassionately 
explaining what those facts mean. Nature speaks through them. (2004, 16) 
 
Following Carbone’s critique of the “academic voice,” we must ask, are we valorizing 
the animal’s voice because we want to remove ourselves—as well as our anthropocentric 
interests—from our writings on animals? And just as scientists imagine that “nature 
speaks through them,” are we not in some way supposing that animals can “speak 
through” us? But if “facts” are imbued with the interpreter’s interests, then “animal 
voices” are also subjected to the biases of the translator. As such, even though the appeal 
to let animals speak may curb our impulse to speak for animals, it does not eradicate the 
anthropocentric biases implicit in our representation of their voice.  
In “How To Do Things With Animals,” literary scholar Karen Raber remarks: “It 
is the peculiar fate of animal studies that the subjects of its liberationist impulses will not 
speak up” (2008, 107). And as a result, “paternalism and repressive displacement” seem 
                                                
36 In a recent article on elephant communication, Phillips wonders how we can represent the behavior or the 
mental states to which we have only partial access (2010, 37). He also highlights the problem of 
“scriptability,” which involves the question of “whether animal behavior . . . can be written (or written 
about) in the first place” (2010, 34).  
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inevitable in our representation of animals (2008, 107).37 Historian Erica Fudge also 
speaks of the impossibility of writing a “history of the inarticulate” (2002, 6). Even 
though there is a history of human representation of animals, there is no “history of the 
animal” because animals do not write their own history (2002, 5). And for philosophers, 
the question becomes this: Is a philosophy of the animal possible? If a history of the 
animal requires documents left by the animals (Fudge 2002, 5), then does a philosophy of 
the animal require thoughts thought by the animals? Can we philosophize about animals 
without any anthropocentric investment and projection?   
Although I have highlighted the connection between rights and speech in the 
previous section, the speaking for others problem clearly does not belong to the rights 
discourse alone. As long as we write and talk about animals, we are constructing their 
perspectives and representing their positions.38 In fact, even the appeal that we should let 
animals speak for themselves involves a representation of their desire, namely, the desire 
that they prefer speaking to being spoken of (a desire that, I must add, betrays our own 
bias to speech and our self-identification as linguistic animals). My point is not that 
MacKinnon and Laycock have misrepresented the preference of animals, and that animals 
would have preferred a spokesperson. Rather, my point is that representation is inevitable 
even in the most radical rejection of representation.    
At this juncture, we begin to see where the problem of speaking for animals 
departs from the problem of speaking for women. And although Alcoff’s treatment of the 
                                                
37 Carbone makes a similar claim regarding animal welfare policy: “What sets animal welfare policy 
studies apart from most other policy studies is that animals have no direct voice. They enter policy 
dialogues only through those people who would speak for them (2004, 5).” 
 
38 Here, Alcoff’s discussion of the distinction between “speaking for others” and “speaking about others” is 
helpful. She argues that the distinction is not necessarily clear-cut. For her, both practices involve “the act 
of representing the other’s needs, goals, situation, and in fact, who they are” (1991, 9). And for her, each 
representation is “the product of interpretation” (1991, 9). 
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speaking of others problem has been instructive, we also begin to see its limits when this 
“other” is an animal rather than a woman. Following Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Alcoff 
makes the following recommendation: “We should strive to create wherever possible the 
conditions for dialogue and the practice of speaking with and to rather than speaking for 
others” (1991, 23, emphases mine). Put differently, those who are in the position to speak 
must seek to democratize the conversation by ensuring that the “other” has a chance to 
speak, too. Now, it seems that we have already created “conditions for dialogue” when it 
comes to human-animal communication. As noted, Koko the gorilla has learned how to 
sign, and captive dolphins have learned to read a version of the American Sign Language. 
But even in these relatively successful examples, the “conversation” is far from being 
egalitarian. In the case of Koko, she was given a chance to speak only on the condition 
that she speaks (signs) our language. So a dialogue with Koko is legitimized only by the 
valorization of human language. Our “dialogue” with dolphins is even more precarious. 
As an underwater acoustic consultant points out in an Oscar-winning documentary The 
Cove, it is ironic that we teach dolphins American Sign Language—given that dolphins 
do not have hands, communication is reduced to a one-way process right from the 
beginning. Surely, we may create “conditions for dialogue” not by teaching animals 
human speech, but by attending to their specific body languages and social habits. But in 
order to make sense of these body languages and social habits, interpretation (or 
translation) is once again necessary. At the end, the distinction between speaking with 
animals and speaking for animal may simply collapse.  
I want to return to an earlier quote from MacKinnon. Considering the significance 
of feminist issues to animal issues, MacKinnon notes: “Not that women’s solution is 
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animals’ solution. Just as our solution is ours, their solution has to be theirs” (2004, 270). 
Even though it is unclear what MacKinnon has in mind with regard to this “animal 
solution” (or how we can gauge the success of this solution), her comment remains 
instructive. While feminists can do feminist things with words,39 animals do not do 
beastly things with words. While feminists participate in the language game of patriarchy 
in order to subvert it and expose its weaknesses, animals don’t write pamphlets or 
articulate their positions. To put it more bluntly, while women and members of other 
oppressed groups eventually speak for themselves, animals do not relieve us of the 
burden of speaking for them, nor do they relieve us of the resultant guilt of “human 
chauvinism.”40 Speaking for animals, it seems, is inevitable, even if it is problematic and 
distasteful. The clichéd notion of the linguistic divide reasserts itself even as we attempt 
to problematize it. 
That animals do not lift our burden of representing them also presents a 
significant challenge for the postmodern project of de-centering the human.41 In response 
to theorists who seek to destabilize the human-animal divide from a postmodern, 
“posthumanist”42 perspective, Karen Raber articulates what she deems a “problematic 
desire” in animal studies, “a desire for a world in which humans and animals live in 
happy harmony without exploitation or abuse” (2008, 100). According to Raber, not only 
do the post-humanists fail to interrogate their own utopianism, they also harbor a “fantasy 
                                                
39 Hendricks and Oliver (1999). 
 
40 See Raber (2008, 107). 
 
41 For a helpful discussion on the post-structuralist, postmodern project of de-centering the human, see 
Raber (2008, 99-101).  
 
42 Wolfe describes the posthumanist project as “challenging the ontological and ethical divide between 
humans and non-humans that is a linchpin of philosophical humanism” (2008, 8). 
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of the post-cruel” in their utopianism, a “desire to eradicate human abuse of animals in all 
forms” (2008, 106).43  
This “fantasy of the post-cruel” is certainly not exclusive to theorists with 
posthumanist, postmodern sensibilities. Animal rights advocates such as Tom Regan and 
Gary Francione have long argued for the abolition of the use of animals (so they go much 
further than the “post-cruel” approach), and their subscription to the rights discourse can 
hardly be characterized as “posthumanist” or “postmodern.” Interestingly, even though 
this “fantasy of the ‘post-cruel’” is shared by many, it poses a challenge unique to the 
posthumanist, postmodern thinkers. For Raber, this fantasy that we can be cruel-free is 
fundamentally at odds with the project of the posthumanist because “to reject cruelty [is] 
to reject the animal that we are—to reinstate human exceptionalism with all its attendant 
problems” (2008, 106). A question that animal advocates often face is why we should 
respect animals’ rights when they don’t respect ours.44 And the response of animal 
advocates inevitably falls back on some version of human exceptionalism. (E.g., unlike 
animals, we are capable of being ethical, therefore we should.45) In a way, this fantasy of 
the post-cruel is a different expression of the fantasy of having animals speak for 
themselves. Just as the posthumanists envision a world without violence and cruelty 
against animals, MacKinnon and Laycock imagine a world without the tyranny of 
speaking for others. However, just as we cannot escape human exceptionalism even in 
                                                
43 It is interesting that, speaking of the “ferocity of man,” Lacan insists that “cruelty implies humanity” 
(quoted in Derrida 2008, 105).  
 
44 For example, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) includes this question on its FAQ. 
http://www.askcarla.com/Q&A-Miscellaneous.asp?CategoryID=2&Category=Misc 
 
45 For instance, in her introduction to J.M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals, Amy Gutmann writes, “Unlike 
some animals, human beings do not need to eat meat. We could – if only we tried – treat animals with due 
sympathy for their ‘sensation of being’” (2001, 4). 
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the most radical animal egalitarianism, we cannot avoid representing animals even in our 
disavowal of speaking for them. In her paper, Raber asks whether it is  “possible that we 
need human exceptionalism” in animal ethics (2008, 101). Following Raber, we may ask 
whether it is possible that we need to speak for animals in animal ethics, and whether it is 
possible that we need the violence of “human chauvinism” or “paternalism” in order to 
curb the violence of animal exploitation.  
 
Reconceptualizing the Linguistic Question 
In this chapter, I seek to demonstrate the social-political relevance of the linguistic divide 
in animal ethics—a topic that remains under-theorized in the literature. Specifically, I 
show that the voice-silence dichotomy remains the bedrock on which animal advocacy 
lies; and as a result, the linguistic divide is still being presupposed in the animal rights 
discourse. But there is certainly more to the question of language in animal ethics than 
this linguistic divide. In The Sexual Politics of Meat, for example, Carol Adams analyzes 
the ways our language “uphold[s] meat-eating” (1990, 63). In her view, our 
anthropocentric language alienates us from other animals. For instance, the use of “it” as 
a pronoun for the animal reduces the animal to a thing-like status, while different animal 
metaphors “distort the reality of other animals’ lives” (1990, 64). Furthermore, Adams 
argues provocatively that “every meat meal is an absence, the death of an animal whose 
place the meat takes” (1990, 63). Once butchered, seasoned, and cooked, the animal on 
our plate is no longer recognizable as an animal; in a similar way, once baptized “meat,” 
animals disappear via a linguistic sleight of hand (1990, 64). For Adams, the 
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consumption of flesh is sanctioned in part through the magic of renaming.46 Adams helps 
us see a connection between language and diet, between what we say and what we eat.47 
Indeed, Adams shows that insofar as we are linguistically constituted, it is important to 
examine what our linguistic capacity has afforded us to do to—and to do for—the 
animals. According to my analysis, the capacity to speak also entails the responsibility to 
speak for our animal others (whether in the form of representation, interpretation, or 
translation)—not because we’ve decided once and for all that animals do not speak, but 
simply because we cannot avoid speaking for or representing them. 
 My analysis of language is made against the backdrop of philosophers’ quick 
dismissal of the linguistic divide as a relevant moral issue in animal ethics. In my view, 
their dismissal also reveals a limited and prejudiced understanding of language. 
Specifically, they seem to associate linguistic capacity with rational capacity primarily. 
(Recall, for example, Bentham’s famous line where he places the capacities to “reason” 
and “talk” on the one side, and the capacity for “suffering” on the other.) As we know, 
logos means both “word” and “reason” — “the term for speech and rational thought are 
indistinguishable in Greek” (Osborne 2007, 64). Historically, we come to think of 
language as a capacity that allows us to reason, to discourse, to philosophize.  
In light of this philosophical backdrop, there is an urgent need to rectify this 
particular kind of philosophical prejudice, the prejudice that links language to reason 
exclusively. Indeed, is it possible to reconceive of our understanding of language? Instead 
                                                
46 For a detailed account on how language justifies the oppression of animals, see Dunayer (2001). 
 
47 Examining the works of Derrida and J. M. Coetzee, McKay (2010) makes the following observation, 
“[language] use is explicitly linked to meat-eating; speaking and carnivorousness are regarded as the 
always-already of humanity” (68). For an interesting account of the relationship between assimilation of 
sounds and the assimilation of flesh in Rousseau, see Oliver (2009, esp. Chaps 2 and 4).  
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of considering language reductively as a capacity that allows us to reason, can we 
consider linguistic capacity as first and foremost a relational capacity—language being 
that which enables us to develop kinship with others, even kinship across species? And if 
we consider language as a relational capacity that enables us to develop relationships 
with others, then perhaps there is a space to talk about the linguistic differences between 
humans and animals without turning these differences into an opposition.  
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CHAPTER II 
FROM ANIMAL FATHER TO ANIMAL MOTHER: A FREUDIAN ACCOUNT 
OF ANIMAL MATERNAL ETHICS 
 
Does Topsy Realize She is Being Translated? 
Sigmund Freud’s letter to Marie Bonaparte 
 
Anna Freud used to write poems for her father, Sigmund, on his birthdays. These 
poems, however, were written on behalf of their dogs and were presented as gifts from 
the dogs. According to one account, “Sigmund would always read the poem out loud, 
with great dramatic flourishes, then thank the dog in whose name it was signed and offer 
the dog the first slice of birthday cake” (Coren 2002, 137). Aptly dubbing these poems 
“birthday doggerel,” another commentator wonders, “Whose voice is speaking through 
this rhyme?  A dog separated from its master? or the one-time naughty daughter 
expressing her love for her father?” (Molnar 1996, 277). Indeed, whose voice is speaking 
here? Anna the writer of the poems? Sigmund the reciter whose physical voice delivers 
the poems?  Or the dogs from whose perspective the poems are composed?  
It is fitting that the “birthday doggerel” anecdote invokes the question of whose 
voice is speaking. The overlapping of voices points to the indeterminacy of authorship—
not only in the case of the birthday poems but also in psychoanalysis more generally. 
During analysis the patient does most of the talking. While she is expected to tell her tale, 
we all know that the patient’s story is rarely the end of the story or the whole of the story. 
The story told by the patient during analysis is often symptomatic of the repressed or 
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displaced psychic story. Freud, as we know, re-tells stories on behalf of his patients by 
reconstructing various scenes of the Oedipal drama in their lives.48 For him, even though 
the free associations of the patient during analysis provide “raw material” for the 
suppressed story, it is up to the analyst to structure the raw material together.49 In an 
important sense, the service of the analyst is premised on the fragmentation of the 
patient’s story.  
That the patient relies on the analyst to come to terms with her psychic story calls 
into question the patient’s ownership of her story. But the indeterminacy of authorship in 
psychoanalysis is perhaps symptomatic of the difficulty of being one’s own author more 
generally. Indeed, psychic story aside, have we ever told a story that is absolutely our 
own? Is it ever possible to tell our own story without supplementary anecdotes from the 
other? (We cannot, for example, tell the stories of our birth and our death. And even the 
childhood memories are often contaminated with the memories of our parents or 
siblings.) As Judith Butler argues, insofar as the self is always interrupted by the other, 
insofar as one’s account of oneself is always an address to the other, there is no account 
of oneself that is entirely one’s own making (2005). The quote with which I opened this 
chapter comes from one of Sigmund’s letters to Marie Bonaparte in 1937, during the time 
when Sigmund and Anna were translating her book on her dog, “Topsy.”50 Freud 
wonders if Topsy realizes that she is being translated (from French to German), but of 
                                                
48 In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari also critique Freud’s interpretation of the Wolf-man’s 
dream. They fault Freud for radically changing the content of the Wolf-man’s dream in his interpretation.  
 
49 For example, Freud uses the phrase “raw material” to refer to the Wolf-man’s dream (1918, 34). In The 
Question of Lay Analysis, Freud uses the analysis of an ore to describe the materials provided by the patient 
during the analysis (1926b, 219).   
 
50 Marie Bonaparte’s book is called “Topsy, Chow-chow au Poli d’Or.” 
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course, even the “original” French is already a translation from Topsy’s voice. But 
insofar as psychoanalysis displaces the self to the unconscious, it makes us all wonder 
whether the voice that we take as our own is not already some kind of translation, some 
act of ventriloquism.  
Keeping the question of authorship in mind, let’s return to the dogs in Freud’s 
family for the moment. Commentators have pointed out that Freud’s dogs took on the 
role of surrogacy (Molnar 1996; Pellegrini 2009; Garber 1997). For instance, Anna’s 
black Alsatian, Wolf, initially served as a paternal surrogate—Sigmund acquired it to 
protect Anna during her evening walks. He later acknowledged that Wolf also served as a 
“replacement” for his grandson, Heinele, who died from tuberculosis (Pellegrini 2009, 
232). Wolf was simultaneously a replacement of the ailing father and a lost child. It is 
also noteworthy that the Freud family recycled the names of their dogs, so the new dogs 
also served as substitutes for the old ones.51 As one reader comments, for Freud “all 
object-love participates in an endless chain of substitutions” (Pellegrini 2009, 244). 
In a bizarre poetic twist, the dogs even became stand-ins for Sigmund to relieve 
him of his digestive duty (Molnar 1996, 275). Sigmund suffered from jaw cancer in the 
last years of his life, which resulted in difficulty in eating. In one of her “birthday 
doggerels,” Anna imagines the dogs eating—and digesting—on behalf of her father:  
They declare their unswerving willingness to serve. 
They dedicate their stomach's ability 
to your dinner's edibility, 
they will eat in a trice 
your plate of rice, 
without mercy delete 
your portion of meat, 
always ready to take 
                                                
51 According to Coren, “there are a number of Luns (named after their first dog), a few Tattouns (named 
after a favorite of Marie Bonaparte), and several generations of dogs named Jofi” (2002, 138).  
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a piece of your cake, 
and when all's done and said 
help you out with your bread. 
 
Thus their persevering jaws 
will tirelessly do your chores 
of chewing, and their fangs won't shirk 
taking on your mealtime work. 
 
They offer themselves up 
as your prosthesis and your prop.  
(quoted in Molnar 1996, 276) 
 
 The logic of substitution is not just at work in Freud’s personal relationship with 
his dogs. As we will soon see, central to Freud’s account of animality is the substitution 
between the animal and the father. But before we go into that in detail, I should note that 
it is difficult to give a singular, unified role to animality in Freud’s corpus. In The 
Interpretation of Dreams, Freud catalogues various meanings of animals in dreams: a 
lizard symbolizes the prevention of the castration threat (as a lizard can re-grow its tail); 
fishes, snails, cats, and mice are all symbols of genitals; small animals or vermin mean an 
undesired sibling, while “being plagued by vermin is often a sign of pregnancy” (1900, 
357). Different commentators have also assigned different roles for the animal in Freud’s 
work: some argue that Freud uses animality “to negatively cast female sexuality”; some 
make connections between animality and “primitivism”; while some see animality as a 
representation of “the lost world of sense and sensation” or an “unconscious archive of 
the past” (Roberts 2008, 30; Armstrong 2008, 142-143; Parikka 2010, 9252). Elissa 
Marder argues that the animal often serves as a conceptual intervention—“without the 
                                                
52 Carrie Rohman also argues that animality for Freud is the “archaic past”: it is a regressive stage that one 
must overcome in order to “become and remain human” (2009, 23).  
  36 
animals, Freud cannot account for the idea of death in the psyche” (2009, 12). The animal 
in Freud’s corpus is an impressive multi-tasker.  
Keeping in mind the varying parts that the animal plays, I am specifically 
interested in its role as the father-surrogate. Freud’s most extensive discussion of animals 
is found in his writings on infantile zoophobia. From Little Hans’s horse to little Árpád’s 
poultry, from the Wolf-man’s wolves to the Rat-man’s rats, many of these animals in 
Freud’s work are father-substitutes. In a chapter titled “Freud’s Zoophilia,” Kelly Oliver 
offers an extensive treatment of Freud and the animal. In her analysis of Totem and 
Taboo, she exposes the animal hidden behind the primal father, and argues persuasively 
that the animal-father substitution is central to the Oedipal drama that drives Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theory (2009, chap. 11). Following and building on Oliver’s analysis, in 
this chapter I interrogate the substitutive role played by the animal with an eye to the 
prohibitive character exhibited by these animal-fathers.  
 
Freud and Animal Fathers 
It seems uncontroversial—at least according to Freud—that the feared animals are always 
father-substitutes. In Totem and Taboo, Freud makes a rather wholesale claim regarding 
this substitution: “It was the same in every case: where the children concerned were boys, 
their fear related at bottom to their father and had merely been displaced on to the 
animal” (1913, 127-128). Indeed, it does seem to be the same in every case: Little Hans 
displaces his fear of his father onto the horses and the Wolf-man onto the wolves, while 
Little Árpád, who is afraid of poultry, proclaims unambiguously, “‘My father’s the 
cock’” (1913, 130). But how exactly does the animal come to represent the father? 
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In “Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety,” Freud argues that the fear of animals 
comes down to the castration complex, as analysis reveals that the phobic little boys are 
specifically afraid of having their penises bitten off by the animal (or otherwise being 
devoured by the animal). The anxiety of having their genitals bitten off by the animal is, 
according to Freud, a “distortion [of] the idea of being castrated by their father” (1926a, 
108). As we know, for Freud the fear of castration is developmentally important for a 
boy’s life. It is by the threat of castration that the boy learns to relinquish his illicit desire 
to be with his mother. Now, given that the castration threat is actually part of a positive 
Oedipal experience, the fear alone does not count as neurotic. For Freud, the neurosis lies 
in the substitution of the father for the animal (1926a, 103). This substitution has two 
advantages: first, the phobic can resolve his ambivalent feelings toward his father; that is, 
he no longer love-hates his father, for the hatred is transferred to the animal (1926a, 125). 
Second, the phobic makes the threat of castration conditional. While the boy can’t avoid 
seeing his father (who presents the threat of castration initially), he can avoid seeing the 
horse by refusing to go on the street (in the case of little Hans) or by refusing to read a 
storybook (in the case of the Wolf-man) (1926a, 125-126).   
Given Freud’s account of animal phobias, the animal takes the place of the father 
and turns into a punitive figure that threatens to castrate the little boy. Indeed, the 
prohibitive character of the animal is also evident in Freud’s account of the primal horde 
in Totem and Taboo. The totem animal replaces the primal father and becomes the 
prohibitive figure that institutes the two taboos in the totemism: incest and murder. In her 
essay “Being Human: Bestiality, Anthropophagy, and Law,” Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks 
helpfully exposes the connection between the animal and the law by articulating their 
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intertwined origins. She argues that species difference (human/animal) and the law are 
concurrently inaugurated when the brothers commit the deed:  
The newly instituted concept of murder organizes acts of killing according 
to the object: those that can be killed (sanctioned slaughter) and those that 
cannot be killed (murder). The former group is comprised of the animal, in 
its difference from the human, as food or as sacrificial object. (2003, 103) 
 
In other words, at the heart of the law against murder we find the difference between 
humans and animals. The law against murder (or more precisely, the concept of murder) 
is predicated on species difference—only the killing of humans counts as murder. The 
killing of animals is, as it were, merely killing. In the time before the law there was no 
murder, and in the time before species difference there were neither humans nor animals. 
Human subjectivity is acquired in our differentiation from the animal, and this 
differentiation is precisely what informs us of what can be killed and what cannot be 
killed—that is, what counts as murder and what counts as killing. But insofar as the 
prohibition against murder (together with the prohibition against incest) is the beginning 
of all prohibitions, the beginning of all laws, the totem animal is, right from the 
beginning, the guarantor of the paternal law.  
 
Prohibitions and Animal Rights Discourse 
Given the Freudian understanding of the animal as the prohibitive paternal figure, it is 
particularly ironic that mainstream discourse on animal rights is imbued with the 
language of prohibition. In his essay “The Case for Animal Rights,” Tom Regan begins 
his argument by presenting the three main goals of the animal rights movement as 
follows: “The total abolition of the use of animals in science,” “the total dissolution of 
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commercial animal agriculture,” and “the total elimination of commercial and sport 
hunting and trapping” (1985, 13). 
Collectively, these goals underscore the inviolability of animal lives, and the 
inviolability of animal lives is motivated by Regan’s deontological commitment to 
respect all creatures with inherent value (1985, 22ff.). Commentators have extensively 
critiqued Regan’s position, ranging from its uncritical appeal to Enlightenment ideals to 
the problematic notion of inherent value.53 I will not rehearse their critiques here. Rather, 
I want to draw attention to the way Regan articulates his vision of the movement. 
Interestingly, Regan expresses these goals in exclusively negative terms—he calls for the 
“abolition,” “dissolution,” and “elimination” of various practices. (In his later work 
Regan aligns himself with the “abolitionist” position.)54   
What does the negative prescription suggest? Why frame the goals of the animal 
rights movement in terms of what we are not allowed to do to animals? Surely, it 
highlights the objectionable character of animal exploitation, and the importance of 
halting such exploitative practices. However, Regan’s negative prescription also defines 
the goals of the animal rights movement in terms of prohibition exclusively—all three 
goals have to do with what we need to stop doing to animals. The negative phrasing of 
his goals betrays an important limitation in Regan’s vision: although it aims to radically 
revamp our treatment of animals, it remains reactionary insofar as it does not go beyond 
the negation of the status quo. That is, while Regan’s vision offers a prescription of do-
                                                
53 See for example Donovan (1990); Oliver (2009, chap. 1); Lee (2008); Taylor (1987). 
  
54 See for example Regan (2003, 1; 2004, xiii). In Animal Rights, Human Wrongs Regan rewords his vision 
as follows: “The total abolition of commercial animal agriculture,” “The total abolition of the fur industry,” 
and “The total abolition of the use of animal in science” (2003, 1). Still expressed in exclusively negative 
terms, the rewording—now with the repetition of the phrase “total abolition”—clearly aligns Regan with 
abolitionism. The abolitionist approach is in contradistinction to the welfarist or protectionist approach. 
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no-harm, it does not articulate how humans and animals may cross their lives in any 
meaningful ways. And oddly enough, by framing his vision of animal rights in the 
language of what-we-ought-not-do, Regan has summoned the animal as the figure of 
prohibition. The psychoanalytic story wherein the animal serves as the guarantor of the 
law finds a strange reincarnation in Regan’s discourse on animal rights. As such, in his 
effort to plead for the animal, Regan has appealed to the institution of law, an institution 
whose very origin invokes the figure of the animal as the prohibitive, fearful father. 
It is not by chance that the prohibitive, fearful animal-father is invoked in 
discourse on animal rights. In The Beast and the Sovereign Jacques Derrida helpfully 
articulates the significance of fear in relation to the law and the sovereign; he calls this 
fear “the political passion par excellence.” The discussion of fear is brought up in the 
context of terrorism. Specifically, Derrida exposes the “terror” that is operative in the 
state (or the sovereign) in order to challenge the oppositions between terrorists and the 
state, anti-state terror and state terror (2009, 39). He first reminds us that the name 
“terrorism” came from “the Terror of the French Revolution, of a Revolution that was 
also at the origin of all the universal declarations of human rights” (2009, 39). In other 
words, the origin of human rights—the rights after which Regan models his animal 
rights—is intertwined with fear and terror. Derrida then points out that in Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, individuals are motivated to obey the law out of fear. The law is instituted out 
of fear (of losing one’s life), and the law is sustained out of fear (of punishment).55 Fear 
                                                
55 Derrida also discusses the way fear motivates crime, so “fear is thus both the origin of the law and the 
transgression of the law” (2009, 41). While the double function of fear is interesting, I am primarily 
interested in the way fear and terror operate in sustaining the law. 
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is that which sustains the power of the sovereign, insofar as the Leviathan (the “animal-
machine”) is “run on fear and reigns by fear” (2009, 40).  
Importantly, protection is promised as long as individuals submit themselves to 
the sovereign/the law. Derrida points out that protection has also become a form of 
subjugation: “‘I protect you’ means, for the state, I oblige you, you are my subject, I 
subject you. Being the subject of one’s fear and being the subject of the law or the state . . 
. are at bottom the same thing” (2009, 43, emphases added). As such, protection is always 
an exchange, a bargain; it is offered only to the subjects who subject themselves to the 
law and the sovereign (and to their own fear).   
That “protection” serves as a machine of subjugation is especially significant 
when we consider the language of “animal protection” that pervades the discourse on 
animal rights. What are we asking in exchange when we offer animals “protection”? In 
what way have we subjected animals by offering them our protection? Consider, for the 
example, the “peacock bill” (SB 1533) that has recently been passed in Hawaii.56 This 
bill was introduced in response to a brutal peacock killing that took place in 2009. A 
Hawaiian resident killed an “annoying” peacock with a baseball bat, and was 
subsequently acquitted after her lawyer convinced the jury that the peacock was a “pest.” 
(“Pests” are normally excluded from anti-cruelty protection.) While an early version of 
the bill clarifies that peacocks are not pests, the final version of the bill merely states that 
the killing of the pest should be “handled in accordance with standard and acceptable pest 
control practices and all applicable laws and regulations.” As Stephen Otto puts it, “an 
annoying peacock could still arguably be considered a ‘pest,’ however anyone 
                                                
56 This bill has been effective since July 1, 2011. See 
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2011/lists/measure_indiv.aspx?billtype=SB&billnumber=1533 
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considering killing this ‘pest’ would not be able to use a baseball bat in doing so” (2011). 
Although the “peacock bill” aims at extending protection to pests from unnecessary pain 
and suffering, it actually affirms that “annoying” peacocks can be punished by death. By 
“protecting” peacocks from death-by-baseball-bat, the “peacock bill” becomes a means to 
regulate the death of pests. As such, this bill reinscribes our sovereignty over animals by 
subjecting their life and death to our jurisdiction.  
Let us return to fear and the rights discourse. Given the centrality of fear and 
terror in the sovereign power, it should not surprise us that Regan articulates his goals in 
terms of prohibition, and that the name “abolitionism” becomes common parlance within 
the animal debate. The abolitionist approach forms a great alliance with the legal 
discourse that pervades the literature. After all, punitive measures do discourage 
exploitative practices that the abolitionists seek to tear apart. However, the language of 
prohibition also simplifies the ethical question at stake. Specifically, thinking of animal 
ethics in terms of what we can (and cannot) do to animals translates the vague notion of 
“human-animal relationship” into legal terms. Instead of interrogating the human-animal 
boundary, we now ask: How should we enforce anti-cruelty laws? Can animals sue? Can 
humans sue on behalf of an animal? As such, the language of prohibition goes hand in 
hand with the emphasis on animal law in current discourses on animal ethics. Mainstream 
animal advocacy often revolves around the legal status of animals—do they have rights? 
Are they persons or property? In fact, questions regarding the moral status of animals are 
often used in service of the legal status of animals.  
Nonetheless, is prohibition a sufficient or even a necessary condition to motivate 
a promising human-animal relation? Can we have an animal ethics based solely—or even 
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primarily—on prohibition? As I will show, to think beyond the language of prohibition 
means to think beyond lawmaking and the extension of rights, and to see that the 
regulation of behavior need not be punitive.  
 
Freud and Da Vinci’s Animal 
Given what we have seen so far, Freud may seem to be an unlikely resource in 
considering an animal ethics beyond prohibition. After all, animals in Freud’s work are 
often linked to the punitive father. In Freud’s account of the primal horde, the animal-
father substitution plays a crucial role in anchoring the familial, social, and religious 
structure of a patriarchal society. The totem animal has to be the father and not the 
mother. In fact, the rigid substitution between the father and the animal sometimes comes 
at the expense of the mother. Throughout Freud’s account of the totemic origin, the 
significance of the maternal figure is repeatedly dismissed. For example, matriarchal 
society is mentioned merely in passing, as Freud speculates that both homosexuality and 
matriarchal institution might be originated during the in-between time after the brothers’ 
expulsion from the horde and before the murder of the father (1913, 144). When it comes 
to mother-goddesses, Freud acknowledges that his account of religion fails to take them 
into consideration, but he quickly moves on to discuss the role of the father-gods, leaving 
this wrinkle of his theory untouched (1913, 149).  
But this animal-father substitution is perhaps not as certain as Freud would have 
it. In her essay on Little Hans, Anna Ornstein argues that it is not entirely obvious that 
Little Hans was afraid of his father rather than his mother, even though “Freud obviously 
maintained a deep conviction that a horse could only represent a male and, if the child 
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was afraid, he could only be afraid of his father, not his mother” (1993, 95). As Ornstein 
points out, Freud insists on the animal-father substitution even when:  
Hans called the coal-carts and furniture vans the horses were pulling the 
“stork-box carts,” which were obvious references to his pregnant mother . 
. . or when Hans related his fear of the horse making a row and screaming 
to his sister’s screaming “when Mummy whacks her on her bottom and 
she makes such a row with her screaming” (Ornstein 1993, 96). 
 
Interestingly, Little Hans also drew a parallel between beating a horse and beating his 
mother. After Little Hans told the story of him (Little Hans) beating a horse in 
Gmunden,57 his father asked him, “Which would you really like to beat? Mummy, 
Hanna, or me?” (What a loaded question!) And Little Hans immediately declared that he 
would like to beat his mother—with a “carpet beater” (1909a, 81).58 More importantly, it 
was the mother who made the castration threat: when Little Hans was caught playing 
with his penis, Little Hans’s mother said to him, “If you do that, I shall send for Dr. A. to 
cut off your widdler. And then what’ll you widdle with?” (1909a, 8). (To which Little 
Hans replied, “With my bottom” (1909a, 8).) Given these remarks, it seems that Little 
Hans’s mother also served as a prohibitive figure, which complicates Freud’s claim that 
the feared animal must be a father-substitute in every case.  
It is also noteworthy that Freud’s first case of animal phobia actually concerns a 
40-year-old woman, Frau Emmy von N. (1893).59 While Frau Emmy’s case offers many 
points of comparison, Freud systematically fails to make reference to her case in his 
examinations of infantile animal phobias (all of them come after the Frau Emmy case). 
                                                
57 A place where Little Hans’s family stayed for the summer holidays.  
 
58 In a parenthetical note, Little Hans’s father added that the mother was the one who often threatened to 
beat Little Hans with a carpet beater (1909a, 81). 
 
59 See “Case Histories: 2. Frau Emmy von N.” 
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First, Frau Emmy had an animal hallucination that seemed to be inspired by a storybook. 
Freud should have made a connection in his diagnosis of the Wolf-man dream, given that 
he insists that the Wolf-man’s dream came from a fairy tale. Second, Frau Emmy’s 
hallucinations often involved mice or rats, but Freud makes no mention of her 
hallucinations in the Rat-man case. Third, one of Frau Emmy’s symptoms involved 
making a “clacking” sound that Freud refers to as a “tic,” a sound that “resembled the call 
of a capercaillie” (1893, 49n1). This comment is strikingly similar to the way Freud 
describes Little Árpád’s speech inhibition, that he “abandoned human speech in favor of 
cackling and crowing” (1913, 130). In both cases, the animal phobics had their human 
speech interrupted by the voice of an animal, but Freud seems completely oblivious to 
this similarity when he discusses Little Árpád’s case. Finally, at one point Frau Emmy 
told Freud, “A whole lot of mice were sitting in the trees”—a hallucination that parallels 
the Wolf-man’s dream of the wolves sitting on a big walnut tree. Again, Freud draws no 
comparison to Frau Emmy’s case in his analysis. Surely, at the time of her treatment Frau 
Emmy was no longer a child, so her animal phobia could not really count as an instance 
of infantile zoophobia. But how did her story get obliterated to the point of never being 
mentioned or referenced in Freud’s analysis of animal phobias? Perhaps Freud neglected 
his case study of Frau Emmy for the same reason he disregarded some of the crucial 
claims made by Little Hans: the animal must take the place of the father and stand as a 
figure that issues the castration threat.  
It is against the backdrop of this seemingly rigid link between the animal and the 
father that I turn to Freud’s Leonardo Da Vinci and A Memory of His Childhood (1910). 
Many pages of this psychoanalytic biography are devoted to a dream that da Vinci had as 
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a child, a dream where da Vinci is visited by a vulture. Interestingly, Freud tells us that 
the vulture is a hermaphroditic creature: it has a female body while possessing a phallus. 
The ambiguity of the vulture’s sex is suggestive, especially in light of the link between 
the animal and the father that we see in cases of infantile zoophobias and the story of the 
primal horde. But what does the vulture substitute in da Vinci’s case? What is the 
relationship between da Vinci and his animal? This ambiguous hermaphrodite opens up a 
place for us to reconsider, to challenge even, the link between the animal and the father.  
 
Da Vinci and the “Kissing Vulture” 
Da Vinci’s memory of the vulture’s visit, which Freud quotes from a German 
translation 60  of Scognamiglio’s transcription of Codex Atlanticus, which was then 
translated by Alan Tyson, is as follows, 
It seems that I was always destined to be so deeply concerned with 
vultures; for I recall as one of my very earliest memories that while I was 
in my cradle a vulture came down to me, and opened my mouth with its 
tail, and struck me many times with its tail against my lips. (1910, 82) 
 
James Strachey, the editor of the Standard Edition, points out in the preface that there is a 
significant inaccuracy in the German translation that Freud references. Namely, the 
Italian word “nibbio” should be translated as “kite,” not “vulture” (1910, 60-61). While 
Strachey attributes this point to Irma Richter,61 this mistake in translation was discovered 
as early as 1923 by art historian Eric Maclagan, and Freud apparently never publicly 
acknowledged the mistake (Anderson, 10-11). As we will soon see, Freud specifically 
                                                
60 Wayne Anderson argues that Freud did not actually copy from the German translation by Marie 
Herzfeld, as Strachey suggests, but instead drew from more than one source “without having read 
Leonardo’s words” (2001, 23).  
 
61 See “Editor’s Note” (61n1). 
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invokes the vulture-goddess in Egyptian mythology in order to ground his interpretation 
of da Vinci, so the mistake in translation seems costly. Since Maclagan’s discovery, 
critics of Freud have dutifully noted this mistranslation in their commentaries on the da 
Vinci case: some merely mention it in passing, some see it as detrimental to his analysis 
of da Vinci, and some go so far as to suggest that this mistake is indicative of Freud’s 
shady scholarship.62 In 2001, art historian Wayne Anderson published Freud, Leonardo 
da Vinci, and the Vulture, a painstakingly researched monograph that disabuses many 
misunderstandings surrounding the translation debate. 63  Given the purpose of this 
chapter, I will not go into the intricacies of Anderson’s argument. And given that I am 
primarily interested in the way Freud (rather than da Vinci) uses the animal in his work, 
the specific species of the bird is inconsequential. However, this translation debate 
reminds us that Freud’s analysis of da Vinci is subjected to the precariousness of 
translation, that is, the precariousness of substitution. It serves as a reminder of the 
significance of—and the risks associated with—the economy of translation/substitution 
in discourses on animal ethics.  
As noted, the ambiguity of the vulture’s sex makes da Vinci’s case exceptional, 
insofar as it departs from the norm of substitution that Freud prescribes for a patriarchal 
culture. Despite its hermaphroditic features, Freud insists that the vulture is a mother-
                                                
62 Anderson carefully chronicles the ongoing debate in the literature in his 2001 book (10ff.). In his 2005 
essay, De La Durantaye argues that Nabokov’s dismissive opinion of Freud (and psychoanalysis more 
generally) is grounded in Freud’s lack of attention to details: “What Nabokov very consciously sought to 
counteract were approaches to art that, in their aspiration to uncover the general, neglected the particular. 
And this he found in Freud” (68). And the prime example De La Durantaye uses to buttress this observation 
is precisely Freud’s use of the mistranslation of “nibbio” as “vulture.”  
 
63 He argues, for instance, that Maclagan’s translation of “nibbio” as “kite” is also problematic; he suggests 
that “nibbio” in the fifteenth century “may have referred to any carnivorous bird . . . while most of the time 
referencing the chief raptor, the hawk” (2001, 34). Interestingly, according to Anderson, hawks, like 
vultures, were also believed to be an exclusively female species. I will discuss the significance of the 
single-gendered species further.  
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substitute for da Vinci (1910, 88). First of all, Freud points out the phonetic similarity 
between the name of an ancient Egyptian goddess Mut (who has a vulture head) and the 
word “Mutter,” the German word for mother (1910, 88). But the vulture has been 
associated with motherhood primarily because the vulture was believed to be an 
exclusively female species, a species that propagates by being impregnated by the wind 
(1910, 89). For Freud, da Vinci’s identification as the “vulture-child” is indicative of his 
father’s absence—he was, like the vulture, a child without a father (1910, 90).  
According to Freud, while Mut was characterized as a mother-goddess, the 
Egyptians usually represented it as an androgynous figure (1910, 94). The maternal figure 
was equipped with paternal potency—an erected phallus (1910, 94). The androgynous 
feature of the Egyptian goddess also supports Freud’s claim that the tail of the vulture in 
da Vinci’s dream signifies a phallus (1910, 85, 97). The vulture is at once a mother-
substitute and a phallic power. But this androgynous goddess is as puzzling as it is 
fascinating: how is it possible that a mother-goddess is equipped with an erect phallus, “a 
mark of male potency which is the opposite of everything maternal” (1910, 94)?  
To resolve this apparent contradiction, Freud turns to the children. He argues that 
before a male child comes to a full understanding of the threat of castration, he undergoes 
a phase where the phallus is compatible with the maternal figure. In fact, the child should 
have no reason to assume that the mother’s body is different from his own; so his mother, 
like him, should have a penis. It is the discovery that the mother does not have a penis 
that makes the castration threat real. Importantly, this discovery invokes “a feeling of 
disgust . . . [which] can become the cause of physical impotence, misogyny and 
permanent homosexuality” (1910, 96). Freud calls the time before this discovery “a time 
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when [the male child] still holds women at full value,” that is, a time before the hierarchy 
of gender is inaugurated (1910, 96). Interestingly, gender egalitarianism is not the only 
kind of egalitarianism that a child seems to take for granted.64 In different writings Freud 
has also commented on a sort of human-animal egalitarianism that he finds in children. In 
Totem and Taboo, for example, Freud points out that the human-animal hierarchy is not 
assumed by children:       
Children show no trace of the arrogance which urges adult civilized men 
to draw a hard-and-fast line between their own nature and that of all other 
animals. Children have no scruples over allowing animals to rank as their 
full equals. Uninhibited as they are in the avowal of their bodily needs, 
they no doubt feel themselves more akin to animals than to their elders, 
who may well be a puzzle to them. (1913, 126-127) 
 
Elsewhere, Freud makes a similar observation: 
Such a displacement [in this case the displacement of the father by a 
horse] is made possible or facilitated at ‘Little Hans’s’ early age because 
the inborn traces of totemic thought can still be easily revived. Children do 
not as yet recognize or, at any rate, lay such exaggerated stress upon the 
gulf that separates human beings from the animal world. (1926a, 103) 
 
Is the parallel between gender egalitarianism and species egalitarianism in children a 
mere coincidence? Do children “discover” that women are not of the same “full value” as 
men at the same time they distinguish themselves from animals?65 Interestingly, the kind 
of egalitarianism that a child purportedly takes for granted seems to be motivated by his 
narcissism. A child holds his mother “at full value” based on the assumption that like 
him, the mother also has a penis. And in the case of species egalitarianism, the child 
ranks animals as his equal by virtue of their likeness in the “avowal of their bodily 
needs.”  
                                                
64 That is, if we consider the absence of hierarchical thinking a negative form of egalitarianism. 
 
65 Outside the psychoanalytic tradition, feminist thinkers such as Carol Adams and Karen Warren have 
pointed out the intertwined relationship between the denigration of women and that of animals/nature. 
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Ironically, this egalitarianism based on sameness is often replicated in 
contemporary literature on animal ethics. In their effort to extend membership of the 
moral community to animals, philosophers often identify morally relevant qualities that 
are shared by both humans and animals to make their case, such as the capacity to feel 
pain (à la Singer) or being an experiencing subject of a life (à la Regan). But grounding 
animal rights on the notion of sameness can be problematic. As Kelly Oliver puts it, “Just 
as feminists ask why women have to be like men in order to be equal, we can ask why 
animals have to be like us to have inherent value” (2009, 30).  As we have seen in chapter 
one, in “Of Mice and Men” Catherine MacKinnon also reminds us that “seeking animal 
rights on a ‘like-us’ model of sameness is misconceived” because we “miss animals on 
their own terms” (2004, 264). Indeed, we may even say that an animal ethics grounded in 
the model of sameness is also narcissistic; and once again we see a strange parallel 
between Freud’s account of animality and mainstream animal rights rhetoric.  
In light of the connection between gender and species egalitarianisms, it is telling 
that Freud also seems to relegate empathy for animals to the feminine. For example, he 
insists that da Vinci’s compassionate acts for animals—declining meat, buying birds from 
the market in order to set them free—are motivated by the “feminine delicacy of feeling” 
(1910, 69).66 Specifically, Freud argues that da Vinci’s mother’s “tender seductions” 
were responsible for the intensity of his infantile sexual researches; and the violent, 
sadistic traits associated with infantile sexual researches were manifested in an opposite 
direction as an “exaggerated sympathy for animals” (1910, 132). In other words, da 
Vinci’s empathy for animals is symptomatic of a lack of paternal authority. Interestingly, 
                                                
66 Anderson disputes the claims that da Vinci was a vegetarian or animal lover (see 2001, 139 ff.). 
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while Freud insists that animals are father-substitutes, his interpretation of empathy for 
animals reflects the age-old association of the animal and the feminine. Specifically, 
empathy for animals is often viewed as some emotional excess that women—because 
they are less rational—are prone to suffer.67  
In Freud’s case studies, the relationship between the child and the animal is often 
ambivalent (hence replicating the love-hate feeling a child has toward his father). 
Nonetheless, because the animal stands for paternal authority, the ambivalent feeling 
invariably involves fear: the Rat-man is traumatized by the rat-punishment (a punishment 
which involved putting rats into one’s anus);68 the Wolf-man is afraid of being devoured 
by wolves; and for little Árpád the fowl represents a constant threat of castration. In da 
Vinci’s case, however, the vulture does not present any obvious threat, and there is no 
evidence that da Vinci was vulture-phobic in Freud’s account. Indeed, throughout his 
analysis Freud describes da Vinci’s obsession with the animal as “vulture phantasy” 
instead of “vulture-phobia.” But if da Vinci’s story is not a case of animal phobia, what 
does it tell us? How might it transform the way we conceive of animality? Let us turn to 
da Vinci’s dream once more.  
Recall in his dream da Vinci was struck by the vulture repeatedly. The striking of 
the vulture may seem violent at first glance.69 But Freud offers two interpretations for this 
scene, both of which make it difficult for us to read physical violence into it. He first 
                                                
67 As Emily Gaarder points out in Women and the Animal Rights Movement, “The image of animal rights 
still suffers from stereotypical portrayals of overly emotional or irrational activists” (2011, 11).  
 
68 “Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis” in Two Case Histories (1909b, 166).  
 
69 While this may be anachronistic, for readers who remember Kevin Carter’s picture of a starving child 
waiting to fall prey to a nearby vulture, an image of infant da Vinci’s being poked by a vulture is unlikely 
to conjure maternal feelings.   
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interprets the striking of the mouth as “an act of fellatio” (1910, 86), but later translates 
this same scene as a mother pressing “innumerable passionate kisses on [da Vinci’s] 
mouth” (1910, 107). While both readings make explicit the sexual undertones of the 
dream, neither presents the vulture as menacing (if anything, the vulture seems very 
affectionate). Also, unlike other case studies of infantile zoophobia, the threat of 
castration is not mentioned. Both interpretations seem to suggest that the vulture is an 
object of fantasy instead of an object of fear.70  
For Freud the tenderness of the mother is damaging. “The violence of caresses,” 
as Freud calls it, is insidious insofar as it has “robbed [da Vinci] of a part of his 
masculinity” (1910, 115-117). (Da Vinci’s supposed sexual abstinence is yet a form of 
castration.) But what exactly is this masculinity of which he was robbed? As far as Freud 
sees it, it all comes down to da Vinci’s alleged inability to pursue heterosexual relations. 
What the two interpretations share in common is the implication that da Vinci was a 
homosexual: When Freud first interprets the dream as a fantasy for fellatio, he finds it 
“strange” that the fantasy is “so completely passive in character” and that “it resembles 
certain dreams and phantasies found in women or passive homosexuals” (1910, 86). 
Moreover, in the biography Freud explicitly draws a connection between homosexuality 
and maternal influence—one becomes a homosexual through one’s erotic relation with 
the mother (see 1910, 98-100). In Totem and Taboo, Freud even speculates (albeit merely 
in passing) that homosexuality and matriarchal society share a common origin (1913, 
144). Hence, even though the vulture did not threaten to castrate da Vinci, it mutilated da 
Vinci’s manhood.  
                                                
70 It is not that phobia and fantasy are necessarily incompatible, but in Freud’s account, da Vinci exhibits no 
fear of the vulture.  
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Freud’s view of violence, of course, presupposes the norm of heterosexuality 
prescribed by patriarchy, and a rereading of the dream will call for resistance to this 
particular notion of violence. Indeed, if one is willing to rethink the hierarchy of 
masculinity and femininity, perhaps the kisses of the vulture-mother can be enabling 
rather than crippling.       
It is significant that Freud identifies maternal influence as the cause of 
homosexuality. Recall that Freud also holds maternal influence responsible for da Vinci’s 
“exaggerated sympathy for animals” (1910, 132). It is not a coincidence that the mother 
is the culprit for both homosexuality and empathy for animals. For Freud, maternal 
influence supposedly erodes masculinity, and homosexuality and vegetarianism are often 
viewed as signs of defective masculinity. Outside of the psychoanalytic tradition, 
feminist thinkers such as Carol Adams and Marti Kheel have called attention to the 
relationship between meat eating and masculinity.71 They argue that the consumption of 
animals is bound up with the consumption of women; hence when a man refuses to 
consume meat, it is suspected that he may refuse to “consume” women as well. In her 
study on gender disparity in the animal rights movement, sociologist Emily Gaarder 
points out that “some male activists experienced ridicule relating to their masculinity and 
sexuality. One man described how hunters called him an ‘animal rights queer’ during a 
protest against hunting” (2011, 107).72   
It seems that patriarchy (whose origin is grounded in the logic of the animal-
father substitution) has prescribed a specific norm governing our relationship with 
                                                
71 Adams (1990); Kheel (2004). 
 
72 In light of this, it is particularly interesting that in 2010, an animal rights group was denied a spot in 
Sydney’s Mardi Gras parade because it was “not queer enough.” See Holman (2010). 
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animals, a norm that replicates the father-son relationship in the myth of the band of 
brothers. Just as the brothers in the myth see the father as their rival, we define ourselves 
in opposition to the animal; just as the band of brothers commemorate their “triumph over 
the father” by instituting the totemic meal, we affirm our superiority with a full-scale 
exploitation of animals, an exploitation that is repetitive and expansive. And just as over 
time the “savages” forgot the origin and significance of the totemic meal, our exploitation 
of animals has also become a mindless and institutionalized repetition. As such, the norm 
governing our relationship with animals in a patriarchal society replicates the father-son 
dynamic that grounded the paternal law. Accordingly, a deviant model of the human-
animal relation (one that is based on compassion instead of fear, for example) is often 
relegated to the maternal in order to preserve the integrity of the patriarchal norm.  
In what ways do animals pose a threat to us? Of course, animals can physically 
harm us. The bars through which we look at zoo animals serve as a constant reminder of 
the danger they pose. And even if they are not the big bad beasts that threaten us with 
their maws or talons, they can still threaten our health by spreading dangerous 
contagions—the bird and the swine seem to be the experts at that. But beyond the 
physical threat, animals almost threaten our human identity. Many qualities that we 
considered uniquely human—rationality, morality, language—are now discovered in 
various animal communities as well. It is no longer easy to locate human uniqueness via 
comparison with animals. In response to the threat of animals, we domesticate them in 
zoos, farms, canine training schools; and we dismember them via castration (to “fix” 
them, we say), experimentation, and butchering. While we may not—and probably 
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should not—erase our fear of animals, is it possible to mitigate it? Can we imagine a 
human-animal relation that is not grounded in fear but in love?  
 
A Maternal Animal Ethics 
The exceptionalities of da Vinci’s animal—its androgynous features, as well as its 
identification with the maternal—interrupt the animal-father substitution that we see in 
other cases of animal phobia. Da Vinci’s relationship with the vulture-mother invites us 
to renegotiate our relationship with animals. Specifically, it invites us to consider a 
maternal animal ethics that emphasizes fantasy and love rather than fear and 
dominance.73 We need not deny that animals are at times threatening like the fearful 
father in the myth. Indeed, with the rapid expansion of human population, it is important 
that we acknowledge the conflicting interests between humans and other species (animal 
or not) when it comes to issues of natural resources and habitats. But animals can be our 
mothers as much as they can be our fathers. They can be our companions as much as our 
competitors. And even though they scratch, sting, and bite, they also cuddle, play, and 
kiss. 
That a human-animal relationship can be based on love and fantasy is certainly 
not something unusual. Many people identify themselves as “animal lovers,” and pets are 
often considered family members. The question here is why such a model of human-
animal relationship remains marginalized while the exploitative model of human-animal 
relationship remains operative. In fact, even the commonly sanctioned pet-love is at times 
pathologized or censured: the stereotype of the “crazy cat lady” becomes such a popular 
                                                
73 While an animal care ethics has been developed by various feminist thinkers, my chapter contributes to 
the literature by taking on the psychoanalytic perspective.   
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icon it gets its own action figure,74 while the image of Paris Hilton and her “purse dog” 
feeds the idea that pet-love is a mere accessory.75 And if even pet-love is marginalized as 
either pathological or vain, we are still a long way away from a normative human-animal 
relationship that is grounded in love. 
Although Freud himself pathologizes da Vinci’s vulture fantasy, such 
pathologization is very much informed by his patriarchal thinking. Accordingly, a 
revision of human-animal relations goes hand in hand with the remaking of gender 
relations (perhaps even a remaking of the myth of the band of brothers). Freud’s account 
of the vulture-mother remains instructive insofar as it showcases a human-animal 
relationship that is based on love and fantasy, instead of fear and dominance. Just as the 
vulture-mother kisses the infant da Vinci in his dream, intimacy can also ground human-
animal relations. And just as da Vinci sublimates his desire for his vulture-mother into 
artistic creativity, we are also inspired by animals in our various scientific and artistic 
endeavors. And recognition of the animal as our nurturing mother, it seems, would point 
to a more nurturing (and less violent) human-animal relationship.  
 
*  *  * 
 
I want to end this chapter by returning to the question of speaking for animals in 
animal ethics. In “The Dog on the Therapist’s Couch,” Stanley Coren suggests that 
                                                
74 See, e.g., http://www.mcphee.com/items/11377.html.   
 
75 That pets are mere accessories is so ingrained in our imagination that the phrase “pet projects” has 
become a synonym to “earmarks” or “pork barrel” in American political discourse. 
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Freud’s dogs served him both personally and professionally. Specifically, the presence of 
a dog seems to help the patients speak: 
This difference was most marked when Freud was dealing with children 
and adolescents, who seemed more willing to talk openly (especially about 
painful issues) when the dog was in the room . . . In addition, during 
psychoanalysis, when the patient is getting near to uncovering the source 
of his or her problem there is often a resistance phase . . . Freud’s 
impression was that the resistance was so much less vigorous when the 
dog was in the room. (2002, 139-140)     
  
Freud’s observations illuminate the recent use of “courthouse dogs” in the US. In the past 
few years, trained dogs have served the role of “testimony enablers” in various 
courthouses. These dogs are allowed in the courthouse to provide comfort for vulnerable 
or traumatized witnesses, such as children who were sexually abused. For example, 
recently a courthouse dog (Rosie) provided emotional support for a 15-year-old who was 
raped and impregnated by her father—“[Rosie] sat by the teenager’s feet. At particularly 
bad moments, she leaned in [to encourage the witness]” (Glaberson, 2011).76 Advocates 
for the “dog-in-court-cause” argue that just as the “Support Persons Case Law” allows a 
support person to “increase some children’s capacity to testify and enhance the child’s 
direct and cross-examination,” a specially trained dog can serve the same purpose 
(O’Neill-Stephens, 2010).   
Just as Freud’s dogs helped the patients speak about their issues, Rosie helped a 
reluctant and frightened teenager to speak for herself. Just as Freud’s dogs helped the 
patients confront their own demons by overcoming the “resistance phase,” Rosie helped 
the teenage girl confront her father. In an important sense, it is Rosie the dog who gave 
the victim a voice in court. In popular discourse on animal rights, we often hear the 
                                                
76 Aug. 8, 2011. “By Helping a Girl Testify at a Rape Trial, a Dog Ignites a Legal Debate.” New York 
Times. 
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rhetoric of “giving a voice to the voiceless.” The case of Rosie as a “testimony enabler” 
should remind us that, well before we can even “give animals a voice,” the animal has 
already helped us speak. Indeed, it is by establishing a relation with—rather than 
identifying herself against—the animal that the teenage girl found her voice in court. This 
flies in the face of the philosophical cliché that defines humanity by setting it against the 
non-speaking animal. Rosie’s courthouse service invites us to rethink and reconfigure the 
triangular relationship between language, humans, and animals. At the end, perhaps we as 
humans are constituted as speaking beings not by virtue of our opposition to animals, but 
rather because of our capacity to relate to animals. Or, to put this more in line with the 
spirit of this chapter: we are most willing to speak, and speak even the most difficult 
truth, when we see the animal not as a fearful, punitive creature, but rather as a maternal 
figure to whom we look for support and inspiration when we have momentarily lost our 
voice.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE POVERTY OF KINSHIP: HEIDEGGER ON THE HUMAN-ANIMAL 
LINGUISTIC DIVIDE 
 
I: Sometime ago I called language, clumsily enough, the house of Being. If man by virtue 
of his language dwells within the claim and the call of Being, then we Europeans 
presumably dwell in an entirely different house than Eastasian man. 
 
J: Assuming that the languages of the two are not merely different but are other in nature, 
and radically so. 
 
I: And so, a dialogue from house to house remains nearly impossible.  
 
  Heidegger, “A Dialogue on Language Between a Japanese and an Inquirer” 
 
Above is an excerpt from a dialogue between Heidegger (the “Inquirer”) and his 
Japanese interlocutor (1971a). This dialogue on language is, in a sense, prompted by the 
question of translation. Specifically, Heidegger questions whether it is possible (and 
necessary) to consider the nature of Japanese art by way of European aesthetics. It is 
within the context of the (un)translatability between European and Japanese conceptual 
systems that these remarks are made. While this chapter is not about aesthetics or 
Japanese language, it is invested in the question regarding the possibility of having “a 
dialogue from house to house.” In “Letter on Humanism” Heidegger speaks of language 
as a place that man “dwells”—indeed, as the “home of man’s essence” (1993, 237). I find 
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the imagery of a “house” intriguing: what makes this “house” a home rather than a mere 
shelter? Who are the ones we share this house with? And who are the ones we keep out? 
Furthermore, if a dialogue between an European house and an Eastasian house “remains 
nearly impossible,” what can we say about a dialogue between a human house and a nest, 
a lair, or an animal shelter? Keeping these questions in mind, I examine Heidegger’s 
philosophy of language in relation to the human-animal divide.  
As we know, the Greek word “logos” signifies both “reason” and “speech.” 
Throughout the history of Western philosophy, the designation of “rational animal” and 
“speaking animal” have both been reserved for the human. Accordingly the human-
animal divide is simultaneously a linguistic divide. Interestingly, although Heidegger’s 
conception of animality continues to endorse the human exceptionalism that has pervaded 
Western philosophy, his account of language does not bow to the authority of reason. 
Indeed, Heidegger is critical of the primacy of reason in our understanding of language 
historically: in “The Limitation of Being” he seeks to recover the bond between physis 
and logos, a bond that had been broken when “logos in the sense of reason and 
understanding achieve domination over being” (1959, 123);77 in “Letter on Humanism” 
he maintains that the Latin rendering of “zoon logon echon” as “animal rational” is not 
an innocuous translation but a “metaphysical interpretation” of the Roman humanist 
(1993, 226).78 Using Heidegger as my resource, in this chapter I seek an alternative 
theory of language that gives kinship its proper place. As I hope to show, Heidegger’s 
                                                
77 Similarly, in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics Heidegger insists that logos understood as 
reason (ratio) has hindered the “proper unfolding of the question of the world” in the history of western 
metaphysics (1995, 290).  
 
78 He makes a similar point in Being and Time as well, §7. 
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account of language opens up a new way of understanding—as well as challenging—the 
human-animal divide.  
 
Human-animal Linguistic Divide 
In his 1929/30 lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger 
examines animality extensively.79 Heidegger aims to establish three theses: (1) the stone 
is worldless; (2) the animal is poor in world; (3) man is world-forming (1995, 177). 
Several commentators have offered extensive and critical treatments of this particular 
work: some focus on the significance of temporality, historicity, and finitude;80 some 
situate Heidegger’s humanism within the larger context of the meaning of being;81 while 
some center on Heidegger’s rejection of humanism, and how this rejection remains 
anthropocentric.82 Indeed, the various ways Heidegger articulates the difference between 
animals and humans all seem to highlight the uniqueness of human Dasein: animals are 
“captivated” by their instinctual needs while humans are opened to beings as such; 
animals merely “behave” while humans “comport” or “act;” animals are poor in world 
                                                
79 The 1929/30 lecture course contains Heidegger’s most extensive account of animality. Like many 
commentators, my analysis will focus primarily on the lecture course. However, it is important to note that 
some commentators have employed other texts of Heidegger’s to envision a Heideggerian animal ethics 
that goes beyond the apparent anthropocentrism in the lecture course. For instance, Cave (1982) extends the 
Heideggerian notion of “Care” to animals; Foltz (1993) advocates a Heideggerian “letting be”—an 
“ontological humility” in animal ethics (85); Zimmerman (1983) argues that Heidegger offers a non-
anthropocentric way of dealing with our environmental crisis.   
 
80 For example, Colony (2007) argues that Agamben’s comparison of human boredom and animal 
captivation is ultimately flawed because he fails to account for the central role of temporality in human 
boredom. Winkler (2007) argues that Heidegger acknowledges temporality and historicity in all physical 
lives, thus the return to the element of time in his lecture course actually allows him to “attenuate in a way 
the abyss between man and animal” (536).  Aho (2007) contends that Heidegger more interested in the 
“temporal ‘event’ (Ereignis) that ‘gives’ (gibt) meaning to beings” than ascertaining the metaphysical 
distinction between humans and animals (110-111).  
 
81 Aho (2007). 
 
82 See for example, Derrida (1987); Calarco (2005); Glendinning (1996); Oliver (2009).  
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while humans are world-forming (cf. 1995, chap. 4, especially § 58 and 59). In the final 
chapter of the lecture course Heidegger reveals that animals’ captivation (and thusly their 
capacity to “behave” and their poverty in world) ultimately results from their lack of 
language. Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of logos, Heidegger anchors his argument of 
world-hood to the linguistic divide that has long segregated humans from animals. 
Given Heidegger’s project, it seems that a reasonable way to approach his account 
of animality is to articulate his conception of logos. As we know, the question of logos is 
bound up with Heidegger’s interrogation of being, thus it occupies an important place in 
his thoughts.83 However, precisely because of his extensive treatment of the logos, it is 
difficult to present his view adequately within the scope of this chapter. Furthermore, it is 
problematic to speak of a “Heideggerian conception of logos,” in large part because he 
explicitly cautions against the temptation to “reduce language to a concept”—that is, to 
essentialize language (1971b, 190). So, given that the purpose of this chapter is to 
develop a relational account of language, my strategy here is to examine various 
important moments in Heidegger’s interrogation of logos that would allow me to do just 
that.  
 
*  *  * 
 
In Being and Time Heidegger identifies communication as one of the structural 
components of “Assertion” (statement) (§33). Although this suggests an important link 
between communication and language, the relational character of language cannot be 
established by appealing to its communicative function alone. That is, we cannot simply 
                                                
83 See Being and Time, An Introduction to Metaphysics.  
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stretch the notion of language far enough to include all communicative gestures. This is 
so because for Heidegger there are two forms of communication, one is proper to 
language and the other is merely a degenerate form of discourse. So even though 
Heidegger sees the communicative aspect of language, he denies that every 
communicative utterance constitutes a discourse. “Idle talk” provides a good example for 
this deficient mode of discourse.  
It is in Being and Time that Heidegger speaks of “idle talk” as a degenerate form 
of discourse. Idle talk “does not communicate in the mode of a primordial appropriation 
of […] being, but communicates by gossiping and passing the word along”(1962, §35). 
While the communicative structure of language/discourse opens up a world of shared 
meaning among the interlocutors (we will return to this point shortly), communication in 
the form of idle talk is nothing more than a proliferation of groundless information. In 
other words, idle talk reduces communication to a mere instrument that “[passes] the 
word along.” As such, despite serving a communicative purpose, idle talk lacks the 
disclosing quality that language offers.  
Furthermore, the communication/language distinction is crucial because even 
though Heidegger denies language to animals, he does not deny communicative capacity 
to them. For instance, he acknowledges that worker bees can “communicate information” 
to their “bee community” via a dancing ritual (1995, 186). So minimally, the bees are 
capable of communication—but still a diminished form of communication that doesn’t 
constitute language. Heidegger also makes a distinction between “words” and “noises”—
the former are meaningful and constitutive of human discourse, while the latter are 
merely sounds produced by the animals, triggered by particular physiological conditions 
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(1995, 307). For Heidegger, even though the sounds of animals do “indicate something” 
among the animals (thus they serve a communicative function), they still lack meaning 
because the “animal does not mean or understand by its call” (1995, 307). I will come 
back to the question of animal communication later, but for now, suffice it to say that 
Heidegger sees no conflict between denying animals language and granting them 
communication.  
 
“As-structure” in Propositional Statements 
As noted, in the lecture course Heidegger aims to establish the thesis that “man is world-
forming.” His discussion on animality (and in particular animal’s poverty in world) is 
ultimately at the service of defending this thesis. Because of this comparative approach, it 
is not until the last chapter of the lecture course that Heidegger finally examines the man-
as-world-forming thesis. He begins by reminding us that the manifestedness of beings as 
beings belongs to the world. The world is bound up with this “enigmatic ‘as,’ beings as 
such […] ‘something as something’” (1995, 274). And importantly, this “enigmatic ‘as’” 
is a “possibility […] quite fundamentally closed to the animal” (1995, 274). So what is 
this “as” that is “refused to the animal” (1995, 287)? What exactly is the animal being 
denied?  
The preliminary step to make sense of this “enigmatic ‘as’” is to look at its 
specific function in a sentence. According to Heidegger, “as” operates as a structural 
linkage of two terms such that their relationship is made explicit—“‘as’ signifies a 
‘relation’ and that the ‘as’ is never given independently on its own” (1995, 288 emphasis 
in original). Within a sentence “as” expresses a relation, it gives a sentence a relational 
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structure. This “as” is not given independently in a sentence because there is always 
something as something. This relational structure is rendered intelligible by the 
expressiveness of beings—“the ‘as’ can only begin to function if beings are already 
given, so that the ‘as’ then serves to render these beings explicit as constituted in such 
and such a way” (1995, 288). Heidegger gives an example of the expression “a as b.” In 
order to understand this expression, the meaning of “a” and “b”—that is, “a” being “b”— 
must be already given (1995, 288). The “as” in this expression is what makes the beings 
(meaning) of “a” and “b” transparent. In other words, the as-structure is what enables 
meaning to be expressed in a sentence. In Being and Time, Heidegger identifies this 
expressiveness as the apophantic—“pointing out”—function of a statement.84 In the 
lecture course, Heidegger confirms that this “as” is a structure that belongs to 
propositional statements insofar as a statement “[makes] something open or manifest” 
(1995, 288).  
Given this preliminary interpretation of the “as-structure,” it seems that for 
Heidegger what is refused to the animal is the capacity to make propositional statements. 
Notably, this capacity to make propositional statements involves the ability to relate. The 
structure of relation, in turn, presupposes a network of meaningful terms. As Heidegger 
repeatedly reminds us, “as” cannot exist independently, “it is a relation which moves 
from one term to the other—something as something” (1995, 288, 292). The “as-
structure” makes sense only against the backdrop of a web of interrelated terms and 
meaning. So, without the apophantic-as—the relational structure that is constitutive of 
propositional statements—animals do not have access to the network of meaning.  
                                                
84 Being and Time, §33. 
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So, is linguistic capacity reducible to the capacity to make propositional 
statements? Interestingly, as soon as Heidegger articulates the relationality of the as-
structure, he qualifies his characterization as “formally correct…[but] utterly vacuous” 
(1995, 292). To say that “as” is a relation doesn’t really help us understand its specific 
character because, as Heidegger acknowledges, “and” and “or” in a statement also 
express a relation between two terms (1995, 292-293). Like “as,” a conjunction and a 
distinction also presuppose the interrelatedness of terms and meaning. Like “as,” a 
conjunction and a distinction also cannot exist independently; there is always “something 
and something” or “something or something”! So, even though we can characterize “as” 
in terms of its relational function in propositional statements, Heidegger is adamant that 
this formal characterization of the as-structure must not be confused with its essence. For 
Heidegger, in order to get to the “originary dimension” of the as-structure, we must see 
that propositional statements merely offer a “point of departure” for our investigation 
(1995, 301). There is an “originary dimension” of the “as” out of which the as-structure 
of propositional statements arises (1995, 301). This view is in keeping with Being and 
Time, where Heidegger makes it clear that propositions are merely a derivative mode of 
interpretation; specifically, the propositional-as is derivative of the more primordial 
hermeneutic-as (§33-34). For Heidegger, the formal (and empty) characterization of the 
as-structure “tells us nothing about the ‘as’ as such, but merely directs us toward our 
proper and peculiar task [of uncovering the originary ‘as’]” (1995, 293).   
After giving a relational account of the as-structure and then pointing out the utter 
vacuity of this account, Heidegger devotes the rest of the lecture course to uncovering the 
“originary” dimension of the as-structure. In the end, Heidegger identifies three crucial 
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moments in Dasein out of which logos becomes possible: 1) holding the binding 
character of things toward oneself, 2) completion, and 3) unveiling of the being of beings 
(1995, §73-74). Given the scope of this chapter, I will not rehearse Heidegger’s argument 
for this tripartite structure of Dasein’s world-formation. Rather, I want to tell a different 
story of what makes logos possible. This story will deviate from the tripartite account that 
Heidegger offers even though it is still informed by the lecture course and his other 
writings on language. As we have seen, for Heidegger the interrogation of propositional 
statements merely offers a “point of departure” for understanding the relationality of the 
as-structure. For the purpose of this chapter, it is important to take this point seriously 
and move beyond the relational structure in propositional statements—after all, saying 
that humans are distinguished from animals by virtue of the capacity to make 
propositional statement is strange and unsatisfactory. It is by moving beyond the 
derivative mode of the as-structure that we see more clearly what animals are being 
denied.  
 
Relationality and Logos 
Heidegger highlights the relational character of propositional statements in his formal 
account of the as-structure. Certainly, Heidegger does not use “relation” (Beziehung) to 
mean kinship (Verwandtschaft). Relation here is understood in terms of the 
interrelatedness of words. But is there a more primordial level of relationality out of 
which the structural relation of propositional statements derives? Specifically, what does 
this structural relation in propositional statements tell us about our social relations with 
others? Does one’s ability to articulate “S as P” say anything about one’s capacity for 
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kinship? And if animals do not relate to meaning in the linguistic realm, can they still 
relate to others meaningfully in the social sphere? While these questions seem to hinge on 
an equivocation of the word “relation,” they are in fact motivated by Heidegger’s 
interpretation of σύµβολου (symbol) in the lecture course. 
Notably, Heidegger’s account of σύµβολου takes place within the passage where 
he discusses the difference between animal utterance (φωνή) and human discourse (1995, 
§72). The two are distinguished insofar as human discourse is bounded by agreement 
(κατά συνθήκην); and the genesis of agreement is found precisely in σύµβολου (1995, 
307). So, following Aristotle, Heidegger isolates σύµβολου as the key ingredient of 
human discourse. But he finds the concept of “symbol” (the common translation for 
σύµβολου) inadequate. Instead, he articulates the meaning of σύµβολου as follows: 
Συµβολή means throwing one thing together with another, holding 
something together with something else, i.e., keeping them alongside one 
another, joining them to and with one another. σύµβολου therefore means 
joint, seam, or hinge, in which one thing is not simply brought together 
with the other, but the two are held to one another, so that they fit one 
another. (1995, 307) 
 
First of all, σύµβολου connotes a relationship—joining two things together. Second, the 
togetherness of σύµβολου is not some state of random thrown-togetherness. Rather, it is a 
kind of togetherness in which one thing fits another. Indeed, one may even say that the 
things are committed to each other. At this point, Heidegger offers a striking example to 
illustrate the “joining together” of σύµβολου: 
Whatever is held together, fits together so that the two parts prove to 
belong together, is σύµβολου. In the original concrete sense, for example, 
the two halves of a ring are σύµβολα which two guest-friends share 
between them and bequeath to their children, so that if the latter happen to 
meet later, they can hold together the halves of the ring to see if they fit, 
and can thereby recognize one another as belonging together, i.e., as 
befriended via their fathers. (1995, 307-308 emphases mine) 
  69 
 
Σύµβολου is about joining or bringing together the parts that belong to each other, like 
the two halves of a ring that fit together. And the two halves of the ring, in turn, are 
symbolic of a friendship. According to the Oxford Greek-English Lexicon, σύµβολου 
also means contract, covenant, bond, engagements of life, and even marriage contract— 
σύµβολου conveys the sociality of human lives.85  
It is interesting that in Heidegger’s example the ring is symbolic of more than one 
friendship, as the friendship between the two friends is passed on to the next generation 
through flesh and blood. The two halves of the ring are bequeathed to the children of the 
two friends so that the children may—many years later—recognize that they are 
“befriended via their fathers.” Importantly, the two children do not become friends upon 
reconnecting the two halves of the token; rather, they recognized that they (already) 
belong together. As such, the children are thrown into a friendship through the father-son 
kinship—a friendship that they will recognize only after their halved-rings find each 
other. Importantly, Heidegger uses the German word “zusammengehörig” to speak of the 
“belonging together” of the two children. The word itself is formed by “zusammen” and 
“gehören;” “zusammen” means “together,” “jointly,” “common,” while “gehören” means 
“to belong,” “to appertain.” Now, “gehören” is derived from “hören,” meaning “to hear,” 
“to listen,” “to hearken.” As we know, “hearing” and “listening” occupy an important 
place in Heidegger’s articulation of Dasein’s being. For one thing, “hearing is 
constitutive of discourse” (1962, 163). And insofar as Dasein is the kind of being who 
can engage in a discourse, listening becomes “Dasein’s existential way of Being-open as 
Being-with for Others” (1962, 163). It is in the “belonging” of “gehören” that we find 
                                                
85 Liddell and Scott (1996), 1676. 
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this “hearing,” which brings us back to the link between discourse and Dasein’s being-
with—that is, logos and sociality.86 
It is revealing that Heidegger uses the friendship token to illustrate what 
σύµβολου means “in the original concrete sense” (1995, 307). Specifically, it points to a 
link between logos and kinship. In the lecture course Heidegger maintains that the 
meaning of words is grounded in convention and agreement (of a community). The 
occurrence of agreement (κατά συνθήκην) is the condition of the possibility of discourse, 
logos (1995, §72). The relationship between sociality and language can be further 
illustrated in Heidegger’s discussion of communication in Being and Time and Basic 
Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy. As we will see, insofar as we are social beings, we 
are also the kind of beings whose utterances are meaningful. Kinship and discourse are 
intertwined.87  
 
Being-with and Language 
We have seen earlier that communication can take two forms: one is the mere 
proliferation of information, as exemplified in “idle talk;” the other has a disclosing 
quality that is proper to discourse. We can now turn to the latter type of communication. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger identifies communication [Mitteilung] as a structural 
component of “Assertion” (statement) (1962, §33-34). According to him, communication 
is  
                                                
86 One of the derivations of “zusammengehörig” is “Zusammengehörigkeit,” which means “togetherness,” 
“solidarity,” “common bond,” even “shared identity.” I am indebted to Susanne Bates for her assistance in 
the translation for “zusammengehörig.” 
 
87 I am indebted to Professor Elizabeth Jelinek for her assistance in the Greek translation. 
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Letting someone see with us what we have pointed out by way of giving it 
a definite character. Letting someone see with us shares with [teilt…mit] 
the Other that entity which has been pointed out in its definite 
character…As something communicated, that which has been put forward 
in the assertion is something that Others can ‘share’ with the person 
making the assertion. (1962, 15588 emphases added)  
 
Assertion (or statement), insofar as it communicates, discloses a shared world. 
Discoursing articulates for Dasein the intelligibility of being-in-the-world; and being-
with—specifically, being-with-one-another—belongs to Dasein’s being-in-the-world 
(1962, 162). In other words, communication makes it explicit that the being of Dasein is 
fundamentally being-with-one-another. Heidegger insists that communication is not a 
bridge that links one subject to the other, as if the two were initially separated. Rather, 
communication presupposes the being-with of Dasein, “In talking, Dasein expresses itself 
[spricht sich…aus] not because it has, in the first instance, been encapsulated as 
something ‘internal’ over against something outside, but because as Being-in-the-world it 
is already ‘outside’ when it understands” (1962, 162).89 Communication reveals to 
Dasein that it is always already socially constituted. (In the same vein, the halved-rings 
that the two friends bequeathed to their children disclose to the children that they are 
always already part of a friendship.)  
In his reading of Aristotle’s Politics, Heidegger articulates the link between 
speaking and sociality even more explicitly: “Speaking is, in itself, communicating; and, 
as communication, it is nothing other than κοινωνια [community, society]” (2009, 43). 
Insofar as Dasein is speaking-being, it is also social-being. In fact, to the extent that logos 
                                                
88 I use the Macquarrie and Robinson translation here. Page numbers refer to the German page. 
 
89 This passage expresses a similar sentiment, “[communication] is never anything like a conveying of 
experiences, such as opinions or wishes, from the interior of one subject into the interior of another. 
Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a co-state-of-mind and a co-understanding. In discourse 
Being-with becomes ‘explicitly’ shared” (1962, 162). 
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makes visible our being-with-one-another, being a speaking animal also means being a 
political animal, 
If λόγος constitutes the having-there-with-one-another of the world, the 
determination of being-with-one-another is constituted in it. And the 
determination of ζώοv λόγον έχον [speaking animal] must then, at the 
same time, contain within itself the determination of ζώοv πολιτικόν 
[political animal]…The distinctive being-with-one-another is not 
something that is brought to humans, but rather the being-possibility. 
(2009, 40) 
 
Heidegger maintains that our being-with is “equiprimordial” with our speaking-with 
(2009, 45). It is “equiprimordial” because, on the one hand, speaking presupposes being-
with; our words are meaningful because they are bounded by agreement (κατά 
συνθήκην). On the other hand, being-with is possible by virtue of our speaking 
capacity—“It is shown that κοινωνια [community, society] which forms the household 
(οικια) is only possible on the ground of λέγειν [expression], on the basis of the fact that 
the being of the human being is speaking with the world—expressing itself, speaking 
with others” (2009, 35). The relationship between speaking and sociality is understood 
circularly because they are equally basic, equally primordial, and we cannot “deduce one 
from the other” (2009, 45). As such, while language discloses our sociality, we must 
understand language and sociality as circularly constitutive. 
At this point, let us return to the discussion on language in the lecture course. We 
begin to see that the formal relationality that we have seen in propositional statements 
(exemplified by the as-structure) goes hand in hand with our social relations with others. 
Just as the “as-structure” of propositional statements makes explicit the relation between 
two terms, σύµβολου is, “in the original concrete sense,” a token that discloses a 
forgotten friendship. According to Heidegger, the occurrence of the symbol 
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(σύµβολου)—that is, the occurrence of this togetherness—is the condition of the 
possibility of discourse (1995, 308). Indeed, we are able to employ the “as-relation” in 
propositional statements only because we are already the kind of creatures who are 
capable of relating socially.  
Given Heidegger’s interpretation of σύµβολου, in particular the significance of 
his “guest-friends” example, the animal’s inaccessibility to logos is shown in a new light. 
If our speaking-with and being-with are “equiprimordial,” then by denying animals logos, 
Heidegger seems to call into question their capacity for kinship as well. (What is in 
question is certainly animal’s kinship with Dasein, but as we will see, even their kinship 
with other animals seems precarious.) Just as the as-structure in propositional statements 
is refused to the animal, σύµβολου is what distinguishes human discourse from animal 
utterance. And if human discourse is bounded by agreement (κατά συνθήκην), then 
animal utterance is mere sound, it is fragmented and unbounded by covenants. The 
distinction between human discourse and animal utterance is grounded in the possibility 
of the two levels of relationality—both the formal as-relation and the social relation. In 
the next section, I will turn to Heidegger’s account of captivation—the specific way 
animals relate to their environments.  
 
Animal’s Captivation 
At the end of §48 of the lecture course, Heidegger’s interrogation of animality has led 
him to the question of animal kinship. He asks, “What does the animal relate to, and what 
sort of relationship does it have to whatever it seeks as nourishment, seizes as prey, or 
attacks as hostile?” (1995, 200). This question is particularly interesting because it seems 
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to suggest that animals have some access to the “as-structure” insofar as they relate to 
others as nourishment, as prey, or as hostile. But for Heidegger, animal relations—if 
animals relate at all—are necessarily impoverished and circumscribed.90 And just as he 
insists that animal sounds are prompted by particular physiological conditions, Heidegger 
describes animal relations in terms of physiological and instinctual needs. 91  Two 
examples (both on the animal’s relation to food) from the lecture courses are particularly 
relevant here. 
In one instance, Heidegger insists that a beetle relates to a blade of grass as a 
“beetle-path on which the beetle seeks beetle-nourishment, and not just any edible matter 
in general” (1995, 198 emphases mine). The beetle acknowledges the blade of grass as its 
nourishment; but it does not acknowledge the blade of grass as food as such. (Heidegger 
doesn’t think the beetle conceives of the blade of grass as food for a cow, for example.) 
In another instance, Heidegger also denies that bees can relate to food as such. He draws 
this insight on one of J. von Uexküll’s experiments. In it, the bee’s abdomen was cut off 
while it was sucking a bowl of honey. The bee reportedly did not stop sucking even while 
the honey was running out from its body (1995, 242). For Heidegger, this example is 
indicative of the bee’s inability to recognize honey as such (honey as presence, honey as 
food). The bee is driven by its instinct to eat, and its honey-sucking behavior is dictated 
by the sensor of satiety in its abdomen, and thus the bee does not—and need not—relate 
to honey as food.  So, while animals may relate to others (as nourishment, as prey, as 
hostile), this relation is necessarily egoistic, driven by a practical, immediate need.  
                                                
90 As some commentators have noted, animals do not have access to the apophantic-as, even though they 
may have access to the hermeneutic-as. See Winkler (2007).  
 
91 As we have seen, Heidegger insists that animal sounds must be contradistinguished from words (1995, 
307).  
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Unlike the beetle and the bee, humans do seem to relate to food as such. We do, 
for example, see a piece of steak on the plate as edible matter in general—it’s edible not 
only because we happened to be hungry at the time. It is edible matter not just for the 
specific diner, but also (potentially) for the diner’s family, friends, and even her pets. 
Indeed, we can even relate to the steak as something other than food. We can, for 
instance, see the steak as fashion (à la Lady Gaga), as art,92 as corpse, as a representation 
of factory farm, or as the dead mother of an orphaned calf. But despite these various 
(non-egoistic) ways of relating to the steak, we may question, in a good Derridean 
fashion, whether humans always relate to food as food. Consider the times when we 
snack mindlessly or distractedly, and we realize that we have eaten too much only when 
we have reached the bottom of a 16-oz bag of chips. Or even the times when we are 
actually “captivated” by the food, and we just want to keep eating. At the end, perhaps 
the main reason we don’t keep gorging ourselves is that we, unlike the amputated bee in 
Uexküll’s experiment, actually have an abdomen! 
The egoistic character of animal relation is buttressed by Heidegger’s notion of 
captivation. Again, drawing on Uexküll’s observations, Heidegger attributes 
“captivation” (Benommenheit) to the animal as its specific manner of being. Heidegger 
describes captivation as “that intermediate state somewhere between consciousness and 
unconsciousness” (1995, 239). This in-between status is particularly appropriate for the 
animal, which is situated between the world-forming human and the world-less stone. 
Heidegger describes the bee as being “taken [hingenommen] by its food,” and that it was 
“captivated by the scent and the honey” (1995, 242, 243). Furthermore, this captivation is 
characterized in terms of the “absorption” of the animal.   
                                                
92 For instance, Zhang Huan, a contemporary Chinese artist, is famous for his muscle suit made of meat. 
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Behavior as a manner of being in general is only possible on the basis of 
the animal’s absorption in itself [Eingenommenheit in sich]. We shall 
describe the specific way in which the animal remains with itself…this 
way in which the animal is absorbed in itself, and which makes possible 
behavior of any and every kind, as captivation [Benommenheit]. (1995, 
238-9; italics in original) 
 
Heidegger’s animal is self-absorbed to the extent that it “remains with itself.” (Or as one 
commentator puts it, the animal is “captive to its own instincts.”93) The language of 
“captivation” is significant as it conjures up the image of animals as our captives.94 The 
German original for captivation is “Benommenheit,” which can also be rendered as 
“dizziness,” or the state of being “stunned,” “numbed,” or “dazed.” Derrida calls 
“Benommenheit” a “mute stupor,” linking together animal’s captivation and their silence 
(2008, 19). But “nehmen,” which is the root of “benommen,” also conveys a sense of 
isolation or severance as it can also mean “taken away” or “blocked.” But from what are 
the animals being “blocked”? For Heidegger, animals are severed from the world of 
meaning and thus severed from all linguistic beings, Dasein. Whereas Dasein is open to 
beings as such, the animal is imprisoned by its instincts and absorbed in itself. Animals 
and Dasein are separated by an “abyss,” as Heidegger puts it repeatedly (cf. 1968, 16; 
1993, 230).  
                                                
93 Calarco, 2004, 24. 
 
94 Winkler offers a helpful etymological analysis of “Benommenheit” as follows, 
benommen (captivated, stunned, taken away, blocked), eingenommen (taken in, 
absorbed), or Benehmen (behaviour)… all refer back to the German verb nehmen (to 
take), which derives from the Indo-European root *nem , to distribute, to allot, to assign. 
(2007, 525) 
According to Winkler, the significance of “distribution” in “Benommenheit” lies in Protagoras’ story of 
nature. In Protagoras’s story, Epimetheus was responsible for providing animals with their respective 
nature, and Epimetheus did so by distributing various capacities to them—a “labour of nature” that 
Protagoras repeatedly describes with the term “nomos,” norms (2007, 524). Drawing on Protagoras’ story, 
Winkler argues that Heidegger uses “captivation” to convey the normativity of animal behavior, thereby 
challenging the norm-nature binary (2007, 524 ff.) While Winkler’s provocative analysis focuses on the 
normativity of animal behavior, I want to draw attention to the ways animals become our literal captives. 
See also Derrida’s discussion on animal captivation (2008, 19).  
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Significantly, Heidegger speaks of animal’s captivation as occurring in and 
through its instinctual drives; and these (interrelated) instinctual drives are constituted in 
what he calls a “disinhibiting ring” (1995, 249). For Heidegger, this ring opens up to the 
animal its instinctual capacities (thus “disinhibiting”). This is within the ring that the 
animal relates to its environment instinctually, though this limited relationship still does 
not give the animal access to beings as such. Indeed, this disinhibiting ring is a ring that 
encircles the animal in a way that “[the animal] cannot escape” (1995, 249). The animal 
is a captive of its own disinhibiting ring. Interestingly, whereas the ring of the two guest-
friends reveals to the children that they “belong together” by way of their own flesh-and-
blood, the ring of the animal becomes the barrier that keeps the animal away from the 
world of meaning and Dasein. In the end, Heidegger’s ring is at the service of human 
kinship exclusively. 
In Heidegger’s account of animal captivation, we see that the animal is denied 
kinship with Dasein. But what about their kinship with other animals? Our treatments of 
animals seem to presuppose that animal kinship is either absent or irrelevant. In zoos, 
babies are often separated from their mothers; in factory farms, calves are taken away 
from their mothers shortly after birth. Isolation or severance is common practice in our 
captivation of animals. In fact, it has become such a standard practice that we come to see 
a solitary existence as a form of de-humanized, animalistic existence. In a recent paper, 
Lisa Guenther analyzes solitary confinement in relation to animality.95 According to her 
research, prisoner advocates often employ the rhetoric of dehumanization when they 
condemn disciplinary practices—including solitary confinement. Prisoners who were 
                                                
95 Guenther questions whether the rhetoric of “de-humanization” is adequate for us to challenge the practice 
of solitary confinement, insofar as this rhetoric continues to rely on the human-animal binary  
(Forthcoming, 6-7). 
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subjected to solitary confinement often compare their condition to that of a captive 
animal. One observer even describes the behavior of these prisoners as resembling 
“caged felines pacing at a zoo” (Guenther, 3). The lack of external stimuli in solitary 
confinement penalizes the inmates by stripping them of their relationality. However, as 
Guenther rightly argues, the rhetoric of dehumanization is problematic as it denies that 
animals, like humans, are also social, intercorporeal beings. The very censure of solitary 
confinement as “dehumanizing” reinforces the myth that solitude is proper to the animal, 
while kinship is proper to the human. The rhetoric of dehumanization reveals that we 
continue to think of animals as asocial beings devoid of kinship in our social-political 
discourse. While for Heidegger “captivation” deprives the animal of beings as such (i.e., 
the realm of the symbolic), our everyday captivation of animals also deprives animals of 
their relational possibility. Once again, linguistic possibility and social possibility become 
intertwined. In Animal Lessons, Kelly Oliver points out that if language for Heidegger is 
the “house of being and the home of man,” then denying animals language would also 
“[leave] animals with neither house nor home” (2009, 199). Following her analysis, we 
may say that Heidegger’s animals are strays because they have no relations: If family and 
friendship are constitutive of a home, then the lack of kinship renders animals homeless.     
 
The Ape That Has No Hands 
The connection between language and kinship is illustrated in a different text of 
Heidegger’s as well. In What is Called Thinking?, Heidegger claims that apes have no 
hands; he insists that “only a being who can speak, that is, think, can have hands” (1968, 
16). The hand is at the service of language (thinking) insofar as thinking is a handicraft. 
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But if having hands presupposes language, then apes don’t have hand precisely because 
they don’t speak. What, then, can the hand do that distinguishes it from a mere “grasping 
organ”? What makes the hand so special that it is reserved for linguistic beings only?96  
 In Geschlecht II, Derrida argues that the distinction between the hand and the 
prehensile organ is “reducible to the assured opposition of giving and taking” (1987, 175; 
italics in original). In his view, “this thought of the hand belongs to the essence of the 
gift, of a giving that would give, if this is possible, without taking hold of anything” 
(1987, 173; italics in original). Derrida’s emphasis on “giving” is informed by 
Heidegger’s own articulation of the hand as welcoming, “The hand reaches and extends, 
receives and welcomes—and not just things: the hand extends itself, and receives its own 
welcome in the hands of others” (1968, 16). Indeed, in handshaking the hand grabs but 
only in order to offer. It is by taking hold of the hand of others that one offers hospitality 
(welcoming) or good wishes (bidding farewell). The hand is the site where relationship is 
inaugurated and celebrated. It is distinguished from other grasping organs by virtue of its 
ability to offer hospitality and nurture relationships. Whereas in the lecture course the 
openness to meaning—and the possibility of meaningful relationships—is reserved for 
those who have access to the “as-structure,” here the having of hands—and the possibility 
of generating relationships—is reserved for speaking beings.  
 
                                                
96 At first glance, Heidegger seems to be making a distinction between physical and mental grasping. With 
“grasping organs,” one may grab, snatch, or capture, but it is with “hands” that one may craft thoughts and 
philosophize. But this distinction is complicated by the metaphoric use of “grasping” to mean 
“understanding.” In French, for example, there is an etymological affinity between “taking hold of” 
(prendre) and “understanding” (comprendre); whereas in English there is “apprehend,” which means on the 
one hand seizing or arresting (grasping physically), and on the other hand understanding (grasping 
conceptually). In Geschlecht II, Derrida argues that the metaphoric use of “grasping” obscures the 
ontological distinction between a hand and a prehensile organ. In his view, at stake is not a distinction 
between physical and conceptual grasping, but between “giving and taking.” 
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Animal’s Poverty in Relationality 
At this juncture, I should turn to one of the main theses that Heidegger intends to advance 
in his lecture course—animal’s poverty in world. There are many interpretations 
regarding this thesis, especially regarding Heidegger’s anthropocentrism.97 I will not 
engage in this debate in this chapter; rather, I will examine this poverty-thesis in order to 
trace another important moment of animal kinship in the lecture course. As we will see, 
in Heidegger’s illustration of “poverty” and “deprivation,” animal kinship once again 
becomes his point of departure. 
Let us return to the question that Heidegger broaches at the end of §48, “What 
does the animal relate to, and what sort of relationship does it have to whatever it seeks as 
nourishment, seizes as prey, or attacks as hostile?” As we have seen, even though this 
question seems to suggest that the animal has access to the “as-structure” and 
relationality, Heidegger ultimately insists on a rather impoverished and egoistic picture of 
animal kinship. The question of how the animal relates to others becomes the focus of 
§49 and 50. But before he plunges into the question of animal kinship, Heidegger 
specifies a methodological problem:  
But how do we do so [inquiring about the animal’s relation to the world]? 
How else by transposing ourselves into the animal? But do we not then 
run the danger of interpreting the being of the animal from our own 
perspective? Perhaps we could ultimately obviate any misinterpretation 
that might arise. However, there is another much more important and 
fundamental question here: Can we transpose ourselves into an animal at 
all? (1995, 201 italics in original) 
 
Heidegger then extends the question of transposability to stones and humans. Can we 
transpose ourselves into a stone? Can we transpose ourselves into another human being? 
                                                
97 See Colony (2007, 12); Winkler (2007, 522-523). Both Colony and Winkler agree that reading 
Heidegger’s thesis as straightforwardly anthropocentric is inadequate. 
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Heidegger insists that transposition is not a matter of transference or substitution. We 
don’t so to speak put ourselves in the shoes of the other (either actually or imaginatively), 
as if we can vacate our subjectivity and assume the interiority of other beings. For 
Heidegger, transposition is not a matter of becoming the other; rather it is a matter of 
going along with the other. And the very idea of going along with someone presupposes 
that there is, in fact, some other person with whom we go along. Indeed, transposition is 
possible only when we maintain a boundary between the other and ourselves. As 
Heidegger puts it, “[there] can be no going-along-with if the one who wishes […] to go 
along with the other relinquishes himself in advance” (1995, 203).  
Interestingly, for Heidegger it is the first question—our transposability into the 
animal—that makes the most sense. Or, as he puts it in a double-negative way, this 
question “does not represent an intrinsically nonsensical undertaking” (1995, 204). With 
regard to our transposability to a stone, Heidegger is adamant that the stone “offers no 
sphere…such that we could transpose ourselves into the stone” (1995, 204). We have no 
access to the stone not because we lack the appropriate means, but rather because the 
stone is not accessible to us in principle. On the other hand, the question regarding our 
transposability into other human beings betrays a problematic Cartesian assumption. 
Specifically, it assumes that each of us begins as a solipsistic consciousness whose being 
is separated from others. But for Heidegger, insofar as we exist, we are already 
transposed into other human beings. In fact, it is “the essential constitution of human 
Dasein that it intrinsically means being with others” (1995, 206). Thus it is “superfluous” 
to ask whether it is possible to transpose oneself into other human beings when this 
possibility “already and originally belongs to man’s own essence” (1995, 207; 205).  
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Now, the question regarding the possibility for the human to transpose into the 
animal is not “nonsensical.” For unlike the stone, the animal does offer the possibility to 
be transposed. But neither is this question “superfluous,” for even though we are in 
principle capable of transposing into the animal, we are not factically transposed into 
them. Here enters Heidegger’s example of domestic pets. Heidegger insists that a dog 
may live with us in the house but not exist with us. The dog may “move within our 
world,” (lying under the table, running up the stairs, eating with us), and yet it refuses to 
go along with us (1995, 210). The dog offers the possibility to be transposed and yet 
refuses to be transposed. For Heidegger, it is the double movement of offering-and-yet-
refusing that characterizes animal poverty. To see this, it is important to clarify what 
Heidegger means by “poverty” or being poor. 
For Heidegger, poverty does not mean having less or being deficient (vis-à-vis 
having more or being rich); poverty is not a measure of quantitative differences (1995, 
195). This is crucial because Heidegger insists that the talk of the poor-in-world animal 
and the world-forming Dasein should not be understood as a “hierarchical evaluation” 
(1995, 194).98 Rather, “poverty” means being deprived of something; it is a “lacking or 
absence of something which could be present and generally ought to be present” (1995, 
195 italics added). One can be deprived only if one is able to have in the first place. 
Consider, for example, taking away a toy from a child in contrast to picking up a toy 
from a chair. We may say that a child is deprived of her toy, but the same cannot be said 
about the chair even though in both instances a toy has been removed. As such, poverty 
                                                
98 As Oliver (2009) points out, a hierarchy would suggest that “humans and animals had enough in common 
to be compared”—a claim that Heidegger cannot accept since he views humans and animals as radically 
different beings (197).    
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(understood as deprivation) presupposes the possibility to have something in the first 
place. As Heidegger puts it, “not-having in being able to have is precisely deprivation, is 
poverty” (1995, 211).  
The poverty thesis has often been read in relation to the animal’s lack of 
language.99 This reading is accurate to the extent that Heidegger anchors his argument of 
world-hood to the linguistic divide. But let us return one more time to the dog that refuses 
us. The domestic pet example is supposed to illustrate the notion of “privation” or 
“poverty.” The dog’s refusal presupposes the possibility for transposition in the first 
place. (After all, it doesn’t make sense for the dog to refuse something that it couldn’t 
have in the first place.) Given its possibility to be transposed, the dog’s refusal to be 
transposed has rendered it deprived of transposition. Indeed, the dog is deprived first and 
foremost a kinship with those whom it lives under the same roof. It lives in our physical 
sphere (our house) without entering the social sphere (our home). The dog is deprived of 
relationality not because it cannot relate in principle, but because it is caught in a social 
limbo: it refuses relation despite offering this possibility. As such, the question regarding 
our transposability into the animal is not superfluous because relationality is not 
something that we can take for granted in the animal realm. Whereas Dasein’s sociality is 
a given, animal kinship is precarious. 
Significantly, the word “refuse” in the original German text is “versagen.” The 
root of “versagen” is “sagen,” meaning to speak or to say. The word-formation “ver-
sagen” is especially telling. In German the prefix “ver” sometimes changes the meaning 
of the verb to its reversal; for example, “achten” means to esteem or to respect, but 
“verachten” becomes to despise, to condemn; “lernen” means to learn, but “verlernen” 
                                                
99 See Winkler (2007, 523). 
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means to forget. Sometimes “ver” changes the verb to mean that the act is being done in a 
wrong or undesirable way. For example, “laufen” means to move or to walk, but 
“verlaufen” means to stray; “sprechen” means to speak, but “(sich) versprechen” means 
to make a slip of the tongue. Sometimes “ver” also carries the implication of excess or 
the progress to destruction. For example, “bluten” means to bleed, but “verbluten” 
becomes hemorrhage or even bleeding to death, and whereas “schlafen” means to sleep, 
“verschlafen” becomes to oversleep.  
In light of these modificatory effects of “ver,” how should we make sense of “ver-
sagen,” and especially animals’ “ver-sagen”? Minimally, their “refusal” has something to 
do with speaking (sagen), and the prefix “ver” seems to change this speaking or saying 
into something negative. (In addition to the verb “refuse,” “versagen” also means to fail 
or to malfunction.) So, is animal’s refusal a failure to speak? Is it a speaking that has 
gone astray? Or is “refusal” a contaminated, degenerated way of speaking? In any case, 
whether Heidegger intends it or not, the refusal of animals brings us back to the question 
of language, and specifically the linguistic divide between Dasein and animals.  
 To summarize, this chapter is a response to the link between reason and language 
that has pervaded the history of Western philosophy. Drawing on Heidegger’s work on 
animality, I articulate an alternative way to conceive language. Specifically, I show that 
for Heidegger, relationality, rather than reason, is at the heart of language. We are the 
kind of beings who speak not because we are intellectually advanced, but because we are 
fundamentally social beings. Our ability to relate to the realm of meaning goes hand in 
hand with our ability to relate to others meaningfully. This alternative account of 
language, in turn, casts a new light on the human-animal linguistic divide—by denying 
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linguistic capacity to the animal, we are also denying them the capacity to relate. While 
Heidegger denies animal kinship to Dasein specifically (so a dialogue between a human 
house and an animal shelter is not possible?), our everyday treatment of animals denies 
animal kinship with other animals more generally.  
 
Transposability and Speaking for Animals 
To conclude, I want to return to the problem of speaking for others. I argue in chapter one 
that animals do not relieve us from the burden of speaking for them—we cannot avoid 
representing animals even in the most radical disavowal of speaking for them. Here, 
Heidegger’s notion of transposition is particularly instructive to the problem of speaking 
for others. As we have seen, Heidegger insists that transposition means “going along 
with” the other rather than assuming the position of the other. He is clear that the 
“otherness” of the other must be preserved in the process of transposition—“the other 
being is precisely supposed to remain what it is and how it is” (1995, 202). After all, there 
is no one to go along with if there is no otherness. 
If Heidegger is right and transposition calls for otherness, then it would certainly 
call into question the usual rhetoric that seeks to blur the differences between humans and 
animals in animal rights discourse. (Specifically, the kinds of arguments that seek to 
grant rights to creatures that possess human-like features.100)  One may then be tempted 
to say that this “otherness” in transposition can be sustained by letting animals “speak for 
themselves.” But as I have argued in chapter one, even the fantasy of having animals 
speak for themselves seems to uphold rather than challenge the authority of speech. As 
                                                
100 In “Of Mice and Men,” Catherine MacKinnon offers a helpful critique of “seeking animal rights on a 
‘like-us’ model of sameness” (2004, 264). 
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such, the very refusal to speak for the animal continues to assert the primacy of logos and 
linguistic beings.  
Now, perhaps a more productive way to sustain this “otherness” is not to insist 
that the animal also speaks, but to acknowledge the asymmetry of our moral 
responsibility—we are responsible to animals even if they do not reciprocate. For animal 
ethicists, the fact that animals are “cruel” to each other and that they consume each other 
does not exonerate our cruelty against animals. Their apparent lack of moral agency is 
irrelevant to our responsibility to them.101 And this asymmetry of responsibility is 
precisely informed by human exceptionalism: we can be compassionate even to the most 
vicious predator, and we can adhere to the strictest vegan diet while allowing our cats to 
chase, catch, and terrorize other creatures in our backyards. We hold ourselves to 
exceptional moral standards because we acknowledge our otherness from other animals. 
At the end, perhaps this is what transposing into the animal comes down to: we must take 
on the responsibility to speak for them even if this responsibility carries an 
anthropocentric and distasteful history. We must go-along-with the animal even if they 
continue to refuse us. It is when we speak for them that we most effectively “go along 
with”—and mitigate violence against—the animal.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
101 I am not suggesting that animals cannot grasp moral responsibility in principle. In fact, animal research 
seems to suggest that some animals can be moral agents (Shapiro 2006). 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
ANIMAL IDENTITY: THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENCE IN THE ANIMAL RIGHTS 
DISCOURSE 
 
Which Animal Should We Save? 
In a recent article “Stop Saving These Animals,” Eric Andrew-Gee argues that animal 
advocates should carefully consider their priority. He points out that some animal 
protection campaigns receive more attention and momentum not because the animals in 
question “suffer most,” but rather because they happen to be more “photogenic” 
(Andrew-Gee 2012). He cites Russia’s recent ban on the import of harp seal pelts as an 
example of a misguided priority because seals are killed in much smaller scale than other 
animals, especially animals that we raise for consumption. He ends his article by 
comparing this misguided priority in animal rights agenda as follows, “[it] would be like 
sending humanitarian aid to a small colony of starving supermodels, while ignoring a 
famine in a country of five million frumpy cleaning ladies” (Andrew-Gee 2012).  
Despite the problematic analogy at the end: comparing photogenic animals to 
“starving supermodels” and unnoticed suffering animals to  “frumpy cleaning ladies,” 
Andrew-Gee’s article raises the important point that not all animals are equal within the 
animal rights movement. Some animals seem to count more just by being cute or furry.  
Interestingly, Andrew-Gee’s point is that all animals should not be equal, especially when 
we think strategically—animal advocates should carefully prioritize given their limited 
resources. So, which animal should we save (first)? And which one should we “stop 
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saving”? Indeed, which animal do we have in mind when we talk about “animal rights”? 
Who (what) do we include in animal ethics? Who (what) are we speaking for?  
 
*  *  * 
 
Within the history of Western philosophy, the “animal” often serves as a foil 
against which we acquire self-identity—we are what the animal is not. The question of 
animal identity is at the service of constructing human identity. This negative 
anthropology, however, presupposes a unified animal identity. But what do we mean 
when we say “the animal”? Surely, we can say that the animal is what is not human, but 
then we simply get caught in a circular argument wherein we define the human as what 
the animal is not, and we define the animal as what is not human. But the indeterminacy 
of animal identity is not just a metaphysical puzzle. As we will soon see, discourses on 
animal rights are fraught with identity questions.  
In this chapter, I analyze issues of identity within the context of the animal 
protection movement. I show that the purported inclusivity of the name “animal” 
obscures our dissonant (and at times conflicting) commitments to different animals. By 
articulating the messiness of animal identity in animal rights discourses, I also show that 
the question of animal identity is intimately tied to the question of language, specifically 
the question of how we should speak for animals. I borrow insights from feminist 
discourses on identity politics to articulate the strategies of identification and counter-
identification employed by animal advocates. The two main figures that I engage with in 
this chapter are Jacques Derrida and Ludwig Wittgenstein. While both thinkers are 
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resistant to the essentialism that has plagued our understanding of concept, definition, or 
identity, they offer radically different ways to respond to the “problem of difference” in 
identity politics. As we will see, whereas Derrida’s deconstruction multiplies identity 
troubles, Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance seeks to “dissolve” these troubles.  
 
What’s in a Name? : Animal Identity in the Animal Protection Movement 
The first chapter of Peter Singer’s seminal work Animal Liberation is titled “All Animals 
Are Equal.” Two questions immediately arise from this provocative title: What counts as 
an animal? And in what sense are all animals equal? Singer devotes a significant portion 
of his argument to answering the second question (the “equality question”). In his view, 
animals are equal insofar as they are sentient beings; sentient beings are equal in the 
sense that their interest should be considered equally. While Singer addresses the 
“equality question” painstakingly, he seems to have sidestepped the “identity” question 
(what counts as an animal). In fact, throughout his argument the identity of animal is 
assumed rather than interrogated. This is perhaps not surprising given Singer’s utilitarian 
commitment. Indeed, for Singer the only relevant feature of animal identity would be 
animal’s capacity to feel pain. For him the question is not what counts as an animal? But 
which animal counts? Various non-sentience creatures might be taxonomically classified 
as “animals,” but they wouldn’t be animals that count in a utilitarian scheme. However, 
reducing animal identity to mere sentience produces some interesting conclusions. For 
example, in the first edition of Animal Liberation Singer feels that “somewhere between a 
shrimp and an oyster” would be a good place to draw a line between sentience and non-
sentience beings (2009, 174). But in the 2009 edition of the book Singer argues that we 
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should play it safe, for “while one cannot with any confidence say that these creatures do 
feel pain, so one can equally have little confidence in saying that they do not feel pain” 
(2009, 174). This argument from ignorance is dubious at best. As Slate columnist 
Christopher Cox puts it, “We also can’t state with compete confidence that plants do, or 
do not, feel pain—yet so far Singer hasn’t made a stand against alfalfa abuse” (2010). In 
his response to Cox, Singer readily admits that he has gone “back and forth” on the oyster 
issue, and concedes that the chances of oysters being sentient are so slight that “there is 
no good reason for avoiding eating sustainably produced oysters” (Cox 2010). 
Interestingly, as soon as Singer moves beyond the token animals in animal ethics (e.g., 
the big mammals), the issue of animal identity returns to haunt him.102  
Singer’s oyster problem highlights the indeterminacy of animal identity in animal 
ethics. This indeterminacy becomes even more evident in the legal discourse. While the 
label of “animal” is inclusive, animal protection agendas do not (and cannot) include 
every species of creatures that we typically call “animal.” In fact, animal laws typically 
protect only vertebrates; given that vertebrates make up only 2% of all animal species, 
most animal species are actually excluded from animal protection law. In the US, each 
state has its own animal protection laws, and the definition of “animal” varies across 
states. For example, in Alaska “animal” includes all vertebrate living creatures except 
humans and fish; in Illinois the definition of “animal” also excludes man, but it is defined 
more liberally to include “every living creature, domestic or wild.” In Colorado, Ohio, 
and Wyoming,  “animal” means “any living dumb creature”—a definition that invokes 
                                                
102 For an interesting analysis on Singer’s oyster problem, see Ito 2008. In it, Ito argues that Singer’s 
reconsideration is motived by a “fundamental compassion” that goes beyond rational thinking (124-125). 
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the linguistic divide between humans and animals.103  
Interestingly, even within the same state, the meaning of animal may change 
depending on the offense. For example, Iowa penal code stipulates the meaning of 
“animal” as nonhuman vertebrates. When it comes to general prohibitions such as animal 
abuse and animal torture, this definition of “animal” has a long list of exceptions; it 
excludes livestock, game, fur-bearing animals, fish, reptiles, amphibians, and any non-
game species that is considered a nuisance. However, the definition of “animal” changes 
when it comes to bestiality. For the purpose of defining bestiality, an “animal” becomes 
“any nonhuman vertebrate, either dead or alive,” and the long list of exceptions 
disappears. In other words, when it comes to animal abuse and animal torture, Iowa law 
does not necessarily protect creatures such as livestock and game, and it certainly does 
not cover dead animals. But when it comes to bestiality, the definition of animal expands 
to include even the dead creatures. It is true that while one cannot abuse or torture a dead 
animal, one can still engage in sexual intercourse with an animal corpse. This definitional 
discrepancy suggests that even though the prohibition against bestiality is catalogued 
under the title “Sexual Assault,” it goes beyond the concern for animal welfare. It is 
considered a taboo—punishable by law—to engage in bestiality even if the animal in 
question is already dead and no longer calls for protection.  
Generally speaking, the animals that matter within the legal realm are restricted to 
nonhuman vertebrates. As such, “pests” are typically excluded from anti-cruelty law.104 
                                                
103 All references to states laws come from Stephan Otto’s 6th edition of the Animal Protection Laws 
compendium (2011).  
 
104 Indeed, even the meaning of “pests” in the legal realm is tenuous and it does not always conform to our 
common notion of “pest.” For instance, peacock is considered a kind of pest. In 2011, an early version of 
the “Peacock Bill” (SB 1533) sought to stipulate that peacocks do not count as pests. But the final version 
of the bill (passed in Hawaii) dropped this stipulation, and merely states that the killing of the pest should 
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As I have noted, given vertebrates make up only 2% of all animal species, 98% of all 
animal species are actually excluded from animal protection law. Indeed, just as our legal 
discourse privileges certain species of animals, public sentiment toward animal welfare 
also reveals favoritism. For instance, while dog-fighting and dolphin-hunting enrage the 
public, slaughterhouses, animal circuses, and trophy-hunting are generally sanctioned. 
Someone can be simultaneously a dog-advocate and deer-hunter, and someone who 
vehemently opposes cock-fighting may not feel any qualms enjoying a chicken sandwich.   
Animal advocates have criticized these “single-issue” campaigns (e.g., the anti-fur 
campaign, the anti-dolphin-fishing campaign) for neglecting the more systematic, 
institutionalized exploitation of animals. As Andrew-Gee points out, some of these 
single-issue campaigns have misguided priorities. In a recent commentary on West 
Hollywood’s ban on fur, legal scholar Gary Francione criticizes these campaigns for 
“[seeking] arbitrarily to declare some form of animal use or some animal product as 
morally more odious than others. These campaigns are not only problematic as a matter 
of moral theory; they are a practical failure in real-world terms.”105 For Francione, as 
long as we remain complacent about the systematic use of animals, picking and choosing 
one issue to protest will not improve animal welfare in general.  
Surely, many animal advocates are vegetarians or vegans; and there have been 
campaigns for animals in slaughterhouses and for the less popular animals such as lab 
mice and spiders. However, even if we refuse to use any animal products, the inclusivity 
                                                                                                                                            
be “handled in accordance with standard and acceptable pest control practices and all applicable laws and 
regulations.” 
 
105 Gary Francione, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/25/ban-fur-then-why-not-
leather/no-moral-distinction-between-furs-and-leathers 
 
  93 
of the label “animal” remains problematic. Different species of animals call for 
different—and at times competing—obligations; and our duty to one animal is often 
made at the expense of other animals. For example, proponents of animal testing at times 
justify their cause with the claim that animal testing saves animal lives as well.106 This 
rhetoric paradoxically appeals to the well being of animals—but only the animals that we 
care about. Although animal rights advocates are often against animal testing, some 
animal protection agendas are also predicated on this economy of life-exchange. For 
instance, the preservation of a carnivorous species at conversation centers necessarily 
involves the death of other beasts as prey (the latter being the food for the former); and 
while we may welcome stray cats and dogs to our home, we feed them turkey and 
salmon.  
Even an ardent animal advocate may tolerate animal “cruelty”—as long as it is 
done by other animals. After all, we don’t condemn our cats and dogs for chasing, 
terrorizing, and devouring other creatures in our backyard. Our concern for one animal to 
flourish (say, our cat) may come at the expense of other animals (squirrels and birds!). 
Insofar as “cruelty” is inevitable in the animal realm, the scope of animal protection is 
circumscribed—even if we can protect animals from human cruelty, we cannot protect 
them from animal cruelty. My point is not that animal advocates are hypocrites; rather, I 
want to draw attention to the label of “animal” in the animal protection movement—the 
purported inclusivity of the name can turn against itself and obscure conflicting and 
dissonant commitments.  
                                                
106 An organization called “Research Saves” argues that animal researches save lives—both human and 
animal. See http://www.researchsaves.org/ 
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Animal Identity, Animal Standpoint 
Questions of identity are intimately tied to the question of speaking for animals. For one 
thing, can we responsibly speak for those whose standpoint we do not (and perhaps 
cannot) occupy? How can we “put ourselves into another’s shoe” when this “other” has 
paws, claws, or talons? This is perhaps why animal ethics often employs the “like-us” 
rhetoric: by emphasizing the shared qualities between humans and animals—be it 
sentience, vulnerability, or the capacity to experience life—philosophers seek common 
ground on which we can speak for the animals.  But as we have seen in chapter one, the 
act of speaking for others, even if well-intended, can still be problematic. Feminist 
philosophers such as Linda Alcoff and Catherine MacKinnon have cautioned against the 
paternalism that often comes with the impulse to speak for others. But the “violence” of 
speaking for others is more than assuming the identity of others in a paternalistic way. As 
we will see, speaking for others can also be “violent” if we speak for them as a unified 
group, that is, if we fail to respect the heterogeneity of those we speak for. 
The problematics of animal identity is forcefully articulated by Derrida in The 
Animal That Therefore I am. There, Derrida takes issue with the name “animal;” he 
argues that the name “animal” is employed so that we can “speak of the animal with a 
single voice” (2008, 32). Indeed, we use the word “animal” in the singular as if it 
represents all animals—from our primate cousins to our feline companions, from birds to 
insects to sponges. We reduce all these different species of living thing into an imaginary 
unity, a “chimera,” as Derrida calls it (2008, 23). For Derrida, whenever we use “animal” 
in the singular we are complicit in a “veritable war of the species” (2008, 31). Perhaps we 
can even think of it as a war on species. In this war, we do violence to animals not with a 
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butcher knife, but with the refusal of a name proper to them. We reduce biodiversity by 
reducing different species to a homogenous singularity.    
Derrida’s critique parallels the concern many feminist, race, or queer theorists 
have articulated regarding identity politics. That is, the concern that labeling a movement 
under a general category (such as “woman,” “gay,” “African-American”) obscures 
internal differences within the movement.107 For instance, the women’s movement has 
been faulted for overlooking racial and class differences among its participants. In Ain’t I 
a Woman: Black Women and Feminism, bell hooks argues that the feminist movement 
has been shaped largely by the vision of middle-class white women, a vision that is either 
irrelevant—or at times antithetical—to the needs of women from different social classes 
or ethnic backgrounds. So despite its inclusive label, the women’s movement is at the 
service of a very specific class and race of women.   
In the animal protection movement, the label of “animal” engenders similar 
identity problems. As we have seen, not all animals are included in the moral community 
and even fewer animals are included in animal protection laws. Just as the women’s 
movement had been at the service of an exclusive class and race of women historically, 
the animal rights movement has largely been at the service of primates and mammals. 
And just as the interest of middle-class white women might be at odds with the interests 
of women from a different class and race, our moral commitment to primates and 
mammals may be made at the expense of other species of animals.  
Indeed, even the strategy of the animal rights movement is bound up with identity 
issues. Once again, we can borrow insights from feminist discourses. Feminists have 
                                                
107 Medina’s essay, “Disidentification and the Problem of Difference” (2003), offers a succinct account of 
the problem of group identity.   
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identified and critiqued the logic of identification and counter-identification in the 
women’s movement. Specifically, the strategic shift from women-can-do-it-too to 
valorizing the differences between men and women. Neither of these strategies is 
satisfactory: the logic of identification continues to privilege men by casting masculinity 
as the norm, while the strategy of counter-identification is predicated on an oppositional 
thinking that many feminists seek to overturn. As José Medina points out, both strategies 
render the feminist movement “parasitic on a masculinist ideology” (2003, 665). 
In the animal protection movement, we also see the logic of identification and 
counter-identification. Early discourses on animal rights/welfare are dominated by the 
strategy of identification. Animal advocates often stress the likeness between humans and 
animals in order to challenge the hierarchical distinction between the two. This effort is 
twofold. On one level, the “like-us” strategy is employed to call into question human 
exceptionalism. Philosophers cite scientific experiments or observations of animals to 
show that animals—like us—also have the capacity to speak,108 use tools,109 or act 
morally.110 On another level, this “like-us” strategy is employed to expand our moral 
community. Human uniqueness notwithstanding, philosophers argue, there are morally 
relevant qualities that animals share in common with us. It is because of these morally 
relevant qualities—be it sentience or being a subject-of-a-life—that entitle humans and 
animals to the moral community.  
In the past decade, philosophers have begun to challenge this “like-us” strategy in 
                                                
108 See Wise (2002, 207-230); Fellenz (2007, 46). For a general account on how philosophers deal with the 
linguistic divide, see Steiner (2005, 18ff.). 
 
109 See Gruen, (2011, 6ff.) 
  
110 See Shapiro, 2006 
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animal advocacy. Feminist thinkers such as MacKinnon and Kelly Oliver have critiqued 
this strategy through an anti-patriarchy lens. For instance, Oliver writes, “Just as 
feminists ask why women have to be like men in order to be equal, we can ask why 
animals have to be like us to have inherent value. The notion that man is the measure of 
all things is precisely the kind of thinking that justifies exploiting animals, along with 
women and the earth, for his purpose” (2009, 30). As posthumanist philosopher Cary 
Wolfe points out, the strategy of identification reinstates the very human exceptionalism 
that animal advocates reject. Responding to the Great Ape Project, Wolfe writes,  
The model of rights being invoked here for extension to those who are 
(symptomatically) ‘most like us’ only ends up reinforcing the very 
humanism that seems to be the problem in the first place. To put it very 
telegraphically, great apes possess the capacities we posses, but in 
diminished form, so we end up ethically recognizing them not because of 
their wonder and uniqueness, not because of their difference, but because 
they are inferior versions of ourselves, in which case the ethical humanism 
that was the problem from the outset simply gets reinforced and 
reproduced on another level. Now it’s not humans versus great apes, it’s 
humans and great apes—the ‘like us’ crowd—versus everyone else. (2003, 
192)  
 
Wolfe nicely articulates the problem of the logic of identification. But what does it mean 
to ethically recognize animals not in spite of, but because of, their uniqueness and 
difference? Against this strategy of identification, some philosophers have argued for an 
alternative model of animal ethics—one that isn’t predicated on the animal’s likeness to 
us. As we have seen in chapter one, philosophers such as MacKinnon and Laycock have 
argued for the need to listen to animals in their own voice and even their own silence. But 
as I argued there, in order to appreciate animals in their own voice/silence, we need to 
translate their voice/silence into terms intelligible to us; and as long as translation is 
inevitable, we cannot avoid contaminating the voice that is purportedly the animal’s own.  
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Furthermore, if there is anything we could learn from the women’s movement with 
regard to identity politics, shouldn’t we be wary of the oppositional thinking that is 
symptomatic of the logic of counter-identification? Don’t we fall back on the animal-
human binary when we insist that animals should have their own voice—in 
contradistinction to the human voice? 
Despite the familiar strategic movement from identification to counter-
identification, there is a limit to the analogy between the feminist movement and the 
animal protection movement. The very notion of identity seems to impose challenges that 
are unique to the animal protection movement. For one thing, while we can articulate our 
own identities, animals don’t participate in discussions on animal identity. Rather, animal 
identity remains largely a human (and primarily academic) construct. This is not to say, 
of course, that animals don’t negotiate or contest their identities in a non-discursive way. 
Consider, for instance, “Nim Chimpsky,” the chimp who was raised as a human infant 
but was later abandoned to a research facility. In the documentary Project Nim, we see 
Nim asserting his place in his caretaker’s family by repeatedly challenging the paternal 
figure in the family. Nim’s struggle to become the alpha male is a non-discursive way of 
negotiating and contesting his place in the family. Nonetheless, there still seems to be 
something amiss when we engage in a discussion on animal identity without the direct, 
non-human-mediated input from those whose identity is being debated. In other words, 
even if we attend to animals’ non-discursive ways of expressing their identities, the very 
fact that animals require our mediation shows that their participation in the discussion is 
compromised in a significant way. As such, even though feminist discourses on identity 
politics have been instructive, we need to be wary of drawing any easy parallels between 
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the feminist movement and the animal protection movement regarding the identity 
question. Indeed, insofar as human identity is formed both discursively and non-
discursively, perhaps there is no neat analogy we can make between our identity troubles 
and that of the animals.  
Thus far I have delineated the complexity of animal identity in animal ethics 
literature as well as in legal discourses. My analysis is very much informed by Derrida’s 
critique of the term “animal” in The Animal That Therefore I am: insofar as we use 
“animal” as a category that covers all creatures that are non-human, we reduce 
multiplicities, differences, diversities to a man-versus-animal binary. Borrowing from 
discourses on identity politics in the feminist movement, I have shown that neither the 
strategy of identification nor the strategy of counter-identification escape 
anthropocentrism. With Derrida’s deconstructive analysis of the “animal” in mind, I now 
turn to another philosopher who also made significant contribution to the critique of 
essentialism—Ludwig Wittgenstein.  
 
Wittgenstein’s Critique of Essentialism 
In his introduction to Slow Cures and Bad Philosophers, a collection of essays on 
bioethics, Carl Elliott confesses that it is an “uphill battle…for any book that claims to 
find useful guidance from Wittgenstein for bioethics and the practice of medicine” (2001, 
1). The same could be said about an essay on Wittgenstein and animal ethics. It is not that 
animals have never made their way into Wittgenstein’s corpus. Quite the contrary, 
Wittgenstein has dutifully invoked the animals in his writings. Dogs are Wittgenstein’s 
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favorite: dogs have no remorse,111 dogs cannot fake pain,112 and (my favourite of all 
canine references) dogs can neither be hypocritical nor sincere.113 While dogs are clearly 
Wittgenstein’s best friends, let’s not forget about the talking lion (whose words we 
wouldn’t understand),114 the beetle in the box, the duck-rabbit, the goose that has no 
teeth,115 and of course, the rhinoceros that lurks in the room.116 Despite this impressive 
menagerie, it remains an “uphill battle” to conceive of a distinctive Wittgensteinian view 
of animality in general and animal ethics in particular. The difficulty of this “uphill 
battle” arises in part due to Wittgenstein’s rejection of essentialism and his suspicion of 
theory, and especially the highly codified moral rules that are so prevalent in 
contemporary animal ethics literature. (His rejection of essentialism makes any unified, 
singular Wittgensteinian view on the animal suspected.) Another difficulty arises from 
Wittgenstein’s aphoristic writing style; his terse and often cryptic remarks on animals 
have been interpreted in very different—even contradictory—terms. Indeed, Wittgenstein 
has inspired theorists from both sides of the animal protectionist movement;117 his 
                                                
111 1967, 518 
 
112 2009, 250 
 
113 Philosophy of Psychology (in 2009), 363 
 
114 Philosophy of Psychology (in 2009), 327 
 
115 Philosophy of Psychology (in 2009), 314 
 
116 In his obituary of Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell (1951) recounts the story that Wittgenstein refuses to 
“believe” the statement that “There is no hippopotamus in this room at present.” It is interesting that the 
animal in question becomes a hippopotamus in this version of the story. In one of Russell’s letters where he 
recounts the same story, the animal is a rhinoceros. (Monk 1990, 39) 
 
117 R.G. Frey (1980) and Michael Leahy (1991) both use Wittgenstein to advance their anti-liberationist 
stance, while David DeGrazia (1994), Nigel Pheasants (2006), and Wendy Lee-Lampshire (1995) all find 
Wittgenstein helpful for reconceiving our relationship with animals.  
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insights are invoked to advance a wide array of theses regarding the animal.118 Keeping 
in mind that it remains an “uphill battle” to articulate a singular, unified Wittgensteinian 
thesis on the animal, in what follows I will contribute to the family of Wittgensteinian 
scholarship by once again picking up the questions of animal identity and animal 
standpoint. Specifically, I will discuss Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblance” as 
it relates to the problem of difference in identity politics. My discussion is very much 
indebted to José Medina’s 2003 essay, “Identity Trouble: Disidentification and the 
Problem of Difference,” where he articulates a Wittgensteinian response to the problem 
of difference in identity politics.   
Wittgenstein begins his Philosophical Investigations with a critique of linguistic 
essentialism. Linguistic essentialism is the idea (or presupposition) that there is a 
singular, unified account of language. Wittgenstein illustrates the essentialist theory of 
language with a long quote by Augustine; in it, Augustine presents an account of 
language in which words function exclusively as labels of objects. Wittgenstein presents 
Augustine’s view as such: “In this picture of language we find the roots of the following 
idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object 
for which the word stands” (§1). For instance, the word “table” refers to the four-legged 
wooden furniture on which I place my laptop; the word “cat” signifies the furry, four-
legged animal sitting on the mat; the word “coffee” means the hot, brown liquid I 
consume every morning, and so on. For Wittgenstein, while this conception of language 
is not wrong, it describes linguistic practices too narrowly. For him, words do label 
                                                
118 Wittgensteinian scholars such as Cora Diamond and Stephen Mulhall have contributed important work 
on animal ethics. See Diamond (1978; 2001; 2003), Mulhall (2009). (While Diamond does not explicitly 
invoke Wittgenstein in her 1978 essay “Eating Meat and Eating People,” she does so in “Injustice and 
Animals” (2001). Specifically, she employs Wittgenstein’s notion of “difference in grammar” to articulate 
different senses of justice (119-120).)  
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objects, but this is only one of the many ways words operate, and linguistic functions are 
not reducible to signification. To capture the diversity of linguistic activities, 
Wittgenstein coins the term “language-games” (§23). There are a variety of language-
games: there is certainly the language game of signification where words are used as 
labels. But there are also language games such as irony, jokes, or flirtations—games in 
which words do more than just signification. (Indeed, it would be unfortunate to interpret 
a game of flirtation as a game of signification!)    
  It is in the context of defending his choice of the word “game” in “language game” 
that Wittgenstein presents his famous account of “family resemblance.” There, 
Wittgenstein is responding to the charge that he is “taking the easy way out,” for he has 
not yet provided the “essence of a language-game, and hence of language” (§65). That is, 
he has not yet offered the necessary and sufficient conditions for what we call 
“language.” In response to this charge, Wittgenstein asks us to consider what we call 
“games” (§ 66). We call a wide range of activities “games,” from chess to video games, 
from the Olympics to children playing spontaneously made-up games. While one game 
may share something in common with another game, there is not a singular quality shared 
by all games. For instance, a basketball game and a game of monopoly are both 
competitive games, but not all games are competitive (e.g., solitaire); and while many 
games are governed by well-defined rules or arbitrated by judges, some games are played 
spontaneously (e.g., two children’s chasing turns into racing on their way back from 
school). How should we characterize the similarities that we find in these different 
games—similarities that are shared by some games but not by all games? Wittgenstein 
proposes that we think of these similarities in terms of “family resemblances” (§ 67).  
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If we look at a family portrait, we see certain features shared by some family 
members and other features shared by other family members. (For instance, the sons have 
the same hair color as the father, and the daughters have green eyes like the mother, but 
all the children are over 6-foot tall, unlike their petite parents, etc.) There is no essential 
feature that defines that family, and yet there are overlapping similarities that we see in 
family members that show that they are a family. For Wittgenstein, different linguistic 
practices are related to each other like family. There are many different language-games, 
and they are grouped together under the label of “language” not because they all share a 
common core, but because they constitute “a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing” (§66).  
It is interesting that Wittgenstein uses the metaphor of family resemblance in his 
account of language. As we have seen previously in chapter three, kinship occupies an 
important place in Heidegger’s account of language. Recall for Heidegger, animal 
utterance and human discourse are distinguished insofar as human discourse is bounded 
by agreement; and the genesis of agreement is found in σύµβολου (symbol). Following 
Aristotle, Heidegger isolates “symbol” as the key ingredient of human discourse. It is 
telling that Heidegger’s interpretation of “symbol” (σύµβολου) hinges on his “guest-
friend” example, where he analogizes the “joining together” of σύµβολου to the joining 
together of the two friendship tokens. For Heidegger, speaking and sociality are 
constitutive of each other. Speaking presupposes “being-with”—our words are 
meaningful because they are bounded by (social) agreement.  
It is important to note that Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance does not 
function in the same way as Heidegger’s example of friendship tokens. For Wittgenstein, 
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family resemblance does not aim at illustrating the social agreement on which meaning is 
found. Rather, Wittgenstein uses this metaphor primarily to contest the essentialism that 
has plagued our concept of language. He aims to show how different language games can 
be grouped together under the same category (family). As such, the “family” in family 
resemblance has little to do with sociality and kinship in Wittgenstein’s account of 
language. Yet, Wittgenstein’s family metaphor remains suggestive insofar as it invites us 
to consider linguistic capacity in relational terms. Indeed, how did we come to acquire 
our social skill and our language skill? Are these two skills entwined or unrelated? But 
just as we play well in certain language-games but are awful at others, we feel at ease in 
some social circles but feel awkward in others. If language-games are structured like 
familial relations (crisscrossing and overlapping each other), then perhaps our ability to 
navigate different language-games is informed and shaped by our ability to navigate 
different social and familial circles. In the end, perhaps we are linguistic beings because 
we are, as it were, social beings.   
Employing Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance, José Medina develops a 
“familial view of identity” (2003, 659 ff.). He argues that thinking of identity in familial 
terms enables us to “dissolve” the problem of difference in group-identity (i.e., the view 
that group identity necessarily obscures internal differences). In his view, insofar as our 
identities crisscross and overlap one another like family relations, identity necessarily 
presupposes differences and heterogeneities. Indeed, just as each one of us belongs to 
more than one family, each one of us also belongs to multiple identity groups. And just as 
being a member of a family does not mean we are identical to our sisters, brothers, and 
parents, our membership to each of these identity groups does not require us to be 
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homogenous to other group members. Rather, we are able to identify with a group 
because we can emphasize the common features against the backdrop of our differences 
with other group members. To use Medina’s term, we are willing to be “blinded” to the 
differences for the purpose of identifying with a group. Conversely, we are willing to be 
“blinded” to the similarities for the purpose of counter-identifying with a group.  
Central to Medina’s argument is the strategy of disidentification, the strategy that 
“brings both similarities and differences simultaneously to bear on one’s identity” (2003, 
664). Unlike the strategies of identification and counter-identification, disidentification is 
“a way of identifying with the members of a family without losing sight of one’s 
differences with them, or a way of counter-identifying with the members of other families 
while seeing one’s similarities with them” (2003, 664). As such, disidentification serves 
as a crystalizing occasion where “our sight is restored and we are no longer blind to our 
differences from our family members and our similarities to members of other families” 
(2003, 664). In other words, disidentification elucidates the multiplicity that is inherent in 
group-identity. Importantly, disidentification does not premised on the binary logic 
wherein identity and difference are viewed as incompatible or opposites. Rather, the 
strategy of disidentification presupposes that identity and difference are constitutive of 
each other.119 
Although Medina is primarily concerned with human identities, his argument is 
instructive for considering animal identities. If we take seriously Medina’s point that 
                                                
119 For a relevant discussion on the problem of difference and identity politics, see Wendy Lee-Lampshire 
(1995). In it, Lee-Lampshire articulates a brand of ecofeminism in the Wittgensteinian vein. Specifically, 
she argues that Wittgenstein’s “naturalistic” conception of subjecthood is helpful for those who seek to 
articulate a feminist standpoint but are wary of the essentialist baggage that often comes with standpoint 
theory. In her view, a Wittgensteinian-inspired ecofeminist standpoint “takes as its point of departure the 
complexities and dissonances which characterize the bio-psycho-social positions occupied by thing” (1995, 
99). For her, such a “standpoint” is not a unified position; rather, it recognizes conflicts and differences as 
its inherent and ineliminable quality. 
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identity and difference are not opposites, then perhaps we can begin to make sense of the 
plethora of differences—and similarities—within the category of what we call the 
“animal.” There are indeed differences within the animal kingdom. Just as the category of 
“language” is constituted by different linguistic practices, the category of “animal” is 
made up by a network of overlapping and crisscrossing subgroups. (We can think of each 
of these subgroups as a family unit.) The most typical way to catalogue these subgroups 
is to divide them according to species membership. However, classifying animals 
according to their species is only one way of doing taxonomy. Once we move beyond 
species and begin to consider different categories, it becomes clear that animals can 
belong to multiple overlapping and crisscrossing subgroups/families. There are many 
different ways to define a family: there can be a family of deceptive animals, a family of 
timid animals, or a family of playful animals. A swan and a gibbon clearly belong to 
different species and inhabit different environments, yet they both belong to the family of 
monogamous animals. A bat, a dragonfly, and a jellyfish all belong to the family of 
carnivores despite their obvious differences. In other words, once we consider family 
units beyond the typical species tags, we begin to see that seemingly disparate animals 
can be brought together as a group, as a family. The crisscrossing, overlapping feature 
highlights the heterogeneity of group members. Assigning a swan and a gibbon to the 
identity group of “monogamous animal” is not to say that they are homogenous—it just 
means that we focus on a particular feature that they share in common (i.e., monogamous 
behavior) against the backdrop of their differences. As such, differences are inherent in 
each identity group. 
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Given the metaphor of “family,” we can even begin to consider our relationship 
with animals in familial terms. Some species of animals are our more immediate families, 
whereas some species of animals are our more distant cousins. Surely, some species of 
animals may be so distant from us that we don’t even recognize them as part of our 
family. But insofar as our extended family is connected to us via a network of 
“immediate” relationships, we cannot rigidly demarcate our family, and we must always 
be ready to accept new family members. Indeed, the overlapping and crisscrossing 
character of family resemblance suggests that we may be kin to the most unexpected 
creatures. We may be closer to our seemingly distant relatives than we ever imagine.120  
At this juncture, it is important to consider the promises—as well as the limits—
of the family metaphor. Articulating our relationship with animals in familial terms opens 
up a different way of thinking about our responsibilities to them. Specifically, it allows us 
to speak of obligations in relational terms. It allows us to speak of our responsibilities to 
animals in terms of our kinship with them and not necessarily their rights against ours. 
After all, we feel obligated to our family members not because they can lay claims on us, 
but because we care about our family. (In fact, we think there is something amiss if a 
father tells his children that he takes care of them because they have the rights to be fed, 
clothed, and sheltered; rather than because he loves them.) As mentioned above, the 
overlapping and crisscrossing feature of family resemblance makes it difficult for us to 
demarcate our family, thus complicating the issue of to whom we respond, and for whom 
are we responsible. Furthermore, the nearly limitless ways we can define a family also 
suggests that our responsibility to other animals is infinite, perhaps even akin to a 
                                                
120 Apart from our closest DNA relatives—chimpanzees and other primates, we can be kin to bees and ants 
insofar as we all belong to the family of creatures with structured social hierarchy.  
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Derridian hyperbolic ethics—an unconditional, impossible, more Kantian-than-Kant 
ethics. Such hyper ethics is a reminder that we must be vigilant of our obligations to other 
creatures. That is, we can never say, with certainty, that we are not responsible to such 
and such animals because they are not our family. Insofar as the boundary of a family is 
porous and uncertain, our familial responsibility is also plastic and open-ended.  
Despite its appeal, the family metaphor is not without its drawbacks. For one 
thing, despite its fluid and malleable boundary, this metaphor remains reliant on the logic 
of exclusion and inclusion. Paradoxically, even though we may belong to multiple 
families, we are necessarily excluded from multiple (indeed infinite) families. Insofar as 
the marking of a family involves identifying non-family members, the metaphor of 
family remains faithful to the exclusionary logic that has hitherto defined our relationship 
with animals. But the family metaphor is also problematic because not even a family is 
immune to violence. In fact, sometimes a family breeds and harbors the most insidious 
and unspeakable violence. As we know, victims of domestic violence are often the least 
willing to speak up against their aggressor. When violence does happen in a family, it 
often goes unpunished. Worse still, family violence is sometimes not even recognized as 
violence (or punishable violence). For instance, up until 1970s, spousal rape was not 
considered a crime in most states in the US. Even though now all 50 states have 
criminalized spousal rape, spousal rape is still not treated as equal to non-spousal rape. 
Specifically, some states recognize spousal rape as a crime only if the aggressor used or 
threatened to use force (Tennessee, for example, recognizes spousal rape as rape only if 
the aggressor was armed, carried a credible decoy, or if the victim is seriously injured). 
Such additional clauses make it more difficult for spousal rape to count as rape.  
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But perhaps we should not be surprised that family is not immune to violence—
perhaps this violence even speaks the truth of the animal family. After all, as long as 
carnivores feast on their preys, as long as a cat’s favourite pastime involves terrorizing 
the squirrels, we cannot eradicate violence in the family of animals. As such, while the 
family metaphor opens up a space for us to speak of obligations in relational terms, it 
does not allow us to escape violence. 
 
Returning to Derrida: Literal and Metaphoric Confinement 
The inescapable violence in the animal family brings us back Derrida’s critique of the 
name “animal” in The Animal That Therefore I Am. As we have seen, Derrida argues that 
every time we use “animal” in the singular we are complicit in a “veritable war of the 
species” (2008, 31). Thus far I have focused on the problem of difference in this chapter. 
But in Derrida’s reading, the danger of the name “animal” in the singular goes beyond its 
homogenizing effect. In The Animal, Derrida tells us that this category of “the animal” 
enables us to “corral a large number of living beings within a single concept” (2008, 32). 
Derrida uses the word “corral” to evoke the image of animal captivity; and a couple of 
pages later he makes this image more vivid by speaking of this “catch-all concept” as a 
“confinement” and “encampment” (2008, 34). For Derrida, the definite article (“the 
animal”) serves as a “strict enclosure” within which we corral different animals (2008, 
34). But what kind of “enclosure”? Derrida gives a list of examples: “a virgin forest, a 
zoo, a hunting or fishing ground, a paddock or an abattoir” (2008, 34). Derrida’s list is 
surely dominated by instances of animal captivity that are at the service of human 
exploitation (zoo, hunting ground, abattoir). The slippage from the metaphoric enclosure 
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(the definite article) to the literal enclosures that typify our treatment of animals is telling. 
It suggests that the violence of reductive naming cannot be detached from the violence of 
our treatment of animals, and specifically the violence of animal confinement. Indeed, the 
metaphoric confinement (of the concept) and the literal captivity inform and legitimatize 
one another.  
In light of the slippage from the metaphoric to the literal, as well as Derrida’s 
examples of enclosure, it seems that speaking of animals in a single voice always implies 
a certain kind of violence. Nonetheless, it would be a gross omission to overlook the very 
first example of enclosure offered by Derrida—a virgin forest. It is interesting that 
Derrida juxtaposes a virgin forest with various artificial confinements. A virgin forest, 
insofar as it confines, also functions as a natural habitat. An abattoir, on the other hand, is 
an artificial confinement operated for the production of death. The contrast between the 
two perhaps suggests that we can’t even be sure of the nature of a confinement. We can’t 
decide once and for all that a “confinement” is a site of violent exploitation. Indeed, the 
plot thickens when we consider not only the way we speak of, but also the way we speak 
for, animals. While the conceptual confinement of “the animal” is complicit in animal 
exploitation, it is the very same conceptual confinement that allows us to speak for them. 
Ironically, the same “catch-all concept” of animality is also what animal advocates 
employ when they speak for the animals.  
The notion of “confinement” is further complicated in light of Derrida’s 
deconstructive analysis of “hospitality.” In various texts Derrida has articulated the 
ambivalent and even paradoxical traits contained within concept of “hospitality.” First, 
the French word “hôte” is ambivalent—it can mean both “guest” and “host” in English. 
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(In his essay “Hospitality,” Derrida even uses English sometimes to specify which sense 
he meant by “hôte.”) Second, Derrida points out that the Latin root of the word “carries 
its own contradiction...[it is] parasitized by its opposite, ‘hostility,’ the undesirable guest” 
(2000, 3). Given the reversibility between guest and host, hospitality and hostility, it is 
not surprising that Derrida draws the further connection between hospitality and hostage: 
“The one inviting becomes almost the hostage of the one invited, of the guest [hôte], the 
hostage of the one he received, the one who keeps him at home” (2000, 9). The idea that 
the host is held hostage by his guest may seem strange at first glance. But we have 
probably all experienced the awkward moment where our friends (our guests) are staying 
too late and too long at our home. Not wanting to throw anyone out, we are then “held 
hostage” by our own guests, in our very own home. Paradoxically, precisely because we 
are the host that we are ones who are “held hostage”—after all, where else can we go?  
The relationship between hospitality and hostage further complicates the notion of 
“confinement.” Just as a host may be held hostage, a virgin forest may turn into a 
slaughterhouse. This is especially true when we consider the alarming rate of 
deforestation that leads to the loss of natural habitats for millions of species (and the 
deaths resulting from the loss of home). As we have seen, Derrida includes “zoos” in his 
list of examples of confinement. Is the zoo a site of violent exploitation? Or is it a place 
where animals live a long, prosper life? And what about our own home? What happens 
when we welcome our animal companions to our home? Are we holding our cats and 
dogs hostage? Or is it the other way round? (My mother, for example, has not taken any 
long trips in the past 10 years because she couldn’t find someone she trusts to take care of 
the cat. In a sense, the cat is holding her hostage.)   
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In response to the reductive violence of the name “animal,” Derrida coins the 
word “animot”—a neologism that seeks to reestablish plurality in “the animal” (the 
singular). Because “animot” is a homonym of “animaux” (animals in French), “animot” 
is heard as a plural, or more precisely, the plural is heard in the singular.121 In addition to 
the emphasis on plurality, “animot” also contains the word “mot,” the French word for 
“word.” By inserting “mot” into the animal, Derrida is mocking the philosophical cliché 
that posits the human as the speaking animal, the linguistic divide that has hitherto 
deprived animals of words. But “animot” does more than challenge the typical view that 
animals lack language. For it also reminds us that, by depriving animals of language, we 
are at the same time depriving language of animation. In her article, Laurel Peacock puts 
this point nicely as follows, 
The term animot can be thought of as marking an animal invasion of the 
word (mot), in which animal otherness animates language. An animot is an 
animalistic kind of word, and a linguistic kind of animal, attributing 
animation, even agency, to language. Thus on the level of the word, and 
even on the level of the letter, animal otherness can be invited into 
language. (2009, 89-90)     
    
But perhaps it is not exactly an animal invasion of language, as “invasion” seems to 
suggest a transgression of territory. Rather, “animot” seems to uncover the animality that 
had once animated language.122 In fact, even Peacock seems to agree that animality is 
always already part of language, as she immediately reminds us that the first letter of the 
English alphabet is an “iconic transcription of an animal into language”—the alpha of the 
alphabet comes precisely from the representation of an ox’s horn and its triangular face, 
                                                
121 I emphasize “heard” because the uniqueness of “animot” takes effect only when vocalized; and 
accordingly the diversity of animot is manifested only when it is spoken/ heard. (And let’s not forget that 
The Animal was first given as a speech.) 
 
122 Abram offers a helpful account of how human language is indebted to the larger non-human world in his 
book, The Spell of the Sensuous. See especially chapters 3 & 4.   
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upside down.123 Our language is always already indebted to animals. 
 
Silencing the Animot? 
Significantly, the word “animot” is heard as a plural. Insofar as the neologism depends 
on the vibration of our vocal chords to take effect, the diversity of animot is manifested 
only when it is spoken/heard. (And let’s not forget that The Animal was first given as a 
lecture.) Put differently, the inscription must be substituted by the voice for the plurality 
to come through. However, as long as the effect takes place only in speech, only by 
saying it out loud, is Derrida inadvertently privileging speaking? To complicate this 
substitution further, in his lecture Derrida makes the following demand:  
In order not to damage French ears too sensitive to spelling and grammar I 
won’t repeat the word animot too often. I’ll do it several times but each 
time that, henceforth, I say “the animal” [l’ animal] or “the animals” [les 
animaux] I’ll be asking you to silently substitute animot for what you hear. 
(2008, 47)  
 
Given that the plurality of animot hinges upon it being a homonym of animaux, it is 
particularly strange that Derrida asks his audience to “silently substitute” his neologism 
for “animal/animals.” Apart from the technical difficulty of delivering a sound effect in 
silence, Derrida’s reluctance to repeat the word animot is interesting. He declares that he 
does not want to “damage French ears” with his neologism. While Derrida’s feigned 
concern for the “French ears” is meant to be a mockery, the question remains: How can a 
new lexicon deliver its critical force if it could only be “silently substituted”? 
                                                
123 Peacock (90). Indeed, the letter “A” is not the only letter that takes after the animal. The letter “Q” also 
supposedly comes from the representation of a monkey (imagine the tail) (Abram 1996, 101). In Animal 
Lessons, Kelly Oliver makes a similar point regarding the relationship between animals and language by 
noting that “the first ink used was animal blood…some of the first pens were bird quills, and…animal 
figures were some of the first written ‘language’” (2009, 118). Notably, the oldest form of Chinese 
character, the “Bone Oracles,” is inscribed on turtle shells.  
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Furthermore, given that in the history of Western thought the animal is repeatedly posited 
as lacking speech, as silent, what should we make of Derrida’s demand to make a silent 
substitution? Paradoxically, while Derrida’s neologoism hinges on its vocalization to take 
effect, its delivery must be made in silence. 
Issues of substitution continue to multiply when it comes to the translation of The 
Animal, in particular when we consider the fact that the play on homonyms becomes 
effective only in French. There seems to be no English substitute for animot that would 
deliver its playfulness as well as its nuances. Interestingly, in the English translation 
“animot” is left untouched, untranslated—and uncontaminated. While keeping a technical 
and crucial word in its original language seems to be a typical practice in translation, I 
wonder if it also betrays a certain reluctance to interrogate the English lexicon. By 
leaving Derrida’s neologism untranslated, we acknowledge that animot is a singularity 
irreplaceable by any existing English word(s). But it can also mean a missed opportunity 
to expand the existing vocabulary. Is it merely a deferment of an interpretive decision? 
(But doesn’t a deferment also involve a decision?) Or is there perhaps an unwillingness to 
adulterate Derrida’s neologism?  
In This Is Not Sufficient, Leonard Lawlor addresses the issue of purity in 
translation. Responding to Derrida’s confession of his taste for purity in language, Lawlor 
makes the following observation,  
The idioms of a language are what make the language singular. An idiom 
is so pure that we seem unable to translate it out of that language. Derrida, 
we have seen, always connects the French idiom “il faut,” “it is 
necessary,” to “une faute,” “a fault,”…but we cannot make this connection 
between necessity and a fault in English. (2007, 118) 
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Just as the necessity-fault connection cannot be replicated in English, the animot-animaux 
play is exclusive to the French language. With Derrida’s extensive use of word play, 
translation often seems impossible. But this impossibility also reflects a demand that we 
make of translation. It is a demand for preserving purity; that is, the purity of the original. 
Because words carry their own histories and cultures, translation often threatens to 
contaminate the original.    
It is against the backdrop of this demand for purity that Lawlor argues that in 
Derrida’s view “what is most pure in a language…is the very possibility of impurity” 
(2007, 119). Lawlor points out that the ambiguity of idioms renders translation necessary 
even within the same language. In his example, the French idiom “il y va d’ un certain 
pas” could either be about a movement to a place at a certain pace, or about the issue of 
negation; and such undecidability shows that “already in the French, in the one French 
language, there is already translation”  (2007, 119).  But if impurity is at the heart of the 
pure and the original, what should we make of the (alleged) unsubstitutability of animot? 
What is it that we are trying to preserve by keeping the word animot in an English 
translation? If Derrida’s neologism is supposed to showcase the possibility of a linguistic 
disruption, isn’t it ironic that we try to fossilize his word in its original French? Also, 
have we foreclosed the possibility of rejuvenating and complicating the English lexicon? 
And finally, if Derrida’s animot is supposed to be fruitful and multiply (within the 
concept of animality as well as the French vocabulary), have we then inadvertently 
neutered Derrida’s animot? In the end, grafting the word animot in the English translation 
may inadvertently undermine the political significance of Derrida’s neologism. 
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*  *  * 
 
The question of translation brings us back to the question of speaking for animals. 
As I argue in chapter one, the tendency to valorize the voice of animals (by insisting that 
animals should speak for themselves) betrays our fantasy that there is a pure animal voice 
that speaks through us, uncontaminated by human interests. But if impurity is at the heart 
of the pure and the original, then what is this impurity in animal voice? As we have seen 
in this chapter, there are multiple—and conflicting—animal voices. The heterogeneity of 
animal voices makes translation both impossible and inevitable. Translation is impossible 
insofar as this heterogeneity of animal voices is irreducible to a singular interpretation. 
But translation is also inevitable insofar as this multiplicity necessitates our selective 
listening of particular voices. After all, the fact that we cannot capture the multiplicity of 
animal voices does not mean that we hear nothing; rather, it means that what we hear is 
already filtered through our interests and biases. In other words, the impurity in the 
animal voice means that we must decide the undecidable.  
Relatedly, we should also ask, can we speak for ourselves? Do we have a voice 
that we can properly call our own? In his article “Following the Rats: Becoming-Animal 
in Deleuze and Guattari,” Lawlor once again concludes with a reflection on purity and 
language. There, Lawlor examines the experience of auto-affection, specifically whether 
it is “truly ‘auto,’ uncontaminated by any other” (2008, 182). He remarks his experience 
of internal monologue as follows, 
It is an irreducible or essential necessity that the silent words I form 
contain repeatable traits. This irreducible necessity means that when I 
speak to myself, I speak with the sounds of others. In other words, it 
means that I find in myself other voices…there is a memory of 
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multiplicity, of the many voices that are in me. Thus the problem with the 
belief that interior monologue is my own is that others’ voices 
contaminate the hearing of myself speaking. (2008, 183) 
 
If other voices even infect one’s internal monologue, can one still claim a voice to be 
one’s own? As speaking beings, we are always already implicated in a linguistic structure 
not of our own making. (Even “free” speech, of course, employs existing vocabularies 
and is regulated by grammatical rules and conventions.) I argue in chapter one that our 
judicial system requires the mediation of a human delegate when it comes to enforcing 
animal rights. Insofar as the human delegate speaks in legal lingo and not in an animal 
voice, the animal does not speak for itself. However, the practice of speaking for animals 
seems to be symptomatic of the representational structure on which our judicial system 
rests. After all, do we get to speak in our own voice in court? Aren’t most 
plaintiffs/defendants represented by their lawyers? And so long as what we want to say is 
always channeled and regulated through the voices of others (including the rather 
impersonal legal language), what does it still mean to speak in our own voice?  
Issues of translation not only complicate the rhetoric of speaking for animals, they 
also challenge one’s certainty of having a voice of one’s own. But perhaps the dubious 
opposition between purity and contamination is just a different expression of the dubious 
opposition between identity and difference. After all, if there is no identity so pure that it 
escapes difference, then there is also no voice that is purely one’s own, uncontaminated 
by the voices of others. In the end, just as difference is at the heart of Wittgenstein’s 
“family resemblance,” the “hetero” is also at the heart of the “auto.”  
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CHAPTER V 
 
RACIALIZING CRUELTY: DEHUMANIZATION IN THE NAME OF 
ANIMAL ADVOCACY 
 
Almost everything we call ‘higher culture’ is based on the spiritualization and 
intensification of cruelty – this is my proposition; the ‘wild beast’ has not been laid to rest 
at all, it lives, it flourishes, it has merely become – deified.  
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 
 
In 2010, English musician Steven Patrick Morrissey stirred controversy after 
attacking China’s animal welfare record during an interview for The Guardian. In the 
interview, the guitarist, whose second album is titled Meat is Murder, expresses his 
disgust over the Chinese’s treatment of animals as follows: “Did you see the thing on the 
news about their treatment of animals and animal welfare? Absolutely horrific. You can’t 
help but feel that the Chinese are a subspecies” (Armitage, 2010). Anti-racism groups 
such as Love Music Hate Racism immediately censured Morrissey’s remark. The 
spokesperson of the group condemned Morrissey’s remark as “crude racism” and made 
clear that the group can no longer accept Morrissey’s donation unless he rescind his 
comment.   
Although the controversy revolves around the overt racism of Morrissey’s 
remark, the language of “subspecies” is interesting in its own right. Who or what counts 
as a member of this “subspecies”? What is this “proper species” under which the 
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“subspecies” resides? Indeed, what is the ethical-political force of indicting the other as 
“subspecies”? Of course, what Morrissey meant to say is that the Chinese are so 
inhumane in their treatment of animals that they are beneath what we consider proper to 
the human. In other words, by mistreating animals, the Chinese have become less than 
human. Morrissey’s remark—while intended to speak for the animal—curiously invokes 
the human-animal hierarchy. But what is this double movement of speaking for the 
animal while simultaneously resorting to the human-animal hierarchy? How effectively 
can we speak for the animal if we continue to rely on the language of “subspecies” or 
“subhuman”—a language that presupposes human exceptionalism?  
 
*  *  * 
 
Despite the rich connection between race and animality, the intricacy of their 
relationship remains under-theorized. In her essay “Connections: Speciesism, Racism, 
and Whiteness as the Norm,” A. Breeze Harper speaks of the importance of “border 
crossing” in animal studies (2011, 75). She is specifically interested in how speciesism 
and racism are dependent on each other, as well as the way speciesism is invoked to 
protect white identity in popular discourses. While Harper gestures toward a promising 
and important area of inquiry, her short essay does not afford her much room to engage in 
this “border crossing” in a substantial way. This chapter is a response to Harper’s 
invitation to examine the way racism and animality crisscross. But first, it is important to 
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contextualize my argument by examining how racism is typically invoked in the animal 
rights debate.124 
 
Racism and Speciesism: The Analogy Debate 
In Animal Liberation, a book that has now become a classic for the animal liberation 
movement, Peter Singer identifies “speciesism” as the crux of the injustice that defines 
the human exploitation of animals. Interestingly, he makes his case against speciesism by 
way of arguing against racism and sexism. For Singer, to see why denying equal 
consideration to animals is wrong, “we need to see, first, exactly why racism and sexism 
are wrong” (2009, 3; emphasis mine). He proceeds to explain that racism and sexism 
violate the principle of equality insofar as genetically based differences should not affect 
one’s claim to equality. Speciesism, like racism and sexism, violates the principle of 
equality insofar as one’s membership in a particular species should not affect one’s claim 
to equality (2009, 4-6). Singer anchors his argument against speciesism on the 
offensiveness of racism and sexism. The power of this analogy lies precisely in our 
abhorrence of racism and sexism—if we don’t want to be a racist or a sexist, we also 
wouldn’t want to be a speciesist. As such, the animal liberation movement is indebted to 
the civil rights and women’s liberation movements, both in terms of its historical timing 
and its theoretical reliance on the said analogy.  
Although Singer’s analogy has proliferated in animal rights discourse, it is also 
widely contested. Critics are typically concerned with the disanalogy between speciesism 
and racism. For example, Carl Cohen considers the comparison between speciesism and 
                                                
124 While issues of race, gender, and animality are bound up with each other right from the beginning, in 
this chapter I focus on race and imperialism as they crisscross with the animal liberation movement. 
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racism “insidious” (2001, 62). In his view, racism is unjustified because “humans really 
are equal,” whereas speciesism is a “correct moral perspective” insofar as there are 
“morally relevant differences” between humans and other species of animals (2001, 62). 
Leslie Francis and Richard Norman (1978) spell out the “insidiousness” of this analogy 
more explicitly in their critique of Singer. They are specifically concerned with the 
political implications of comparing animal advocacy to the civil rights and women’s 
liberation movements: “the equation has the effect of trivializing those real liberation 
movements, putting them on a level with what cannot but appear as a bizarre 
exaggeration” (1978, 527; emphasis mine). Indeed, animal suffering and human suffering 
seem so incomparable that the comparison of the two is often deemed offensive. In 2009, 
Germany’s High Court ruled against an ad campaign run by People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals (PETA) that involved a comparison of animals in the 
slaughterhouse to Jews in concentration camps. The rationale for banning the ad 
campaign was that it “would have made the fate of the victims of the Holocaust appear 
banal and trivial.”125  
While it is certainly important to consider the political implications of the 
comparison between racism and speciesism, this will not be the focus of this chapter. In 
fact, the way animal rights theorists have dealt with the question of racism seems rather 
limited—when the issue of racism is broached, it is often in the context of the analogy 
debate. It is as if the question of racism were relevant to animal ethics only insofar as it 
showcases the wrongness of speciesism. (Or, in the case of Singer’s critics, the question 
of racism is raised only to illustrate the weakness of Singer’s analogy.) It is against the 
                                                
125 “High Court Rules Against PETA Holocaust Ad Campaign” in The Local: German News in English. 
March 26, 2009. http://www.thelocal.de/national/20090326-18261.html 
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backdrop of this standard (and narrow) way of dealing with the question of racism in the 
rights discourse that I situate my analysis. I want to consider the link between racism and 
animal advocacy that goes beyond the analogy debate.  
Outside the rights discourse, ecofeminists have offered alternative analyses of the 
relationship between racism and animal advocacy. In her essay on the Makah whale hunt, 
Greta Gaard (2001) examines the tension between ecofeminists’ commitments to whales 
and their respect for the Makah tradition. She presents the dilemma by asking: “how do 
we voice our dissent about the oppressive features of traditional cultural practices in a 
way that does not reinscribe colonialism, enhancing divisions within the tribe for our own 
commercial or political purposes?” (2001, 18). That is, what should ecofeminists do 
when their ecological commitment appears to be at odds with their anti-colonial 
sensibility? Gaard articulates the connection between racism and advocacy not by 
analogizing racism and speciesism, but by showing that animal advocacy may actually be 
complicit in racism and colonialism.  In a similar vein, Cathryn Bailey examines the link 
between animal advocacy and white identity. In her 2007 essay “Africa Begins at the 
Pyrenees,” Bailey points out that moral indignation over bullfighting has become a trope 
that demarcates the “civilized” and the “uncivilized.” The rhetoric against bullfighting is 
imbued with the racist and colonialist language:  
It has often been argued that bullfighting was further proof that Spain was 
actually more Eastern than Western, or more African than European. 
According to Adrian Shubert, “The true horror of the bullfight was that it 
turned Spaniards from Europeans into Africans. . . . The bullring brought 
Spaniards down to the level of the Moors, and the bullfight was nothing 
more than an ‘African ferocity’” (2007a, 31) 
 
Relatedly, in another 2007 essay Bailey examines the connection between diets 
and the production of racial identity (2007b). She points out, for example, that fetishism 
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for ethnic food has become a way for middle-upper class whites to redefine their 
whiteness. By adopting exotic ethnic food or alternative diets, middle-upper class whites 
can rearticulate their identity as a “special” whiteness; specifically, they distinguish 
themselves from other “reviled suburban” whites, whose unsophisticated palates render 
them quite content with supermarket frozen meals and chain restaurants. Her analysis 
reveals that one’s identity (including racial identity) is intimately tied to one’s diet. 
Both Gaard and Bailey showcase a fruitful way to reconsider the connections 
amongst race, racial identity, vegetarianism, and animal advocacy. Specifically, they are 
both attuned to the danger of the ways animal rights rhetoric or practices may reinscribe 
white privileges. My analysis of racism and animal advocacy in this chapter is similar to 
Gaard’s and Bailey’s approach insofar as I, too, am concerned with the numerous ways 
animal rights rhetoric may be used in the service of racist discourse. But my analysis also 
differs from theirs—I am particularly concerned with how the human-animal hierarchy 
reasserts itself as animal advocacy and racist discourses crisscross. I introduced this 
chapter with the Morrissey controversy because it helpfully highlights two issues that I 
want to examine: 1) the intersection between racist discourses and animal advocacy, and 
2) the ironic presupposition of human superiority in animal advocacy. As I will show in 
this chapter, these two issues are intimately connected. 
 
Animalization as Dehumanization 
It is no news that racist discourse often invokes the animal. The Jews were called 
“vermin,” while Africans have been compared to apes or monkeys. Racist rhetoric often 
highlights the danger and foreignness of the others by associating them with animals. The 
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2009 swine flu epidemic offers another good example here: during the early phase of the 
outbreak, Israeli Health Minister Yakov Litzman complained that the reference to pigs is 
“offensive” to both Islam and Judaism, and that “swine flu” should be renamed “Mexican 
flu.”126 The easy slippage between “swine” and “Mexican” is far from innocuous. By 
suggesting that the two are substitutable, it highlights the otherness of Latino 
Americans—they are so other that they could be a different species. Furthermore, as 
physician Stanley Aronson points out, assigning geographic names to communicable 
diseases segregates the world into the “contaminated and the “uncontaminated” (2010). 
And such line drawing is informed by a “racism which [. . .] is prompted by the inchoate 
fear that the third world is intent on sending both its uneducated young and its threatening 
pathogens to seek shelters on our pristine shores” (2010). Indeed, the swine flu outbreak 
fueled discussions on border control; and anti-immigrant groups predictably exploited the 
epidemic to push their agenda. For instance, conservative commentator Michelle Malkin 
blogged on her website that “the spread of contagious diseases from around the world 
into the U.S. [is] a result of uncontrolled immigration.”127 Talk show host Michael 
Savage warned his listeners that the swine flu could be a terrorist conspiracy, as virus-
carrying Mexicans were marching across the US border as humanoid biological 
weapons.128 The slippage between “swine” and “Mexican” feeds the racist imagination 
                                                
126 BBC News, April 27, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8021301.stm 
 
127 http://michellemalkin.com/2009/04/25/hey-maybe-well-finally-get-serious-about-borders-now/  
 
128 “Amid Swine Flu Outbreak, Racism Goes Viral” http://rss.msnbc.msn.com/id/30467300/ 
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whereby the foreigners are crossing borders to take over our land, much like the swine is 
crossing the species borders to take over our body.129  
Dehumanization is typically achieved by animalizing the other. Calling a person 
by an animal name or comparing that person with an animal is injurious because it is 
intended to strip the person of the dignity that is proper to the human. More importantly, 
animalizing a person makes treating the person like an animal seem justified.130 The 
strategy of animalizing the other is certainly informed by the human-animal divide. 
Animalization is viewed as “dehumanizing” because being human means not being an 
animal. In other words, dehumanization derives its power from the human-animal 
hierarchy that is already in place.  
The swine/Mexican flu example shows that animalization has become a typical 
tactic by which immigrants are racialized; there is an ineliminable link between 
animalization and racialization. In their essay “Le Pratique Sauvage: Race, Place, and the 
Human-Animal Divide,” Elder et al. (1998) identify three major ways that the animal 
body has been used as a tool of dehumanization. The first two are familiar: people are 
dehumanized when they are either being treated like an animal, or when they are being 
compared to an animal (e.g., colonialists imputed a similarity between the bone structures 
of Africans and apes). The third way is particularly interesting: Elder et al. argue that 
people are dehumanized when their treatment of animals is being scrutinized as savage 
and uncivilized (1998, 82 ff.). Using five different case studies, Elder et al. show that 
                                                
129 In his infamous diatribe against a Mexican teenager who was accused of incest with his sister, Judge 
Gerald Chargin compares the teenager (as well as Mexican people more generally) to an animal: “You are 
just an animal. You are lower than an animal. Even animals don’t do that. You are pretty low [. . .] Mexican 
people, after 13 years of age, it’s perfectly all right to go out and act like an animal” (Lopez 2003, 84). 
 
130 In a recent paper, Lisa Guenther (forthcoming) offers a provocative analysis of solitary confinement as a 
means of dehumanization. Her analysis complicates the notion of what it means to be “treated like an 
animal.” 
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animal cruelty has been used by dominant group to racialize and marginalize immigrant 
groups. Specifically, the dominant group calls attention to the otherness of immigrants 
not by presenting them as beasts, but by presenting them as “people-acting-beastly 
toward animals” (Elder 1998, 82). Focusing on the ways subaltern  “animal practices” 
(what we do to the animal bodies) become the site of racial conflicts, Elder et al. 
complicate the link between animalization and racialization. While in their paper Elder et 
al. focus primarily on immigrants and minorities born in the U.S., their argument is also 
instructive for the larger international context. Following and building on the insights of 
Elder et al., I show that The Cove, a 2009 documentary, unwittingly reinscribes the 
human-animal binary despite its effort to advocate for the animal. 
 
Case Study: The Cove 
The Cove received considerable attention for capturing footage of dolphin slaughtering in 
Taiji, a remote Japanese fishing village. Even though it was the gruesome footage that 
made the film famous, a major part of the film is devoted to the making of the footage. In 
one interview, director Louie Psihoyos notes that the “making-of” portion of the 
documentary is reminiscent of a thriller:131 the covert mission of capturing the footage 
was planned in a closed hotel room, performed in the dark, facilitated by various decoys, 
and chronicled by a military infrared camera. This environmental Mission Impossible is 
peppered with high-tech props such as camouflage, hydrophones, thermal-grade cameras, 
and even “rock cams” (fake rocks that hold the secret cameras). But one element that 
makes The Cove a classic thriller—an element that Psihoyos neglects to mention—is the 
                                                
131 “Dolphin Confidential: Docu-Thriller ‘The Cove’ Exposes Slaughter.” 
http://www.documentary.org/content/dolphin-confidential-docu-thriller-cove-exposes-slaughter 
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hero-villain opposition. If the supposed “hero” in the film is the team of dolphin activists, 
the “villains” of this thriller are those who support the dolphin-fishing business. Unlike 
the high-tech activists, the Japanese fishermen are portrayed as barbaric and dangerous. 
In one particularly memorable scene, a Japanese fisherman kills the dolphins in the cove 
by stabbing them repeatedly with a spike as the seawater turns from blue to a deep red.132 
Following Elder et al.’s analysis, we see that the dolphin bodies are employed to 
marginalize the Japanese fishermen as the moral underclass. The brutal death that the 
Japanese fishermen inflict upon the dolphins is indicative of their otherness. The 
Japanese fishermen are portrayed in the documentary as cruel and violent—and the 
harpooning-dolphins-to-death scene at the end makes them look particularly “savage.” 
The main activist, Ric O’Barry, implicates the Japanese mafia as the supporter and 
beneficiary of the dolphin fishing business, thereby imputing the image of gangster 
violence to the Japanese fishermen as well. As Elder et al. point out, the dehumanization 
that is operative goes beyond treating the subaltern group (in this case the Japanese 
fishermen) as animals; it also goes beyond attributing likeness between the group and the 
animal. Rather, the dehumanization of these Japanese fishermen is achieved precisely by 
pitting them against the animal. It is their practice with respect to the animal that 
alienates them from the dominant group.  
For Elder et al., the shift to practice is distinctive of the postcolonial and 
postmodern epoch. They argue that this shift results from “radically changing time-space 
relations that epitomize postmodernity” (1998, 81). The compression of space “brings 
visible difference ‘home’ instead of restricting it to a distant, exotic colonial space” 
(1998, 82). That is, whereas in the colonial past the “us” and “them” were geographically 
                                                
132 This scene is found in a DVD version of The Cove, Video On Demand from Amazon. 
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segregated, in postmodern times the “us” and “them” are often dwelling in the same 
place, due to the hyper-mobility of globalization. As such, the exotic practices of the 
foreigners are no longer fantastical stories that one reads from a missionary’s journal, but 
realities that one must confront. In the case of The Cove, the slaughtering of the dolphins 
take place in a distant Japanese village, but the compression of space remains operative 
as the documentary brings this “exotic” practice to the home of the American audience. 
Or, more precisely, The Cove brings to light the “exotic” practice behind the seemingly 
innocuous American pastime—dolphin entertainment at various water parks such as the 
SeaWorld.       
While the changing time-space relation certainly offers a good explanation for 
this new focus on animal practice, the postmodern challenge to the centrality of the 
human should not be overlooked.133 The project of decentering the human subject that 
characterizes the postmodern movement disrupts the place of the human as well as the 
way we interpret the world. But if the human were defined against the animal, then the 
displacement of the human would also muddle the human-animal hierarchy. Our 
heightened sensitivity to the treatment of animals is reflective of the postmodern, 
posthumanist skepticism toward anthropocentrism—the infrastructure that has hitherto 
grounded our relation with animals. In a sense, the animal turn in academia and the 
proliferation of public discourse on animal welfare are indicative of our posthumanist 
sensibilities. But as we will see, even the disavowal of anthropocentrism continues to rely 
on anthropocentrism. It is important to consider the following questions: Are we actually 
disrupting the human-animal hierarchy by challenging animal practices that we deem 
                                                
133 This point is implicit in Elder’s et al.’s account, but they do not articulate it in their paper. 
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anthropocentric? Or are we in fact reinscribing the human-animal hierarchy in the name 
of animal advocacy?  
 
Beastliness as a Given of the Beasts 
Recall that in The Cove it is the fishermen’s cruelty—their beastly actions—to the 
dolphins that dehumanize them. What does it mean to act “beastly”? And who can be 
called “beastly”? In J.M. Coetzee’s novel The Lives of the Animals, one of the main 
characters Elizabeth Costello speaks of the Nazis as the “beasts”: “by treating fellow 
human beings, beings created in the image of God, like beasts, they have themselves 
become beasts” (2001, 21). It is not uncommon to hear heinous crimes being described as 
“beastly” or “brutal.” Humans become beasts when we treat one another like beasts. But 
do we become beasts by treating beasts like beasts? If we follow Costello’s holocaust 
analogy, it seems that humans also act beastly toward the animals insofar as our treatment 
of the animals is analogous to the Nazis’ crime against the Jews. For her, “beastliness” is 
cruelty. “Beastliness” is antithetical to “humaneness” and ‘humanitarianism.” “Beastly” 
is what we have become if we have failed to act “humanely”—that is, when we have 
failed to act kindly and compassionately. There is an ineliminable link between 
beastliness and cruelty. But then again, who can be called “beastly”?  
In The Animal That Therefore I Am Derrida insists that only men can act 
“beastly.” For him, “[one] can always speak of the bêtise of men, sometimes of their 
bestiality; there is no sense of speaking of the bêtise or bestiality of an animal” (2008, 
64). (Derrida is playing on the etymological connection between “the beast” (la bête) and 
“stupidity” (bêtise) in French.) Just as animals cannot be naked because nudity is just a 
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fact of their lives,134 they cannot be beastly because their beastliness is already a given—
they are supposed to be beastly.135 But if animals are supposed to be beastly, then does it 
make sense to condemn their “cruelty”? Can animals even be “cruel” if their “cruelty” is 
also a given? Significantly, speaking of the “ferocity of man,” Jacques Lacan insists that 
“cruelty implies humanity” (quoted in Derrida 2008, 105). Indeed, we don’t condemn 
animals for chasing, terrorizing, and devouring other creatures. We don’t even condemn 
animals for devouring their young! While we may avert our gaze when we see animals 
attacking and brutalizing one another, we say that this is “nature”—this is what animals 
do. In fact, we may even say that this is good for the environment, good for the 
ecosystem—animal war is the ecological just war. 
That cruelty is a uniquely human trait stems from a common intuition that cruelty 
must be accompanied by the intent to harm. One can be harmed by a natural disaster such 
as a tornado, or an unfortunate automobile accident. But it seems strange to speak of the 
“cruelty” of a tornado (except as a metaphor where the tornado is personified as an 
intending agent), or the “cruelty” of a novice driver. We are unwilling to describe these 
harm-inflicting incidents as “cruel” because we conceive of cruelty as willful actions that 
intend to harm, and it is precisely this intention to harm that renders such actions morally 
blameworthy. Given the importance of intent in our conception of cruelty, the claim that 
only humans can be cruel, it seems, is yet another way to posit that only humans are 
capable of moral deliberation and intentional actions. The claim that “cruelty implies 
humanity” is yet another way to affirm human uniqueness through moral agency. As 
                                                
134 See Derrida (2008, 4-5).  
 
135 Also, if being beastly is what the beasts do, then is being humane what humans do? Put differently, if it 
makes little sense to call a beast “beastly,” does it make sense to laud a human for being “humane”?    
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Kelly Oliver points out, animals occupy the margins of the moral community; they are at 
once “absolutely innocent” and “absolutely monstrous” (forthcoming). Indeed, the two 
poles of these extremes may simply be two sides of the same coin: it is because of the 
absolute monstrosity of animal behaviors (e.g., inbreeding, devouring their own young, 
and attacking other animals) that they are disenfranchised from the moral community. 
Nothing can explain these monstrous behaviors except their violent, uncontrollable 
instincts. But as soon as they are pushed outside the moral community, they become 
absolutely innocent. After all, if animals merely act on their instincts, then they can’t 
really be held accountable for their “monstrous” acts. If animals are supposed to be 
monstrous, if it is natural (instinctual) for them to be monstrous, then their monstrosity 
also serves as a testament to their innocence. Indeed, the more prevalent these 
“monstrous” behaviors, the more natural—and banal—they seem.136 As such, just as 
animals cannot be naked because they are naturally naked, they cannot be cruel because 
they are instinctively cruel.  
Given the link between beastliness and cruelty, the portrayal of the Japanese 
fishermen as heartless dolphin-killers is yet another way to animalize them. While Elder 
et al. have helpfully distinguished between two mechanisms of dehumanization—
presenting “people-as-beasts” and presenting “people-acting-beastly toward animals”—it 
seems that the distinction collapses in the end. By highlighting the cruelty of the Japanese 
fishermen, the filmmakers have actually presented them as beasts, and their beastliness is 
antithetical to the activists’ humanitarianism. Following Costello, we may say that the 
                                                
136 For an insightful analysis on racism, accountability, and animality, see Peterson (2010). In this essay, 
Peterson analyzes the character of Bigger Thomas in Richard Wright’s 1940 novel Native Son. He argues 
that Bigger is portrayed as both an animal and a human. Bigger is portrayed as an animal insofar as his 
crime seems “natural” and that his actions are “instinctive” (2010, 165).  But insofar as Bigger is held 
accountable for his crime, “the prosecution inadvertently confers a certain humanity in him” (2010, 164). 
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Japanese fishermen have become beasts by treating other beasts like beasts. Ironically, 
the human-animal opposition reasserts itself at the heart of animal advocacy. 
 
The Linguistic Divide in The Cove 
Importantly, linguistic difference also plays a role in buttressing the hero-villain 
opposition in this film. Throughout the documentary, the Japanese fishermen are 
portrayed as barbaric, dangerous, as well as inarticulate. Their communication with the 
activists is, for the most part, confined to poking them with hand-written placards (“Don’t 
Take Photos”) or yelling at them in Japanese to get out of the killing cove. One fisherman 
seems to know only two English words, “Private Space,” and he has repeated these two 
words to the activists long enough that they nicknamed him “Private Space.”  
In a scene where the Japanese police interrogate O’Barry, the linguistic divide is 
even more evident. For one thing, in that scene the dominant voice is that of O’Barry—he 
speaks the loudest and clearest. And while we can also hear the voice of the Japanese 
translator, the two Japanese police sit silently. The effectiveness of the interrogation is 
certainly undermined when the interrogatee appears to be more articulate than the 
interrogators. Furthermore, the filmmakers have dutifully subtitled all the translator’s 
words, presumably because the translator’s accent is nearly incomprehensible. The 
theatrical effect of the subtitles is significant: while O’Barry’s voice seems unmediated 
and directly accessible to the audience, 137  the voice of the interrogators is twice 
removed—it is first deferred by a translator and then the subtitles. The subtitles in this 
scene function as cues to the foreignness and otherness of the supposed villain. 
                                                
137 The target audience of this film is, of course, the English-speaking Westerner. Both the film and the 
DVD of this film was first released the US. 
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Significantly, it is also in this scene where O’Barry brings up the issue of 
speaking for others. When the translator asks O’Barry about the Oceanic Perseveration 
Society (OPS), O’Barry denies ties with the OPS. He adds that he cannot “speak for” the 
OPS. Indeed, he tells the police “I can only speak for Ric O’Barry…I cannot speak for 
anybody except myself.” This is a rather intriguing claim, considering that it comes from 
a dolphin advocate whose mission involves speaking for the dolphin other. Indeed, 
O’Barry’s response brings us back to the question of whether we can speak for others, be 
it fellow activists or dolphins, humans or animals.  
Contra these foot-stomping, chest-butting Japanese fishermen, the activists 
recount the plights of the dolphins movingly and eloquently. They offer both sentimental 
anecdotes and reasoned arguments to persuade us of the horror of the killing cove. In 
fact, even the dolphins seem to speak. In one scene, Director Psihoyos stresses the 
importance of using hydrophones so that they can hear the dolphins, while in a different 
scene O’Barry maintains that “[the dolphins] are always trying to communicate with us” 
and that he can even “read their body language” after spending years living with them. In 
another scene, O’Barry speaks of the death of Kathy, one of the star dolphins in the show 
Flipper. O’Barry maintains (both in the film and elsewhere) that Kathy had “committed 
suicide” in his arms, and that he sees dolphins committing suicide in Taiji. In a NPR 
interview, O’Barry reiterates his view as follows, “I see [the suicide] in the cove, in Taiji, 
almost every day, from September through March. And somebody’s standing next [to] 
me, maybe they don’t see it because they can’t read the dolphins’ body language like I 
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can.”138 But how exactly does this “body language” get translated in human terms? What 
counts as an adequate translation of this “body language”? Where does translation end 
and projection begin? (Can we distinguish the two?) It is striking that the activists seem 
to communicate better with the dolphins than the Japanese fisherman. The language 
barrier, it appears, bifurcates the dolphin-rescuers and the dolphin-killers, heroes and 
villains, good and evil. 
Although the language barrier arises rather innocuously as the activists and the 
fishermen do not have a shared language, it becomes complicit to the mechanism of 
dehumanization. The linguistic divide operates in a similar way as the cruelty-kindness 
divide that we have seen earlier. As we know, throughout the history of Western thought 
the human is posited as the speaking animal, the animal with logos. The 
speaking/reasoning human is defined against the dumb beast. As such, the human-animal 
divide is simultaneously a linguistic divide. Given this philosophical backdrop, the 
portrayal of the fishermen as violent and inarticulate is yet another way to animalize 
them. The filmmakers exploit the language barrier to reinscribe the human-animal 
linguistic divide: whereas the eloquent activists are humanitarians, the inarticulate 
fishermen are cruel dolphin murderers.  
 
Revisiting the Cruelty-Beastliness Link 
My analysis of The Cove reveals that the dolphin activists unwittingly fall back on the 
human-animal opposition in their advocacy for the animal. By portraying the Japanese as 
violent and inarticulate, the filmmakers highlight the two elements that we commonly 
                                                
138 “‘Cove’ Director Surfaces Deep (And Dark) Secrets.” NPR, July 30, 2009. In the documentary, O’Barry 
also explains that dolphins does not breath automatically, and that “every breath they take is a conscious 
effort.” Thus, “They can end their lives whenever life’s become too unbearable” (my emphasis). 
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attribute to the animal. This mechanism of animalization at best marginalizes the racial 
other as the moral underclass and at worst disenfranchises the racial other from the moral 
community. Animalization goes hand in hand with racialization and marginalization.  
But the link between beastliness and cruelty is deeply problematic. As we will 
soon see, this link presents a significant paradox for animal advocates even if they are not 
targeting the “exotic” practices of racial minorities specifically. In chapter one I have 
followed literary scholar Karen Raber’s insightful critique of the “fantasy of the post-
cruel.” Recall in her provocative essay “How To Do Things With Animals,” Raber 
problematizes the wholesale rejection of cruelty that posthumanist animal advocates often 
endorse. In particular, she calls into question a “problematic desire” in animal studies, “a 
desire for a world in which humans and animals live in happy harmony without 
exploitation or abuse” (2008, 100). According to Raber, not only do the post-humanists 
fail to interrogate their own utopianism, they also harbor a “fantasy of the post-cruel” in 
their utopianism, a “desire to eradicate human abuse of animals in all forms” (2008, 106).  
For Raber, this fantasy that we can be cruelty-free is fundamentally at odds with 
the project of the posthumanist. This is so because “to reject cruelty [is] to reject the 
animal that we are—to reinstate human exceptionalism with all its attendant problems” 
(2008, 106). In other words, insofar as cruelty is part of what it means to be an animal, 
the very rejection of cruelty (toward animals) is a disavowal of our animality. Indeed, a 
question that animal advocates often face is why we should respect animals’ rights when 
they don’t respect ours. Why should be we vegetarians when animals hunt and consume 
each other?139 And their response inevitably falls back on some version of human 
                                                
139 For example, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) includes this question on its FAQ. 
http://www.askcarla.com/Q&A-Miscellaneous.asp?CategoryID=2&Category=Misc 
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exceptionalism: insofar as we identify ourselves as moral agents, we are beholden to a 
different—exceptional—moral standard. We can be compassionate even to the most 
vicious predator, and we can adhere to the strictest vegan diet while allowing our cats to 
terrorize other creatures in the backyard. Paradoxically, animal advocacy expresses yet 
another form of human elitism that elevates us above the animal. For Raber, even the 
most radical animal egalitarianism does not escape human exceptionalism.   
Insofar as cruelty is part of what it means to be an animal, animal advocacy and 
its concomitant rejection to animal cruelty remain faithful to the very anthropocentrism 
that they seek to challenge. At the end of her paper, Raber wonders whether it is 
“possible that we need human exceptionalism” in animal ethics (2008, 101). Her point is 
that perhaps we do need this exceptionalism in order to speak of our moral responsibility 
to animals. Perhaps we do need the “violence” of this human exceptionalism so that we 
can curb the literal violence that we inflict on animals. While in the first chapter I 
followed Raber and argued that we cannot avoid speaking for animals, just as we cannot 
avoid human exceptionalism, here I begin to wonder if the link between animality and 
cruelty is not itself problematic.    
Before we resign ourselves to embrace human exceptionalism, perhaps we should 
also reconsider the link between cruelty and beastliness. Is cruelty really a fact of animal 
life, a given of animality? Are all animals predators? Can predators also love? Indeed, 
isn’t the cat that chases and torments the squirrel the very same cat that plays with us? 
Isn’t love or kinship also possible for the most ferocious predator? My point is not to 
romanticize animals and the ugliness of their cruelty, but to challenge the link between 
beastliness and cruelty. It seems that animals—and dare I say like humans—are at once 
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cruel and tender, dangerous and gentle, hostile and affectionate. Before we embrace 
human exceptionalism, perhaps we should first undo the insidious link between 
beastliness and cruelty—a link that has been at the service of racism and colonialism. 
Undoing this link helps animal activists resist animalizing the other in their animal 
advocacy. After all, if cruelty were not linked to the beasts, then the strategy of 
portraying others as “acting-beastly toward animals” would lose its rhetorical force. I end 
my final chapter on this hopeful note.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation began as a response to the rhetoric of “giving a voice to the 
voiceless” in popular animal rights discourse. I was intrigued by the voice/voiceless 
distinction highlighted by this rhetoric; but I was particularly concerned with the 
reinscription of the linguistic divide in animal advocacy—a divide that has long 
safeguarded human uniqueness in the history of philosophy. I thought that the best 
strategy for resisting the human-animal hierarchy would be to problematize and challenge 
this distinction. So, in chapter one, I borrow from feminist discourses to critique the 
problem of speaking for animals as I sketch a relational account of language. This 
account, I hoped, would broaden our conception of the scope of language, and unsettle 
our presumption of what it means to have a voice, and what it means to be voiceless. 
Now, two and a half years and five chapters later, I believe I have achieved the 
primary goal of uncovering and articulating the role of kinship in language. In my third 
chapter, for example, I examine Heidegger’s analysis of “symbol.” I use the image of the 
friendship token in Heidegger’s analysis to highlight the importance of kinship in his 
account of language. I argue further that by denying animals linguistic ability, Heidegger 
is also denying them relational capacity. In chapter four I engage Wittgenstein’s notion of 
“family resemblance.” In my reading, even though the “family” in “family resemblance” 
does not refer to sociality or kinship (but rather the structure of language games), it opens 
up a new way for us to think about our linguistic capacity. That is, our abilities to 
navigate different language games may very well be informed by our abilities to navigate 
different social circles, to explore different identities.   
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While I managed to articulate the importance of kinship in language in different 
chapters, the connections between the two sometimes take unexpected turns. There are 
moments in my dissertation that I had not anticipated when I took up the project initially. 
I want to highlight three of these surprising moments as my way of concluding this 
dissertation.  
First: chapter one begins with a critique of the primacy of rights, which eventually 
leads to a discussion of the problem of speaking for others (specially, the problem of 
speaking for animals). While I draw from feminist critiques regarding speaking for others 
in this chapter, I have come to see that the problem of speaking for women is quite 
different from the problem of speaking for animals. Specifically, the insistence of “letting 
animals speak” or  “appreciating their silence” still does not escape issues of 
interpretation and translation. And insofar as these interpretations and translations are 
human interpretations and translations, they are necessarily shot through with human and 
anthropocentric interests. Indeed, the very rejection of representing animals already 
presupposes a representation of their desires, namely, animals’ desire for self-
representation. Following Raber’s critique of posthumanism, we need to take up the 
responsibility to speak for animals even if it reeks of paternalism and anthropocentrism.   
Second: at the end of chapter two I discuss the presence of Freud’s dog during 
analysis. I compare Freud’s dog (who seems to take on the role of a therapy dog) to 
courthouse dogs that serve as “testimony enablers” in the United States. The use of these 
courthouse dogs gives the “giving a voice to the voiceless” rhetoric a surprising twist: 
these dogs are giving a voice to young witnesses who are otherwise too timid to speak. 
Indeed, they give them a voice not by speaking for them, but by walking up to them, 
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nudging them, or staying close to them physically—in short, by relating to them. As 
these witnesses are often victims of sexual abuse, we may say that the courthouse dogs 
“give voice” to them by reaffirming the victims’ status as social, relational beings. This 
flies in the face of the linguistic divide that has long upheld human uniqueness and 
exceptionality: for these witnesses wield the power to speak not by setting themselves in 
opposition to the dumb animals, quite the contrary. At the end, perhaps we are linguistic 
beings only because we are, first and foremost, relational and social beings.  
Freud’s therapy dog and contemporary courthouse dogs challenge us to rethink 
the rhetoric of “give voice to the voiceless.” It also challenges my own assumption of this 
rhetoric. My concern with this rhetoric is that it reinscribes the voice/voiceless binary, as 
it still valorizes the capacity to speak and the having of a voice. But the courthouse dogs 
show us that they can give voice to us without speaking for us. Indeed, the courthouse 
dogs seem to accomplish what remains a fantasy for animal advocates—the fantasy of 
having the powerless speak for themselves. Whereas animal advocates cannot avoid 
representing animals even in the most radical disavowal of representation, the courthouse 
dogs help us speak without having to utter a word.  
Third: Courthouse dogs also challenge my investment in the family metaphor in 
my account of language. I first learned about the use of courthouse dogs from a New York 
Times article, where Rosie (a courthouse dog) helped a 15-year-old teenager testify 
against her father, who had raped and impregnated her. I have focused primarily on the 
relationship between the dog and the victim in this story, as well as its implication for the 
rhetoric of “giving a voice to the voiceless.” Nonetheless, even though Rosie is clearly 
the star of the story, I cannot overlook the fact that the teenager needed Rosie in part 
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because she had to confront her own father, her own family. And even though Rosie gave 
this teenager a voice by reaffirming her social, relational being, I cannot overlook the fact 
that it was the father who robbed the teenager of her voice in the first place by treating 
her as a mere thing. In light of this, in chapter four I examine the limits of the family 
metaphor. As I show there, sometimes a family breeds the most insidious and 
unspeakable violence: most insidious because family violence is often not even 
recognized as violence, most unspeakable because victims of domestic violence are often 
unwilling or unable to confront their aggressors. But if family is not immune to violence, 
what does it mean to have a philosophy of language that gives primacy to kinship and 
relationality? Perhaps this suggests that language is also not immune to violence, 
especially when we consider the violence of translation and the violence of speaking for 
others. In the end, perhaps the worst violence is the fantasy that we, as living beings, 
could live without violence. And accordingly, the worst violence in language is the 
fantasy that we play, as linguistic beings, a post-violence, cruelty-free language game.  
I have highlighted three moments where my own arguments take me across 
unexpected terrain. These moments challenge my own assumptions with regard to animal 
advocacy and the family metaphor. In a sense, they expose some of the limitations of my 
own thinking. Nonetheless, I hope they also serve as invitations for further inquiry on 
issues of language and violence in animal ethics.   
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